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Abstract 
Information security is one of the concerns any organization or person faces. The 
list of new threats appears, and information security management mechanisms 
have to be established and continuously updated to be able to fight against possi-
ble security issues. To be up to date with existing information technology threats 
and prevention, protection, maintenance possibilities, more significant organiza-
tions establish positions or even departments, to be responsible for the information 
security management. However, small and medium enterprise (SME) does not 
have enough capacities. Therefore, the information security management situation 
in SMEs is fragmented and needs improvement. 
In this thesis, the problem of information security management in the small 
and medium enterprise is analyzed. It aims to simplify the information security 
management process in the small and medium enterprise by proposing concen-
trated information and tools in information security management framework. Ex-
istence of an information security framework could motivate SME to use it in 
practice and lead to an increase of SME security level. 
The dissertation consists of an introduction, four main chapters and general 
conclusions. The first chapter introduces the problem of information security 
management and its’ automation. Moreover, state-of-the-art frameworks for in-
formation security management in SME are analyzed and compared.  
The second chapter proposes a novel information security management 
framework and guidelines on its adoption. The framework is designed based on 
existing methodologies and frameworks.  
A need for a model for security evaluation based on the organization’s man-
agement structure noticed in chapter two; therefore, new probability theory-based 
model for organizations information flow security level estimation presented in 
chapter three.  The fourth chapter presents the validation of proposed security 
evaluation models by showing results of a case study and experts ranking of the 
same situations.  The multi-criteria analysis was executed to evaluate the ISMF 
suitability to be applied in a small and medium enterprise. In this chapter, we also 
analyze the opinion of information technology employees in an SME on newly 
proposed information security management framework as well as a new model 
for information security level estimation.  
The thesis is summarized by the general conclusions which confirm the need 
of newly proposed framework and associated tools as well as its suitability to be 
used in SME to increase the understanding of current information security threat 
situation.     
 vi 
Reziumė 
Informacijos sauga yra viena iš problemų, su kuriomis susiduria tiek šiuolaikinės 
organizacijos, tiek ir individualūs asmenys. Kadangi nuolat atsiranda naujų 
saugos grėsmių, tai informacijos saugos užtikrinimas privalo būti vykdomas ir 
atnaujinamas nuolat. Dėl šios srities sudėtingumo didesnėse organizacijose 
steigiamos papildomos darbo vietos ar net padaliniai. Tačiau dėl savo ribotų 
resursų mažas ir vidutinis verslas ieško priemonių, kurios leistų ir ne saugos, o 
pavyzdžiui informacinių technologijų specialistui, įsisavinti šią sritį. 
Šioje disertacijoje analizuojama informacijos saugos valdymo problematika 
mažame ir vidutiniame versle. Darbo tikslu išsikeliama supaprastinti informacijos 
saugos valdymo procesą mažame ir vidutiniame versle, susisteminant reikiamas 
žinias ir pasiūlant įrankius informacijos saugos valdymo karkase. Pasiūlytas 
informacijos saugos valdymo karkasas leis ir ne informacijos saugos ekspertams 
perprasti organizacijai kylančias saugos grėsmes ir skatins didinti organizacijos 
saugos lygį. 
Disertaciją sudaro įvadas, keturi pagrindiniai skyriai ir bendrosios išvados. 
Pirmajame skyriuje apibrėžiama informacijos saugos valdymo problema, 
apžvelgiami egzistuojantys informacijos saugos valdymo karkasai ir galimi taikyti 
įrankiai. 
Antrame skyriuje siūlomas naujas informacijos saugos valdymo karkasas, 
kuris remiasi egzistuojančiomis gerosiomis praktikomis ir egzistuojančiomis 
metodikomis.  
Kadangi antrame skyriuje nustatyta, kad organizacijos valdymo struktūros 
modeliavimui ar vertinimui saugos atžvilgiu įrankių nėra, siūlomas naujas 
tikimybių teorija paremtas modelis. Šis modelis leidžia įvertinti informacijos 
srauto saugumo lygį duomenų konfidencialumo, prieinamumo ir vientisumo 
atžvilgiais ir yra aprašytas trečiame skyriuje. 
Ketvirtame skyriuje aprašomas pasiūlytų modelių taikymo eksperimentas, 
kurio rezultatai lyginami su ekspertų įvertinimais. Atlikta daugiakriterinė analizė, 
kuri leidžia nustatyti informacijos saugos valdymo karkaso tinkamumą taikyti 
mažoje ir vidutinėje įmonėje. Šiame skyriuje taip pat analizuojama, ar pasiūlytas 
informacijos saugos valdymo karkasas yra suprantamas  mažo ir vidutinio verslo 
atstovams.  
Disertacija apibendrinama bendrosiomis išvadomis, kurios patvirtina 
informacijos saugos valdymo karkaso ir su juo siejamų įrankių poreikį bei jų 
tinkamumą mažo ir vidutinio verslo informacijos saugos rizikų pilnesniam 
suvokimui. 
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Notations 
Symbols 
BSj – BSj is modified CVSS base score for vulnerability j 
conf – employee confidentiality level coefficient for node 
IMPACTconf  – confidentiality impact value 
IMPACTInteg – integrity impact value 
IMPACTAvail – availability impact value 
ISCBase – modified CVSS v3.0 base score   
nlj – data leakage likelihood value for threat j 
Pa() – channel accessibility by external attacker 
PAn() – receiver’s availability  
PAN() – probability that the version is available in at least one of nodes which stores the 
version of information object 
PAs() – receiver’s storage availability  
PAt() – probability of data availability in transfer channel  
PAv() – versions availability 
PAv-1() – previous versions availability 
PC() – object data leakage probability 
PCn() – the probabilities of data leakage in a node  
 viii 
PCt() – data leakage probability in transfer between enterprise nodes 
PIf() – the integrity of information flow 
PIh()  – integrity corruption probability by its user (human factors) in node  
PIs() –  integrity corruption probability while storage in node  
PIt() – integrity corruption probability during transfer between two nodes 
PIv() – integrity of objects version 
Pr() – attack probability against this type of enterprise 
 
 
Abbreviations 
AHP – analytic hierarchy process 
BPMN –  Business Process Model and Notation 
PE-BPNM –  privacy-enhanced extensions to the BPMN 
CISO –  Chief Information Security Officer 
COBIT –  Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies 
EAAT –  Enterprise Architecture Analysis Tool  
CySeMoL –  The Cyber Security Modeling Language (an extension to the EAAT) 
EMS – enterprise management structure 
ENISA – European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
ETTIS –  European security trends and threats in society 
IT – information technologies 
ITC – information technology and communication 
ITIL –  Information Technology Infrastructure Library 
IS – information system 
ISM – information security management 
ISMF – information security management framework 
HISMF – high-level information security management framework 
ISO – International Organization for Standardization 
SABSA –  Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture 
PDCA –  Plan-Do-Act-Check cycle, also known as Deming cycle 
SME – small and medium enterprise 
MCDM –  multiple-criteria decision-making 
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Introduction 
 
Problem Formulation 
Business processes of a modern organization are increasingly growing to be reli-
ant on information technology. Therefore, information security is one of the main 
concerns of any enterprise. All enterprise data must be available to execute oper-
ations of the enterprise, provide services to its customers. The enterprise must 
ensure the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of the enterprise and its cus-
tomers’ data. However, news on data breach, distributed denial of service attacks 
on different systems occur daily if not hourly. Even extensive information tech-
nology-related companies are vulnerable to some security issues. It is crucial to 
see information security management as a continuous process. Large enterprises 
typically have departments of information security management established. Ex-
perts in information security analyze existing security standards, best practices, 
look for, and apply the newest security systems. Meanwhile, small and medium 
enterprises (SME) are lacking resources while the same threats for information 
security apply. In SMEs information technology (IT) department or even a single 
person is responsible for all the maintenance and management of IT and enterprise 
information security. It is not enough, as information security management (ISM) 
requires specific knowledge and skills. Non-professional information security 
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personnel needs constant monitoring of the current situation in the enterprise and 
time to look for new recommendations, solutions, and at the same time, need to 
look after the enterprise IT infrastructure. Such a workload can be exhaustive and 
prove insufficient to ensure the quality of the processes. Therefore, the infor-
mation security management framework (ISMF), dedicated to SME, might im-
prove the situation. 
A variety of information security management frameworks exist. However, 
an ISMF with most important information security management elements, high-
level processes, and stakeholders of ISM is missing. This leads to a situation an 
SME need to look for multiple frameworks and combine them individually. It 
takes time and requires additional resources. As well the time is necessary to get 
a list of tools, dedicated to analyze the existing ISM situation or/and to improve 
it. The list of ISMF associated tools is not present in existing ISMF as well.   
Relevance of the Thesis 
Variety of tools and standards, dedicated to information security regulation, risk 
evaluation, and management exist. However, most of the tools are not adapted to 
SME or covers just a part of ISM. Therefore, it is a hard, resource demanding task 
to adjust them in practice. The consequences of partially adapted tools or usage of 
no support system for ISM leads to cases when security vulnerabilities in the en-
terprise exist, attacks on the enterprise are executed, enterprise data and services 
are corrupted, the enterprise cannot operate, the damage is done to customers or 
partners systems, etc. 
By providing the SME focused and up-to-date information security manage-
ment framework, the SME could keep up with evolving security baseline and en-
sure proper level information security management in the enterprise even with 
lacking resources for ISM. 
The Object of Research 
The Object of this dissertation – information security management frameworks 
for usage in the small and medium enterprise. 
The Aim of the Thesis 
The main aim is to enrich the area of information security management frame-
works by proposing an information security management framework with ex-
tended lists of stakeholders and tools for SME simplified usage.  
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The Objectives of the Thesis 
To achieve the aim of the thesis, the following objectives were formulated: 
1. To analyze the existing frameworks for information security manage-
ment; 
2. To design a new information security management framework which will 
combine high-level processes and stakeholders of ISM; 
3. To provide a list of associated tools for proposed ISM framework to au-
tomate or simplify the framework usage in SME; 
4. To evaluate the proposed ISM framework and tools as information secu-
rity management improvement solution for a small and medium enter-
prise. 
Research Methodology 
To achieve the aim of the thesis, the following research methods were used: 
1. Comparative research and systematic literature research for information 
security management and existing information security management 
frameworks; 
2. An experiment research method was applied to validate the proposed ISM 
ideas; 
3. Generalization for structuring the research and analysis results. 
Scientific Novelty of the Thesis 
The scientific novelty is proven by the following results: 
1. New information security management framework designed to concen-
trate main best practices of information security management and concen-
tration to all types of stakeholders introduced to ensure broad perspective 
of the information security management. At the same time the ISM frame-
work simpler applicability in SME is assured by providing a list of needed 
tools; 
2. Information security level estimation models developed to model the im-
pact of information flows and human factors. The use of these models 
allows information flow security evaluation by considering both hard-
ware, software technologies as well as information flows and human fac-
tors. 
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Practical Value of the Research Findings 
The proposed ISM frameworks with a list of existing and newly proposed tools 
require fewer resources to evaluate and model the ISM in the small and medium 
enterprise. By using the proposed framework and tools, SME can reduce the need 
for ISM resources as automated information security level evaluation and model-
ing require less time and knowledge, comparing to manual assessment. The de-
crease of resources during the usage of automated information security evaluation 
tools in SME allow maintenance or increase the information security level where 
information security experts do not exist as numeric values for comparison of dif-
ferent situations are more understandable. 
The Defended Statements 
1. Integration of all type stakeholders into the ISM framework allows assur-
ance of wider range information security threads in the enterprise and in-
creases the understanding of security policy importance. 
2. Probabilistic methods are suitable for SME information security level eval-
uation and can replace the experts work in security risk ranking, therefore, 
can reduce the information security management cost. 
3. Quantitative evaluation of information security management framework 
suitability for small and medium enterprise requires multi-criteria decision-
making and analytical hierarchy process. 
Approval of the Research Findings 
The material of this dissertation is published in Clarivate Analytics Web of Science 
databases refereed journals. One with a citation index and two without a citation 
index. The author has made two presentations at two international scientific con-
ferences: 
1. The 1st IEEE Workshop on Advances in Information, Electronic and 
Electrical Engineering AIEEE’13, Riga, Latvia, November 26–27, 2013; 
2. IEEE International Conference, Hamburg, Germany 4th October 2018. 
Dissertation Structure 
The scientific work consists of an introduction of the dissertation, four chapters, 
general conclusions, references, list of author’s publications and annexes. The to-
tal scope of the dissertation – 114 pages without annexes. There are 39 pictures 
and 16 tables in the text. 132 references were used in the dissertation text. 
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1. Information Security 
Management and 
Existing Information 
Security Management 
Frameworks 
To manage information security, a deep understanding of this area and existing 
tools must be considered. Therefore, in this chapter, the main principles of infor-
mation security management and existing solutions are presented. The result of 
the systematic literature review is summarized by topics as well as publication 
year and demonstrates researchers’ interests in information security management 
area during the last ten years. The existing ISM frameworks are analyzed and 
compared according to different criteria to highlight the missing components or 
problems for application in SME. The results are essential as ideas of the proposed 
Information security management framework are concentrated and generated 
based on this comparative analysis.  
Analysis presented in this Chapter was published in (Kauspadiene, 2017)2. 
                                               
2 The references are given in the list of publications by the author on the topic of the dissertation 
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1.1. Information Security Management 
Information security management covers tools, links, interconnections, docu-
mented policies, data, technologies and other means that help to ensure a minimal 
level of information security risks within and outside the organizational processes, 
therefore ensuring business continuity. 
By sustaining systematic and well-timed processes of information security 
management, the organization can protect its assets and sensitive data from being 
breached, leaked, or exposed to other damaging elements, e.g., human factor er-
rors. Due to poorly established information security management processes, val-
uable assets of an organization face unimaginable risk. Irreversible damage can 
be made for all aspects of the organization’s activities – from sensitive personal 
data of employees, customers to commercial activities while breaching servers, 
cloud services and, even, physical security measures. 
Further on in this dissertation, three key elements that information security 
stands for will be referred to. These are Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability. 
ISO/IEC 27000 – Information security management systems – standards family, 
defines Confidentiality as where “Information is not made available or disclosed 
to unauthorized individuals and entities or processes.” Integrity is defined as “the 
property of accuracy and completeness of assets.” Finally, Availability is defined 
as “the property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized 
entity.” In short, information must have specific limited access, be trustworthy, 
accurate and accessible by authorized people. 
1.2. Existing Information Security Management 
Researches  
This study has been undertaken as a systematic literature review, partly based on 
a Guidelines, proposed by Kitchenham (Kitchenham 2007). This section asks 
questions that scope future research activities and are intended to identify the ex-
isting basis for the research work and should make it clear where the research fits 
into the current body of knowledge. As further research is going to be on the topic 
of ISM process optimization, it is needed to investigate what frameworks are al-
ready composed for the ISM. For that reason, it is necessary to perform a relevant 
literature review. 
1.2.1. Search Process and Study Selection 
The search process was performed in digital libraries and search engines.  For 
searching, the keywords were extracted from the research questions, e.g., Infor-
mation security management, Information security governance, cyber-crime 
1. INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND EXISTING INFORMATION… 7 
 
defense, etc., and a list of synonym words was conducted. For the search process, 
the following databases were used: 
1. ACM; 
2. InterScience; 
3. Google scholar; 
4. IEEE Explore; 
5. Inspec; 
6. ISI Web of Science; 
7. ScienceDirect; 
8. SpringerLink. 
 
Search results exceeded 2400 references. Evaluation of the title enabled to 
reject approximately 1150 references. After the assessment of the abstracts there 
was a list of 350 papers, and finally, after a more in-depth sight into the papers 
and the evaluation of their relevancy, a final list of 80 articles was established. 
The process of papers‘ selection is shown in Fig. 1.1. 
 
 
Fig. 1.1. Steps of the paper selection process 
Following the recommendations of Kitchenham et al. (2010), relevant studies 
were assessed for their actual relevance. Main inclusion criteria for selecting stud-
ies were: 
1. Paper describes research on ISM; 
2. Issues, concerning ISM are discussed, e.g. standards, methodologies, 
policies, applications; 
3. An ISM framework is proposed. 
Criteria for exclusion of research works were: 
1. Pure technical approach to ISM system; 
Step 3 
Identify relevant studies – search databases 
and conference proceedings 
Exclude studies on the basis of abstracts 
Exclude studies o the basis of titles 
Exclude studies on the basis of deeper inside 
analysis 
Step 1 
Step 4 
Step 2 
N=2400 
 
N=1250 
N=350 
N=80 
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2. Lack of ICT approach. 
As the main task of this systematic literature review is to prepare for further 
detailed investigations of information security management and its framework de-
velopment, all the papers were divided into six groups. One group serves as an 
umbrella for a sub-group of similar topics. The classification was established after 
the revision of the literature contents and semantic analysis of further investiga-
tion‘s topic. Thus, all the groups will serve as a foundation for going on the re-
search of information security management framework concept. Established 
groups will cover the research questions, as well. The groups are as follows: 
1. disclosure of information security management; 
2. analysis of Information security management conceptual models: 
a) risks and solutions in organizational level; 
b) the operational system frame; 
c) an integrated system platform layer; 
d) information security conceptual frameworks. 
3. innovative cloud computing, distributed systems; 
4. analysis of standards and methodologies; 
5. methodological grounds of the research. 
The classification was developed for the purpose of our review and is not 
intended to be a general-purpose classification of information security manage-
ment studies. Most of the categories are nonexclusive; thus, a paper applies to 
more than one research approach. This general schema serves as a starting point 
for more in-depth investigation of findings that seem to suggest possibilities for 
improvement. 
In the next section, the results of the research are given. A chronological ap-
proach for the research is chosen. The special attention was given to papers, where 
a particular solution on Information security management conceptual frame-
works/models is suggested.  
1.2.2. Disclosure of Information Security Management 
Principles of information security management are presented in most ISM related 
papers. However, a portion of scientific papers is oriented on the description of 
information security management or sharing of experience in this area.  
Von Solms (1998a) was one of the first who started working on information 
systems management and attempted to define guidelines for information technol-
ogy (IT) security systems.  This author was one of the initiators of information 
security management investigation and provided multiple scientific papers on in-
formation security management. He clarified the information security concepts 
and terms (Von Solm, 2005) and led in this area. 
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By sharing his experience, on 2004 Von Solms  (Von Solms et al., 2004) 
republished a work about main mistakes that are made by information security 
officers. The title of this paper was high-sounding – “The 10 deadly sins of infor-
mation security management”. This article is intended to promote and systematize 
the author’s experience of the last six years.  
There exist more papers on information security management both by Von 
Solms and other authors. However, those papers are more related to a more spe-
cific area, rather than defining the main concepts and personal experience. There 
those papers are analyzed in other categories of information security related sci-
entific papers. 
1.2.3. Analysis of Information Security Management Models 
As Von Solms was the initiator of information security management area investi-
gation, he participated in an analysis of the conceptual nature of IT security sys-
tems. Von Solms (Von Solms, 1998b) released an article about information secu-
rity conceptual modeling. This approach was more applicable, and it was a 
continuity of the article, published earlier by the same author.  
In the area of ISM conceptual modeling, new authors raised. But the variety 
of conceptual modeling was so broad, so we divided it into four groups. 
Risk and Solutions in Organizational Level  
Von Solms are active in this field and presents a paper, dedicated to the eval-
uation of risk solutions in the organizational level (Von Solm et al., 2005).  
Information security as a management process was analyzed by Gary Stone-
burner, Alice Goguen, and Alexis Feringa (Stoneburner, 2002). These researches 
were interested in risk, arising at an organizational level and risk impact for the 
organizations. Therefore, their research activities result in the preparation of sys-
tematic information security risk management documentation for information 
technology systems.  This is one of the first officially recognized and well-known 
implementation of the risk management processes application in the organiza-
tion's ISM processes.  
The evaluation of the risk assessment during the implementation of infor-
mation security solutions is analyzed. Arora Ashish (Ashish, 2004) in his group 
of publications, analyzes the risk of information security systems. System frame-
work, it's architectural and technical solutions are being examined by Shahram 
Gilaninia (Gilaninia et al., 2012), who seek to evaluate the efficiency of ISM on 
information system management.  Those are papers, oriented to system level risk, 
while a more significant number of papers was geared to organizational level 
risks. 
Economic potentials for information security risk assessment was analyzed 
by Rok Bojanc and Borka Jerman-Blažič (Jerman-Blazic, 2008) too. Their 
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research is oriented to the risk’s economical cost evaluation and organization se-
curity risk assessments. 
In organizational-level risk management, Walter Baer and Andrew Parkinson 
analyzed the role of cyber insurance in security management (Baer et al., 2007). 
They examined the organization-level risks of management decisions, investi-
gated economic possibilities to ensure information systems from possible infor-
mational leakage and analyzed options for risk management.  Meanwhile, Baer 
Wade and Linda Wallace explained potentials of information security control, 
with an emphasis on quality in the field of ISM.  These authors defined the eval-
uation criteria for ISM process quality, but, as the evaluation of conceptual infor-
mation model is not set yet, these scientists‘ attempts and proposed solutions are 
episodic. 
Thomas L. Wheeler (Wheeler, 2008) investigated organizations‘ security 
metrics‘ calculation methods, and according to the data of successful cyber at-
tacks, analyzed if organizations are capable of protecting themselves. The author 
brings up a question of a need for a governmental organization for information 
security. Stefan Fenz and Ekelhart Andreas (Fenz et al., 2011) represented possi-
bilities for ISM evaluation, identification, and standardization. Meanwhile, 
Zhanna Mingaleva and Kapuskina Tatiana (Mingaleva et al., 2009) studied a spe-
cific case – the impact of information security on the economy of Russia.  
The quantitative evaluation and discrete solutions were actual in analyzed pa-
pers. Therefore, Pooya Jaferian el al. (Jeferian et al., 2014) highlighted the need 
for quantitative analysis. In their article, a heuristic of ISM tools was analyzed. It 
can be stated, that the first organizational research was based upon user‘s motiva-
tion model analysis and was oriented to the evaluation of organization‘s infor-
mation security, and the other study by Pooya was adapted to the applicable re-
view of organization‘s ISM tools and was more coherent to the technical 
management of ISM processes. Mayer (Mayer et al., 2018) supports the vision 
and proposes to integrate information system security risk management with en-
terprise architecture management. 
Herrmann Mimi (Herrmann, 2009) analyzed security strategy rather than eco-
nomic possibilities or quantitative security metrics. While in the field of infor-
mation security conceptual model Van Niekerk together with Von Solms 
(Van Niekerk et al., 2010) described information security culture from the man-
agement perspective.  
Tohidi (Tohidi, 2011) presented a paper about the role of ISM processes and 
risk management in organizations‘ information systems. At the same time Jian 
Zhang, Wei Hua Yuan, Wenjing Qi (Zhang et al., 2011) and Mike Faessler with 
Mark Morgan (Faessler et al., 2011) defined possibilities to optimize information 
security risk management and ISM. 
There through distinguishes two key aspects of ISM: 
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1. risk control; 
2. operations‘ management.  
Organization-level risk and solutions are also analyzed by scientists‘ groups 
Anil Kumar Chorppath with Tansu Alpcan (Chorppath et al., 2012) and Hyeun-
Suk Rhee, Young U Ryu with Cheong-Tag Kim (Rhee et al., 2012). The first 
group of researchers analyze information security risk management, compare the-
oretical and practical aspects of information security risk management. Mean-
while, the second group of scientists skeptically take the achievements of the last 
15 years of ISM researches, define the human factor, and introduce new indeter-
minacy elements into the science of ISM. 
Mario Spremic describes ISM model of organization, represents a holistic 
approach to the information systems, risk management. His model is based on 
Von Solms‘ ontological solution, that was proposed in 2002. The second re-
searcher analyzes the application of integrated ISM to the governmental institu-
tions, offers a conceptual solution based on ISO 27000 standard and PDCA (Plan-
Do-Act-Check) cycle. The author integrates conventional solutions and systemat-
ically represents them.  This article can be assigned not only to the group of the 
articles on information security conceptual model evaluation but to the group of 
ISM literature review articles‘ group as well. 
The Operational System Frame 
The previously analyzed papers defined there should be a separate area of 
risk management – operations management. One of the first authors, which ex-
plained specifically this area was Fredrik Bjorck (Bjorck, 2004). In 2004 he ana-
lyzed security and decision making issues and described the institutional infor-
mation security theory from the perspectives of the application of information 
systems‘ organizing principles.  
Von Solms was active in this area too, as they examined the operation level 
of ISM, were dedicated to disclosing fundamental obstacles for implementing 
ISM. In 2015 Von Solms (Von Solm, 2005) released paper in the Journal of Com-
puters & Security and proceeded their work in the spectrum or ISMS analysis. In 
the second disquisition paper, Von Solms (Von Solms et al., 2005) analyzed in-
teractions between information security and business security on purpose to reveal 
how information security influences business security. The point of this article is 
that the discipline of information security has outgrown its name and information 
security has become a critical component to corporate governance. It proposes 
that business security is a more appropriate name than information security be-
cause information security activity is now broader than just the protection of data, 
information, and software. In the context of the generally accepted notion that the 
objective of information security is to protect organization‘s asset, the article 
poses the question „if we accept that such protection mitigates business risks, 
should we not start calling it business security instead of information security?“.  
12 1. INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND EXISTING INFORMATION… 
 
The information security management relations to enterprise management are 
analyzed by Jo Malcolmson (Malcolmson, 2009) too. This author analyzes infor-
mation security culture from the organizational perspective. Meanwhile, Kenneth 
Knapp (Knapp et al., 2009) analyzed the policy of information security in the level 
of the organization process model. 
The more specific area was an article about information security conceptual 
model by Jai-Yeol Son (Son, 2011) and Karin Hedström et al. (Hedstrom et al., 
2011). These authors analyzed information security conceptual model through the 
prism of the human factor. Articles were based upon Janine L. Spears and Henri 
Barki 2010-year research data on users’ participation in ISM.  
The operational system security management is essential, and nowadays re-
search activities in this area are still seen: Cezar (Cesar et al., 2017) analyzes out-
sourcing related ISM; Tweneboah-Koduah (Tweneboah-Koduah et al., 2018) con-
centrates on critical infrastructure systems; Radanliev (Radanliev et al., 2018) 
investigates security operational management in internet of things area.  
An Integrated System Platform Model 
Hong Kwo-Shing (Hong, 2003) in his paper proposed the theory of integrated 
information security management systems. It was the beginning of information 
security management as a complex, multi-component problem. The same idea was 
supported by G. Whitson (Whitson, 2003) as he provided clarifications of the 
compositional facility of the three common elements in computer security – the-
ory, process, and management. All this crystallization of ISM processes and ISM 
sciences and it's body of knowledge leads to an integrated approach to its research 
field.   
The need of engineering solutions is highlighter in article "Information secu-
rity management: a new paradigm" a system framework was analyzed by Jan HP 
Eloff and Mariki Eloff (Eloff et al., 2003), who delivered a need for a robust en-
gineering system design.   
The analysis of an integrated system's platform-level is presented by Ernest 
Chang Shuchih and Chienta Bruce Ho (Ernest Chang et al., 2006). This group of 
scientists researches the impact of the organization factors on the efficiency of the 
ISM solutions, i.e., how the environment of the organization effects ISMSs.  
The integrated system platform level is analyzed by Maxim O. Kalinin (Ka-
linin, 2010) too. He proceeded the analysis that was started by Beznosov scientific 
group and introduced an innovative solution for that period – information system 
security method by applying integrated control and automated security solutions.  
Also, based on these articles in an article by G. Pavlov and J. Karakaneva 
(Pavlov et al., 2011), about ISMS in organizations was published. Researchers in 
the article appealed to the results of Beznosov‘s researches that were announced 
in 2009 and works of Von Solms in the field of information security conceptual 
model and standardization. Scientific solutions by Pavlov and Karakaneva can be 
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considered as a prolongation of Kalinin‘s works on automated security and inte-
grated control systems at the conceptual theoretical level.  
With a rise of the internet of things using the threat management has to be 
implemented for it too. Therefore Ko (Ko et al., 2018) proposes a threat infor-
mation management platform. 
It is essential to mention that not only high-level proposals existed. Some of 
the analyzed papers were very detailed and oriented to implementation, while 
Shervin Erfani (Erfani, 2003) patented his invention – the Security management 
system and method.    
Information Security Conceptual Frameworks 
While multiple models and solutions for information security risk evaluation 
and management exist, it can be consolidated into one framework. One of the first 
attempts to adjust concepts and terms, and with respect to the earlier proposed 
information security conceptual models propose a framework was in 2003 by 
Denis Trèek (Trèek, 2003). This author submitted the article about the integral 
systematic framework application into the ISM. 
Farn Kwo-Jean, Lin Shu-Kuo, and Andrew Ren-Wei Fung (Fam et al., 2004), 
also published a paper in the category of system framework analysis. Authors seek 
to execute the evaluation of ISM, to define vulnerability, threats, and weaknesses. 
This article has a diagnostic character, where authors present in what way while 
applying COBIT standards, it is possible to avoid information security procedural 
gaps in the organization as well as what type of system can be used for the same 
purpose. 
Bill Tsoumas and Gritzalis Dimitris (Tsoumas et al., 2006) represented a pa-
per in the field of systems‘ framework analysis. Authors in the International sci-
entific conference Advanced Information Networking and Applications presented 
an ontology-based concept of the security management model, thereby brought a 
significant scientific contribution to the analysis of ISMS frames. 
Ellie Myler and George Broadbent with the paper on security standards in 
2006 made a foundation for further studies, which were performed in 2007 while 
investigating the level of integrated system platform. Integrated system platform 
level is also used by David Botta, Andrew McGee, and Richard Tracy. David 
Botta (Botta et al., 2007) in his paper analyzed tools that are used by information 
security professionals.  Andrew McGee (McGee et al., 2007) studied the imple-
mentation of Bell labs‘ security framework and submitted proposals for ISMS 
improvements, thus unveiled the potentials for further development of integrated 
system platform. Meanwhile, Richard Tracy (Tracy, 2007) in his article about 
ISM and business processes‘ automatization challenges, perspectives, and bene-
fits, presented further dimensions of integrated platform development.  
In 2008 upspring a paper, that is a continuity of Von Solms information se-
curity conceptual framework indoctrination, that he presented in the ISM 
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guidelines. The article was composed by Kirstie Hawkey, Kasia Muldner, and 
Konstantin Beznosov (Hawkey et al., 2008). Authors explored a conceptual 
framework that should equilibrate organization‘s ISM and proper interaction with 
the external environment. Further, in 2009 these researches were proceeded by 
Rodrigo Werlinger, Kirstie Hawkey, and Konstantin Beznosov (Werlinger et al., 
2009).  
One more group of scientists that analyzed information security framework 
was Parkin Simon (Parkin et al., 2010) with joint authors. They studied potentials 
and were looking for solutions on how information security managers, adopting 
an integrated information security platform, could optimize the process of security 
management.  
An article that analyzes the information security system platform framework 
was represented by Y.Monfelt, S.Pilemalm, J.Hallberg, L.Yngstrom (Monfelt et 
al., 2011). Here authors investigate 14 layered ISM framework from social and 
organizational aspects.   
A case study on implementing an Information Security Management Frame-
work in a green energy production plant was presented by A. I. Hohan et al.  
(Hohan et al., 2014), where the paper highlighted a part of the results of infor-
mation security management systems research in the context of business excel-
lence. The study was focused on the design and implementation of an Information 
security management framework for protecting a grid-connected renewable en-
ergy power plant – a critical infrastructure with growing relevance in the energy 
markets, and heavily dependent on industrial information systems. The proposed 
approach was intended for use by all grid-connected renewable energy producers, 
either solar, wind or biomass generation. 
Currently, more specified, dedicated to specific area frameworks are pro-
posed. For example, Hussain (Hussain et al., 2018) offers a conceptual framework 
for the security of mobile health applications; Jouini (Jouini et al., 2019) published 
a paper on security framework for secure cloud computing environments. 
Innovative Cloud Computing, Distributed Systems 
During the technological progress of information technologies, occurred so-
lutions for the application of innovative cloud distributed systems due to ensure 
the security of ISM processes. This topic was analyzed by Jung Youngmin and 
Mokdong Chun (Jung et al., 2010). They submitted a solution to adaptive security 
management model in the cloud-computing environment. 
Together with the rise of Industry 4.0 approach, a significant shift in the the-
matic of the researches of information security can be noticed. Major ICT ele-
ments, such as the Internet of Things, Big data, Artificial intelligence, Virtual and 
Augmented reality, Smart everything everywhere, empowered a significant num-
ber of articles in that field. However, no significant alterations were observed in 
the field of information security management. Governmental regulatory, e.g., 
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European Union General Data Protection Regulation, illustrates the importance of 
the holistic approach regarding information security management. Nonetheless, 
there is very few researches on ISM. However, during the last year, a patent exists 
in this area, which defines system and method for enhanced security and manage-
ment mechanisms for enterprise administrators in a cloud-based environment 
(Kiang and Lee, 2018). 
Analysis of Standards and Methodologies 
Publication with the pure subject of information security standards came up 
by Von Solms in 1999 and was one of the first of its kind papers.  
Later ISM process applicability standards were analyzed by Karin Höne and 
Jan H. P. Eloff (Karin et al., 2002). In their relevant approach activity, researchers 
seek to perform a review of information security policy application in terms of 
international information security standards as well as analyze information secu-
rity paradigm at the international level. Meanwhile, Clive Vermeulen and 
Rossouw Von Solms (Vermeulen Clive, 2002) proceed their investigations and in 
2002 represents a paper on ISM tools application in an organization.  
Standards and methodologies were studied by René Saint-Germain 
(Saint-Germain, 2005) in the paper „Information security management best prac-
tice based on ISO/IEC 17799“. In this article, that was published in the Infor-
mation Management Journal, the author presents the analysis of ISO standard, and 
elaborates on which ISO standards ISMS should be based. 
The domain of information security standards was analyzed by Ellie Myler 
and George Broadbent (Myler and G. Broadbent, 2006). The object of their anal-
ysis was security standard ISO 17799. Research results and comprehensive anal-
ysis of ISO 17799 were published in the Information Management Journal – Prai-
rie Village.  
Later a paper by Edward Humphreys (Humphreys, 2008) was published. This 
article is about ISM standards, where the author makes a review of information 
security management, certification, and risk management. This article holistically 
combines previous publications: 1998–1999 Von Solms, 2002 Karin Höne and 
Jan H. P. Eloff, 2005 René Saint-Germain, 2006 Ellie Myler and George Broad-
bent. The comparison of views of these authors gives a basis for the further re-
searches of Konstantin Beznosov‘s scientific group. 
Standards and methodologies were analyzed by Edward Humphreys  
(Humphreys, 2008). Shoichi Morimoto, Mikko Siponen, and Robert Willison. 
Morimoto (Morimoto, 2009) started studies on this topic and paid special attention 
for possibilities to adjust COBIT security management standards to the formation 
of information systems. Meanwhile, Mikko Siponen and Robert Willison (Sipo-
nen et al., 2009) performed an analysis of ISM standards‘ issues and solutions. 
Tati Ernawati and Nugroho Doddi (Emawati et al., 2012) published an article 
by representing the information security risk management framework, based on 
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primary studies and ISO 31000: 2009 standard. This framework was presented in 
an international conference ICSET in 2012. Meanwhile, Razieh Sheikhpour and 
Nasser Modiri (Sheikhpour et al., 2012) published a paper, where analyze best 
practices for integrating ITIL and ISO IEC 27001 into the processes of ISM. These 
both articles attempted to review the role of standards to the operation of ISM 
ensuring and to proceed with the analysis of standards and methodologies.  
Best practices are included in Antoni Lluı ś Mesquida and Antonia Mas 
(Mesquida et al., 2012) paper “Implementing information security best practices 
on software lifecycle processes: The ISO/IEC 15504 Security Extension” pre-
sented extension that may be relevant for a software development company in-
volved in a process improvement program according to the ISO/IEC 15504 inter-
national standard. The significant contribution of the work is the development and 
validation of the software extension, built from a thorough mapping between the 
ISO/IEC 27002 security controls and the ISO/IEC 15504-5 base practices for soft-
ware lifecycle processes. The extension details the changes that software compa-
nies should make in the software lifecycle processes for the successful implemen-
tation of the related security controls. To attain research objectives, the authors 
evaluated the ISO/IEC 15504 Security Extension through case studies in a sample 
of software development organizations. This study followed the design science 
research paradigm that is based on constructive research. Proposed security ex-
tension could complement existing information security management frameworks 
with additional security control features.   
B. Borgman (Borgman et al., 2015) came up with the article “Cybersecurity 
readiness in the South Australian Government.” In this paper, authors conducted 
a series of face-to-face interviews with 17 participants from 11 SA government 
entities, to validate whether existing processes and strategic direction were suffi-
cient to satisfactorily achieve the implementation of an ISMS and classification 
of data for the respective SA government entities. Based on interviews and review 
of ISMS associated reviews conducted within other Australian State and Territory 
jurisdictions, authors identified key areas that the SA Government may need to 
consider as part of the progressive roll-out of the different phases of ISMF version 
3 implementation up and to June 2017. Observations outlined the specific areas 
that have been directly attributed to the implementation and overall classification 
of data as part of the general transition project. These are information security 
management systems, governance, risk assessment, government strategic direc-
tion, information security documentation, government reporting, classification of 
data, project resourcing, awareness training, and finally, certification. In summary 
there were identified vital areas that SA government entities may need to consider 
as part of the implementation of the ISMS and classification of data: (i) increased 
levels of engagement and general project governance by senior management;  
(ii) further development as part of the ongoing awareness training pitched at 
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multiple levels throughout government entities; (iii) continues review of project 
resourcing levels to ensure that key project milestones are achieved; (iv) increased 
monitoring of government entities' progress at a whole of government and (v) 
continued review of the project scope to ensure that expectations are appropriate 
and achievable. 
Human service organizations were analyzed by S.Mubarak (Mubarak, 2016) 
in the article “Developing a theory-based information security management 
framework for human service organizations.” This paper identified organizations’ 
information security issues and explored dynamic, organizational culture, and 
contingency theories. It includes a critical review of global information security 
management issues for HSOs and appropriate multidisciplinary organizational 
methods to address them. In consideration of the unique nature of the organiza-
tional environment in HSOs, the author developed a new generic information se-
curity management framework based on the dynamic theory of organizational 
knowledge creation, organizational culture theory and contingency theory. This 
paper highlights the importance of addressing information security issue by 
providing and unpacking a new theory-based generic framework of how to embed 
information security management into the organizational culture. The author 
claims that adopting the proposed framework may be a useful step in beginning 
the process of developing an HSO-sector culture of awareness of the responsibil-
ities and risks of working in electronic information storage and sharing the envi-
ronment and instituting information security systems within each organization.  
Methodological Grounds of the Research 
In 2000, regarding the Von Solms doctrine of the practical applications of 
information security conceptual model, two papers, describing information secu-
rity developmental trends, emerged. According to Gurpreet Dhillon and James 
Backhouse (Dhillon et al., 2001), in the field of investigation of information se-
curity, technical instead of management approach should be dominant. In their 
work „Information System Security Management in the New Millennium,“ pub-
lished in The communication of ACM journal, authors analyze information secu-
rity management systems’ technical principles in the enterprise level, provide 
terms and definitions as well. Also, in 2000 emerged an ontological classification 
of information security management processes and systems. This work was pub-
lished in Computer and security journal, and the authors are Mariki M. Eloff and 
SH Von Solms (Eloff et al., 2001). Following Von Solms, Gurpreet and Back-
house investigations, in 2001 another two interpretative works of information se-
curity topic came into being. This time the work results in analyzing terms and 
definitions were represented by Basie Von Solms (Von Solms, 2001a). Scientist 
has developed and defined information security concepts in the articles about joint 
management of the organization and information security, as well as emphasized 
the importance of information security, as an interdisciplinary science (Von 
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Solms, 2001b). This article presents information security as a multidimensional 
discipline. The intent is to view information security as a business issue, and not 
only a technical one. The various dimensions of information security identify are: 
1. strategic/corporate governance (senior management responsibilities); 
2. governance/organizational (information security organizational strucure); 
3. policy (corporate policy); 
4. best practices (prescribed standards); 
5. ethical (professional ethics); 
6. certification (professional organizations); 
7. legal (statutory requirements); 
8. awareness (stakeholders‘ security awareness); 
9. measurement/monitoring (policy enforcement). 
The proposed multidimensional discipline of information security demon-
strates a need for a formal “standards” approach to information security manage-
ment. For this approach to be successful, the various information security dimen-
sions outlined in the article would have to be inter-dependent. 
According to the researches of years 2000, 2001 and 2007–2009, in the topic 
of organization-level risk management, came up a paper that analyzes methodo-
logical grounding of the researches – this is the first empirical research with the 
attempt to explore and evaluate users‘ participation in ISM. This article was writ-
ten by Janine L. Spears and Henri Barki (Spears et al., 2010). 
M. Moeti and B.M.Kalema in 2014 presented the paper “Analytical Hierar-
chy Process Approach for the Metrics of Information Security Management 
Framework.” The primary objective of this study, therefore, was to identify met-
rics needed for the development of an information security management frame-
work. From related literature, relevant metrics were identified using textual anal-
ysis and grouped into six categories of; organizational, environmental, 
contingency management, security policy, internal control, and information and 
risk management. These metrics were validated in a framework by using the ana-
lytical hierarchical process (AHP) method. Results of the study indicated that en-
vironmental metrics play a critical role in the information security management 
as compared to other metrics whereas the information and risk management met-
rics was found to be not so significant during the rankings. The article came up 
with some practical recommendations, e.g., an organization’s top management 
should provide proper and adequate support for the security program. This in 
terms of supporting information security policies and procedures, budget, employ-
ing skilled IT personnel and providing in-service training to the employees is par-
amount for substantive improvement of the stature and effectiveness of the overall 
corporate security; there is a need for the security team to understand the business 
processes of the organizations; security managers or the chief information security 
officers (CISO) should conduct periodic reviews or briefings to the top 
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management; the security team should ensure that they document and periodically 
publish security reports that should include but not limited: Data breach investi-
gations reports, success and failed incidents, near-misses, latest security threats 
and any other security events that actually occurred within the organization.  
While scientific papers were using information security management defini-
tions, proposed mostly by Von Solms, till 2008 there were no attempts to codify 
the information of cyber security articles. This attempt was made by Aggeliki 
Tsohou (Tsohou et al., 2008). He examined the research field of information se-
curity, summed up the results of the investigations and their practical applications, 
has identified weaknesses in the analysis of standards. The primary input of this 
scientist into the research field of information security development was that he 
defined till then latent topics and identified directions for further investigations.  
1.2.4. Historical Overview of Information Security Management 
Researches 
Based on the executed analysis, we can see that in 1998–2003 together with rapid 
ISM science crystallization three phases of this branch of science development 
were passed: 
1.    purification of a scientific concept, concepts‘ and terms‘ clarification; 
2.    analysis of standards and its definitions; 
3.    conceptual modeling and tools‘ formation. 
Between 1998 and 2002, ISM originator‘s, Von Solms‘ contribution to the 
development of information security science is significant, as researcher initially 
analyzes standards, concepts, and ISM processes, and in 2002 goes on with the 
creation of ISM conceptual framework. The researcher could be considered as a 
precursor of information automates systems applications. 
It should be noted, that during the decade starting 1998 of Von Solms works, 
the paradigm of ISM changed significantly. In the first stage, till 2001 in the field 
of information security development concepts and standards were necessary, in 
the second stage of information security, scientific researches and process devel-
opment field processes and economic costs became important. Scientists strived 
to identify system framework, define organization-level risk.  
2010–2011 was necessary for distributed and cloud computing information 
security management as researchers understood the new technologies require a 
different view to information security management. 
While analyzing the groups of the articles according to the popularity, it can 
be noted, that the majority of the papers were written on the topic of organization 
risk management issues. The second place goes to the articles and scientific re-
searches, dedicated to the analysis of standards and methodologies. In the third 
place remains analysis of integrated system platform, information security 
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conceptual model, concepts, terms, and frameworks. These are conceptual funda-
mental studies with a purpose to reveal what is ISM and in what level it is imple-
mented. Least works were performed in analyzing literature and in exploratory 
tactical level. In summary and after structuring articles by categories, it can be 
assumed, that most favored field in ISM processes is a risk as well as process 
management and organization-level solutions ‘retrieval. Since 2014, there were 
no new disruptive approaches to ISM; only specific areas of information security 
management systems were analyzed. 
The literature review covers 80 papers starting in 1998. According to the 
number of papers of each group, class (their number) per year is shown in 
Fig. 1.2. 
 
Fig. 1.2. Chronological distribution paper’s groups and sub-groups 
The chronological distribution of information security management related 
scientific papers show active publication in period from 2001 till 2012, while a 
gap is noticeable in period from 2013 till 2018. During these five years just several 
scientific papers were published in topic, related to information security 
management. However, the information security management area becomes 
popular in the last years as the number of scientific papers increases. 
1.3. Existing Information Security Management 
Frameworks 
Currently, there exist a large number of ISM frameworks, proposed by scientists, 
universally accepted organizations, business companies, governmental initiatives 
for protecting information security and others. All these ISM frameworks concen-
trate on a specific domain or have its own point of view. The framework selection 
depends on many factors including industry sector and geography (EY, 2014). 
Therefore, in this section we will provide an overview of some relevant ISM 
frameworks to form a general view on existing solutions. 
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1.3.1. Overview of Information Security Management  
Frameworks 
M. M. Eloff and S. H. von Solms (Eloff et al., 2000) proposed a hierarchical 
framework for various approaches consisting of three levels, where the top level 
of the hierarchical framework represents IT in its broadest sense and includes all 
activities and tools associated with and all approaches adopted to IT in general. 
This all-covering category is entitled Assessment of Information and Related 
Technologies. The second level is divided into two areas, namely Information 
Technology: General and Information Technology: Security. The area entitled In-
formation Technology: General includes all IT activities and tools that cannot in-
cur any security-related risks. The area entitled Information Technology: Security 
is divided into the areas entitled Technology and Processes. The area entitled IT: 
Security Processes is allocated to all IS management actions that should be per-
formed; The area entitled IT: Security Technology is reserved for all the ‘visible’ 
aspects involved in IT security, such as the controls that are put into place to pre-
vent possible damage by malicious software. The areas IT: Security Processes and 
IT: Security Technology is mapped onto the third level of the framework. Going 
down IT: Security Processes are divided into four terms (fourth level): (1) guide-
lines, code of practice, (2) standards, (3) legislation, (4) benchmarking. The area 
of IT: Security Technology consists of the same terms except for legislation, as it 
is replaced by evaluation. At the fifth level of the framework, some of the above 
conditions are subdivided further as being either internal or external. Internal 
guidelines are dictated by the specific in-house requirements of an organization. 
It should be noted, that in terms of the framework, international standards, as en-
dorsed by an international standards organization, are classified as being external 
standards. 
Denis Trček (Trcek, 2006) proposed an integral framework for information 
systems security management based on layered multipanes (see 
Fig. 1.3). The author declares that to protect the information, an organization has 
to start with the identification of threats related to business assets. Based on threats 
analysis, he proposed a layered multiplane approach. The first plane is focused on 
interactions, starting with security mechanisms and therefore, deploying security 
services, which are linked to human-machine interactions. Finally, human inter-
actions have to be covered. Thus, in parallel, to make things operational, scientist 
proposes to address another perspective, which includes technological, organiza-
tional and legislative planes. 
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Fig. 1.3. Layered multi-panes model for information systems security  
(Trček, 2006) 
Bradley and Josang (Bradley et al., 2004) propose an open framework for 
enterprise security management. This framework is intended to be a technology-
dependent and comprises an information repository, manager programs, and con-
figuration agents — the information repository stores network and security policy 
information. Manager programs are technology-domain-specific and act as expert 
systems querying the repository and communicate with configuration agents. 
Configuration agents provide the required expert system functionality. The study 
proposes a technical solution to information security management problem. Since 
the proposed framework is technology-dependent, it would not provide the type 
of flexibility that may be required in some instances. 
John Sherwood, Andrew Clark, and David Lynas (Sherwook et al., 2009) 
represented the SABSA (Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture) 
framework for Enterprise Security Architecture. SABSA is intended for develop-
ing risk-driven enterprise information security and information assurance archi-
tectures and for delivering security infrastructure solutions that support critical 
business initiatives. It is an open standard, comprising several frameworks, mod-
els, methods, and processes. The SABSA Model covers the life cycle of opera-
tional capabilities and shall consist of six layers. For each horizontal layer, there 
is a vertical analysis based on the six questions: What (assets)? Why (motivation)? 
How (process and technology)? Who (people)? Where (location)? When (time)? 
This leads to a six-by-six cell matrix called the SABSA Master Matrix. The sixth 
layer, the service management layer, is overlaid on the other five layers and further 
vertically analyzed to produce the five-by-six cell SABSA Service Management 
Matrix. Some of the key features of the SABSA are: it can be implemented incre-
mentally, may be used in any industry sector and in any organization whether 
privately or publicly owned, can be used for the development of architectures and 
solutions at any level of granularity of scope, enables relevant existing standards 
to be integrated under the single SABSA framework, enabling joined up, end-to-
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end architectural solutions, is continually maintained and developed and up-to-
date versions are published from time to time. 
SABSA is a generic architectural development framework that can be used 
for the operational-risk-based development and maintenance of operational capa-
bilities in any business organization (Institute, 2014). It provides a holistic ap-
proach to information security and is baselined against the Security Architecture' 
standard ISO 7498-2:1989 (ISO, 1989). Five-layer SABSA framework answers 
the what, why, how, who, where, and when questions for security architecture. 
Five layers of SABSA are (see Fig. 1.4): Contextual Architecture, Conceptual Ar-
chitecture, Logical Architecture, Physical Architecture, and Component Architec-
ture. A sixth layer is added for Service Management Architecture and is synony-
mous with Operational Security Architecture.   
Manuel Suter (Suter, 2007) introduced a Generic National Framework for 
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP). CIIP is universally acknowl-
edged as a vital component of national security policy. To protect their critical 
infrastructure, countries establish sophisticated and comprehensive CIIP organi-
zations and systems, involving governmental agencies from different ministries, 
with a variety of initiatives. In the paper, the author offers a few building blocks 
for a functional CIIP unit and states, that by concentrating on top priorities, coop-
eration between various stakeholders, flexibility, and adaptability, relatively inex-
pensive solutions can be developed to meet country-specific needs. Essential tasks 
of CIIP author arranges in a “Four-Pillar Model.” The four pillars of this model 
are Prevention and early warning; Detection; Reaction; and crisis management. 
While the aim of Prevention and early warning is to reduce the number of infor-
mation security breaches; Detection aims to discover threats as quickly as possi-
ble, Reaction includes the identification and correction of the causes of disruption, 
Crisis management aims at minimizing the effects of any disorders. In the paper, 
essential partners of the framework, organizational structure of the CIIP unit are 
also discussed, as well as the case study provided. 
Shuyuan Mary Ho (2008) represented a solution and procedures of coordi-
nated defense. In the paper, the nature of attacks has been analyzed, and counter-
measures of coordinated defense have been provided, the weakest link (the human 
element) in the layered defense has been identified. This paper contributes to the 
information systems security by providing a framework for approaching coordi-
nated defense. It benefits research into information systems security by introduc-
ing the evolutional concept of coordinated defense. According to the author, his 
solution of a coordinated defense framework aims to protect information as assets 
by technologies, policy, and best management practices for defending against co-
ordinated attacks. 
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Fig. 1.4. SABSA model (SABSA Institute, 2014) 
Also, it is noted that the framework forms unique characteristics of an infor-
mation security culture for the organization. Layered defense covers all aspects of 
defense, including social and technical aspects. Building security mechanisms and 
infrastructure comprise the first layer of this defense strategy. Secondly, a funda-
mental “deny all unless specified” access control security policy is proposed for 
implementation. The third layer in the coordinated defense model should conduct 
infrastructure threat analysis and intrusion forecasts. The fourth layer in the coor-
dinated defense model would be to monitor and detect intrusion. In the framework 
sensor technology at an infrastructure level, or systems level are built to identify 
and control activities. Besides, human (physical) activities could be monitored. 
Finally, an overarching layer of the defense emphasizes the resiliency and sustain-
ability of the defense infrastructure, where the damage assessment and impact 
analysis lead to the rebuilding of recovery and response mechanisms. 
Qingxiong Ma, Mark B. Schmidt and J. Michael Pearson (Ma et al., 2009) 
propose an integrated framework for ISM (see Fig. 1.5), in which ISM is concep-
tualized as a continuous decision making process. The rationale of this framework 
is based on four guiding principles: (1) have a goal in mind, (2) align security 
goals with business strategy, (3) ISM is a multivariate system, and (4) ISM is a 
dynamic process. Key components of the proposed ISM framework include the 
following steps: assess the organizational environment, establish information se-
curity objectives, analyze information security requirements, develop information 
security controls, and train/evaluate information security controls. The authors de-
fine ISM as a continuous improvement process intended to assure business conti-
nuity, customer confidence, and protection of business information assets and the 
minimization of damage to the business by preventing or minimizing the impact 
of security incidents. They declare, that the framework is beneficial because it 
serves as a common ground for integrating all types of information security 
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functions, helps answer questions of how to react to information security issues 
and it helps identify what the critical components involved in establishing and 
maintaining information security initiatives are. 
 
Fig. 1.5. Information security management framework (Ma, 2009) 
An organizational-level process model in Information security policy was 
proposed by Kenneth J. Knapp et al. (Knapp et al., 2009). The model (see Fig. 
1.6) suggests that a security governance program together with the organization’s 
information security office, an ongoing process of interrelated policy management 
activities, and the proper gauging of critical external and internal influences to-
gether contribute significantly to the success of an organization’s information se-
curity policies. The model provides unique value through its comprehensive, real 
world representation of an information security policy process in modern organi-
zations. The data used in the development of the model is rooted in the broad 
based experiences of those who have been most active in developing and imple-
menting organizational information security policies. Thus, this model provides a 
more complete, practice based framework that informs organizations and re-
searchers concerning the interactions of critical processes and influences that form 
an effective information security policy process.  
In the model, information security governance is an overarching category di-
rectly affecting the entire policy management process. The organization infor-
mation security office is depicted as a category supporting the policy management 
phases. The internal and external influences are depicted as global influences on 
the entire policy management process. Internal influences include senior manage-
ment support, organization culture, technology architecture, etc. External double 
arrows illustrate the two-way interaction between the policy management pro-
cesses and the internal and external influences. 
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Fig. 1.6. Comprehensive information security policy process model  
(Knapp et al., 2009) 
External influences include economic sector, industry standards, legal and 
regulatory requirements, etc. The central part of the model pictures the entire pro-
cess of organization’s security policy – it is a continuous cycle, affected by inter-
nal and external factors, where key elements are policy approval, training, imple-
mentation, monitoring, enforcement, review, risk assessment and, finally, policy 
development. 
In September 2014, the Government of South Australia approved the Infor-
mation Security Management Framework  (Government of South Australia, 
2014), which provides maximum coverage for control and risk management ob-
jectives by providing a wide array of risk management controls and is not purely 
mapped directly to the most recent standards publications, but refers to a suite of 
publications in order to provide government agencies with a comprehensive set of 
risk controls in order to appropriately protect their information and support their 
business undertakings. This framework references a set of policies, standards, 
guidelines, and control mechanisms for South Australian Government Agencies 
to use in developing their information security capabilities. It has been designed 
as a practical, useable framework, which can be implemented readily by South 
Australian Government Agencies and Suppliers to the Government of South Aus-
tralia. 
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In 2018, Gaute Wangen et al. came up with a framework, that is dedicated to 
estimating information security risk assessment method completeness. A paper, 
representing the framework, proposes the Core unified risk framework as a com-
prehensive approach to compare different methods. All-inclusive since the Core 
Unified Risk Framework was grown organically by adding new issues and tasks 
from each reviewed method. If a task or issue was present in surveyed information 
security risk assessment method, but not in Core unified risk framework, it was 
appended to the model, thus obtaining a measure of completeness for the studied 
methods. The scope of this work is primarily functional approaches risk assess-
ment procedures, which are the formal information security risk assessment meth-
ods that focus on the assessment of assets, threats, vulnerabilities, and protections, 
often with measures of probability and consequence. The proposed approach al-
lowed for a detailed qualitative comparison of processes and activities in each 
method and provided a measure of completeness.  
Romain Laborde et al. published (2019) a situation driven framework for dy-
namic security management. Authors present a dynamic security management 
framework where security policies are specified according to situations. Situation 
based policies easily express sophisticated vigorous security measures, are closer 
to business, and simplify the policy life cycle management. Situations are deter-
mined using complex event processing techniques. The framework is supported 
by a modular event based infrastructure where a dedicated situation manager 
maintains current situations allowing the command center to take dynamic situa-
tion–based authorization and obligation decisions. The whole framework has been 
implemented and showed good performance by simulation.  
1.3.2. Comparison of Information Security Management 
Frameworks 
To compare the surveyed frameworks, defined characteristics (features) had to be 
used. For this reason, we decided to use the logic modeling theory (ENISA, 2014) 
as the security strategy of the enterprise has the same principles as national cyber-
security is. ENISA presented a number of general and specific security objectives 
(ENISA, 2014), while we grouped them into five more abstract characteristics. 
All given frameworks were evaluated by the following defined characteristics: 
application of standards (C1), implementation or performance model provided 
(C2), whether the framework is a process (C3) or goal (C4) oriented, framework 
integration regarding different approaches and/or ISM levels (C5). C1 refers to 
application, implementation or reference to standards, such as ISO 27000 series, 
COBIT and others, into the framework proposed. For a successful framework 
adoption, it is essential to have in place all the steps, participants and relations 
among them; therefore, implementation or performance model (C2) of the 
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framework is among features in evaluating the ISM frameworks. Characteristics 
C3 and C4 are essential to discern whether the framework is developed for man-
agerial purposes of organization whether to assure the main aspects of the infor-
mation security – confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Value added is pro-
vided for the framework when one or more approaches (e.g., Plan-Do-Check-Act 
cycle, Command and Control system, etc.) are applied and different levels, from 
operations/service managing to international matters, are covered.  
Thinking on the application of information security framework, it is im-
portant to have a high-level view as well as a detailed framework implementation 
specification. The high-level view gives a solution to understand the overall area 
of information system management while the individual level is needed to imple-
ment it in a real situation. However, to implement the framework successfully, the 
overall area understanding is a must. As well, it is important to consider a wide 
area as possible to introduce all potential stakeholders. Therefore, we add two 
more characteristics for the comparison of ISM frameworks: framework presen-
tation in high-level abstraction concepts (C6) and different type of stakeholder 
presentation in the framework (C7). C6 is meet if the framework provides an un-
derlying architecture of information security management framework which can 
be used for information security management area understanding. While “four Ps 
of Service Design” (Clinch, 2009) should have an analog in the ISM framework 
to meet C7. 
We evaluated all overviewed ISM frameworks according to the chosen char-
acteristics (does it apply (+) to the framework fully, partially (+-), or not apply at 
all (-)) and the results are presented in Table 1.1.  
The results showed most of the analyzed solutions are internal level (organi-
zational or information security system) ISM frameworks. This proves the idea 
there is a lack of ISM framework which would consider the versatility of nowa-
days enterprise, organization or system as relationships between different stake-
holders are ignored.  
During the comparison of analyzed information security management frame-
works we noted some of the information security management frameworks could 
apply to a particular part of the organization, e.g., to the operational level, while 
others are intended to be used to the entire organization but in very abstract ap-
proach, not considering integration, partnership, external communication. In most 
cases it is high abstraction level frameworks, despites on the application area. 
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Table 1.1. A summary of Information security management frameworks’ comparison 
results 
Author Framework Purpose C
1 
C
2 
C
3 
C
4 
C
5 
C
6 
C
7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
M.M. 
Eloff1 et. al 
(Eloff, 
2000) 
Hierarchical 
framework 
for various 
approaches 
Aims to unite and integrate issues 
of certification, benchmarking, 
guidelines, codes of practice, and 
IS management approaches widely 
accepted in the international arena. 
+ - + - + + - 
Denis 
Trček  
(Trèek, 
2003) 
An integral 
framework 
for infor-
mation sys-
tems security 
management 
A layered, multi-plane approach 
based on the identification of 
threats to e-business assets, focuses 
on physical security and human in-
teractions. Technological, organi-
zational, and legislative perspec-
tives are addressed. 
+ + - + + - +- 
Bradley et. 
al (Bradley 
et al., 2004) 
An open 
framework 
for enterprise 
security man-
agement 
Aims to turn the black art of enter-
prise security management into a 
reproducible, automatable science. 
- - + - - - - 
John Sher-
wood et. al 
(Sherwood, 
2005) 
Sherwood 
Applied 
Business Se-
curity Archi-
tecture 
(SABSA) 
Designed for developing risk-
driven enterprise information secu-
rity architectures and for delivering 
security infrastructure solutions 
that support critical business initia-
tives. 
+ + + - + + - 
Manuel 
Suter 
(Suter, 
2007) 
Generic Na-
tional Frame-
work for 
Critical In-
formation In-
frastructure 
Protection  
Provides concrete solutions to meet 
country-specific needs in protecting 
critical information infrastructure 
by concentrating on top priorities, 
and cooperation between various 
stakeholders, flexibility and adapta-
bility. 
- + + - + - + 
Shuyuan 
Mary Ho 
(Ho, 2008) 
Coordinated 
defense 
framework 
Aims to protect information as as-
sets through the use of technolo-
gies, policy, and best management 
practices for defending against co-
ordinated attacks.  
+ - + - + + + 
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End of Table 1.1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Qingxiong 
Ma et. al 
(Ma et al.,  
2009) 
An integrated 
framework 
for ISM 
Intended to serve as a common 
ground for integrating all types of 
information security functions. It 
helps answer questions on how to 
react to information security issues. 
- + - + - + - 
Kenneth J. 
Knapp et. al 
(Knapp et 
al., 2009) 
An organiza-
tional- level 
process 
model 
The purpose is to provide a more 
complete, practice based frame-
work that informs organizations 
and researchers concerning the in-
teractions of key processes and in-
fluences that form an effective in-
formation security policy process.  
+ + + - - - - 
Govern-
ment of 
South Aus-
tralia  
(Govern-
ment of 
South Aus-
tralia, 2014) 
Information 
security man-
agement 
framework 
(ISMF) 
Among many objectives of the 
ISMF, the main is to support the at-
tainment and realization of three in-
formation security objectives 
across Government: Confidential-
ity, Integrity, and Availability of 
information. 
+ + + - + + + 
 
The balance between abstract level presentation and implementation step def-
inition in achieved in Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture 
(SABSA) model by John Sherwood, Andrew Clark and David Lynas (Sherwood 
et al., 2005) and Information security management framework (ISMF) by the 
Government of South Australia (Government of South Australia, 2014). These 
frameworks present a main architecture of the framework as well as provide 
guidelines for framework implementation. The difference between those two 
frameworks is application area as SABSA is organization oriented, while ISMF 
is government oriented framework. This makes ISMF harder to apply in small or 
even medium size organizations. Meanwhile, SABSA framework does not in-
volve all 4 P’s from ITIL (Clinch, 2009), which means it does not present enough 
wide organization security management area. 
In overall, it can be said that analyzed ISM frameworks do not meet all de-
picted characteristics. Frameworks consider theoretical and conceptual ap-
proaches for managing information security, and there is a lack of attention, com-
mitted to ensuring the unimpeded and resilient process of ISM as some important 
stakeholders are not considered. 
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1.4. Research on Information Security Management 
in Lithuania 
In 2015 National audit office in Lithuania released a comprehensive report on 
cybersecurity environment in Lithuania (Valstybės kontrolė, 2015). In this audit 
report, cybersecurity is viewed in a broader sense than in the Law on Cyber Secu-
rity (The Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Cyber Security, 2014), and includes 
certain elements (security of electronic information, application, network, internet 
and other information infrastructure) covered by the standards of the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the recommendations of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Ex-
cellence. As the report states, "up to 2015, development in the field of cybersecu-
rity was based on legal acts that did not clearly define the institutions responsible 
for shaping and implementing cybersecurity policy, the duties and responsibilities 
of the parties involved in cybersecurity, or organizational and technical require-
ments for cybersecurity and measures for ensuring cybersecurity. At the end of 
2014, essential changes were made to cybersecurity regulation: The Law on Cyber 
Security6 was passed, detailing how to set up, manage and control the national 
cybersecurity system and defining cybersecurity terms and other related con-
cepts." The purpose of the performed audit was to assess whether cybersecurity is 
being ensured in Lithuania, whether an effective cybersecurity system has been 
set up and cyber security is ensured in public establishments.  
In the report National audit office came up with the conclusions, that (i) in 
Lithuania, the areas of cybersecurity and electronic information security are gov-
erned by separate laws, however, implementing them is not an easy task, and the 
general public security level in these areas has so far not seen significant improve-
ment; (ii) The implementation of technical and organizational measures for cy-
bersecurity and electronic information security in the public sector is insufficient, 
and establishments are not adequately prepared to react to potential cyber threats. 
Information security management in Lithuania was analyzed in-depth by   S. 
Jastiuginas. In 2012 an article “Integral Information Security Management Model 
for Lithuanian State Institutions” was published (Jastiuginas, 2012). In the article, 
the author asserts, that for a long time the technological solutions of research prob-
lems have dominated, but lately more relevant have become the human, economic 
and other issues, and there is a need for a more managerial approach. The article 
discusses the empirical study as a theoretical integral information security man-
agement model that could be applied in practice. 
In his works (Matulevičius et al., 2010; Altuhhova et al., 2012; Pullo-
nen et al., 2017; Matulevičius, 2017) R.Matulevicius demonstrate results of a 
comprehensive analysis of business process modeling regarding information se-
curity requirements. The author proposes PE-BPMN – privacy enhanced ex 
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tensions to the BPMN language for capturing data leakages. It should be noted, 
that models proposed are related to the software development over the new ap-
proaches of information security management.  
Other information security scientists in Lithuania develop significant re-
searches that are targeted at the security of software development as well: 
•    R. Rainys researches we tied up to computer network infrastructure 
(Rainys, 2006; Kajackas et al., 2011); 
•    N. Goranin proposed a genetic algorithm based model for estimating 
the propagation rates of known and perspective Internet worms after 
their propagation reaches the satiation phase (Goranin et al. 2008); 
•    S. Ramanauskaite proposes a composite denial of service attack model 
that combines bandwidth exhaustion, filtering, and memory depletion 
models for a more realistic representation of similar cyber attacks (Ra-
manauskaitė et al. 2015); 
•    J. Janulevicius performed analysis of virtualization and risk assessment 
(Janulevičius et al., 2017); 
•    Several scientists under M.K. Ragulskis leadership performed an in-
depth analysis of cryptography. Research results were published in 
several articles (Ragulskis et al., 2007; Palevičius et al., 2015; Pet-
rauskienė et al., 2014).  
Summarizing, it can be stated, that among Lithuanian researchers, there is a 
significant interest and absorption of the information security topic. Though no 
new approaches or solutions for information security management were spotted.  
1.5. Conclusions of the First Chapter and 
Formulation of the Objectives of the Thesis  
The first chapter of this thesis provides an overview of information security man-
agement principles and existing research in this area. More significant concentra-
tion is dedicated to the analysis of existing information security management 
frameworks to define the missing elements. The following conclusions have been 
drawn: 
1. The systemic analysis of scientific papers in the field of information se-
curity management revealed the majority of the papers in the period from 
1998 till 2016 were written on the topic of risks and solutions in organi-
zational level. The importance of this topic in scientific society shows the 
importance of this problem and a variety of different issues as well as 
solutions; 
2. Existing information security management frameworks were compared 
according to 7 criteria. The comparison proved there is no one superior 
framework, able to cover all information security management related 
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areas. Therefore, a new, more holistic information security management 
framework is needed to concentrate all SME needed information security 
management relevant information; 
3. Analysis of information security management framework revealed there 
is no information security management framework, where all main stake-
holders would be included. The lack of broader information security man-
agement framework perspective does not allow a more realistic under-
standing of the situation. 
Based on the conclusions, the following tasks are formulated to achieve the 
goal: 
1. To design a new information security management framework which will 
combine high-level processes and stakeholders of ISM; 
2. To improve the applicability of proposed information security manage-
ment framework, by providing a list of associated tools to automate or 
simplify the framework usage in SME; 
3. To evaluate the proposed ISM framework and tools as information secu-
rity management improvement solution in small and medium enterprise. 
 
  

 35 
2 
2. Proposed Information 
Security Management 
Framework 
In this chapter, the new information security management framework is pre-
sented. The Information security management framework defines and extends 
stakeholders’ categories based on existing categories, by considering missing and 
influencing the ISM process categories. The construction of the proposed ISM 
framework is based on military C2, PDCA, and other paradigms. While for more 
straightforward adoption of this framework, a list of questions is presented close 
to the framework. Each question in this questionary is dedicated to analyzing a 
specific area of the framework, and a list of tools is given for each question to 
help to answer the question or to improve the situation. All idea of the framework, 
as well as its details, is described in this chapter. However, we were not able to 
find a tool for modeling or evaluation the security of enterprise management se-
curity; therefore, a need for information flows security modeling tool was identi-
fied in this chapter too. 
Analysis presented in this Chapter was published in (Kauspadiene et al., 
2017). 
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2.1. Idea of Information Security Management 
Framework 
The second generation (Solms, Information security management: The second 
generation, 1996) ISM framework must consider the nature of nowadays enter-
prise. Today business has multiple partners, uses collaborative systems, outsourc-
ing, and other third parties, which requires a broader view into organization se-
curity management. S. B. Maynard et. al (Maynard et al., 2011) identifies 9 
stakeholder categories in organization security policy development while Euro-
pean security Trends and Threats In Society (ETTIS) (European security trends 
and threats in society, 2012) uses the broader concepts of security and identifies 
7 stakeholder categories in global security area. We used a classification of 7 
stakeholder categories (see Table 2.1) to define high-level stakeholder categories, 
which acts in today’s enterprise and have to be considered to ensure organizations 
security.  
Table 2.1. High-level Information security management framework stakeholder  
categories and its relation to organization oriented and global security oriented  
stakeholder taxonomies (invented by authors) 
Stakeholders 
Category Description 
Interest/ Re-
sponsibilities 
S. B. Maynard 
Category  
(Maynard, 
Ruighaver, & 
Ahmad, 2011) 
ETTIS 
Category  
(European 
security 
trends and 
threats in 
society, 
2012) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Corporate 
governance 
Ensuring the secu-
rity of critical infra-
structure 
Critical infra-
structure secu-
rity 
Business Unit 
Representa-
tives 
Think 
tanks 
Legislative 
bodies 
Ensures Cyberspace 
monitoring 
Cyber space 
monitoring 
Legal & Regu-
latory 
Govern-
ment 
Professionals Ensures the man-
agement of infor-
mation security in a 
system level 
Information 
security man-
agement 
ICT Special-
ists; Security 
Specialists 
Industry 
IT Enterprises Enterprises, that 
provides physical 
infrastructure 
Physical infra-
structure 
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End of Table 2.2 
1 2 3 4 5 
Developers 
Academia 
Software develop-
ment 
Prepare expertise 
human resource for 
performing the pro-
cesses of infor-
mation security 
management 
Software 
Human re-
sources 
Executive Ex-
ecutive Man-
agement; Hu-
man 
Resources 
Aca-
demia/ 
research 
institu-
tions 
External par-
ties  
Collaborates with 
the organization, by 
changing different 
information, tools, 
services, etc. 
Information 
and resource 
exchange 
Public Rela-
tions; User 
Community; 
External Rep-
resentatives 
Civil So-
ciety Or-
ganisa-
tions; 
The me-
dia; The 
public  
 
Most ISM frameworks have no list of default stakeholders and require iden-
tification of stakeholders as every situation can be unique and require a different 
type of stakeholders to include. However, this approach is stakeholder identifica-
tion knowledge and practice dependent. If one or more important stakeholders 
would be missed, the final security management result can be crucial as this is a 
base for other information security management elements. Our proposed ap-
proach has 7 top level stakeholder categories, which can be divided into smaller, 
more specific ones. Therefore, the stakeholder identification, specification pro-
cess starts from these high-level categories to think of and leads to lower proba-
bility to miss some important stakeholders. 
The proposed framework has needed information security management com-
ponents too. In Fig. 2.1, essential elements in performing information security 
management are shown. It is a matter-of-course that the continuous and resilient 
processes are the gist of information security management performance.  
Information security management processes are performed by profession-
als – an expertise human element, e.g., CISO (Chief Information Security Of-
ficer), that are prepared by academia and science institutions. This is the core of 
the proposed framework as presents the organization level. The organization has 
multiple processes (internal as well as external), which are the engine of the com-
pany. The organization enables a command to manage and installs a control to 
perform monitoring of these processes. For continuous development, best-prac-
tice-based processes optimization should be organized. However, all innovations 
and optimizations have to be audited and confirmed by certain control to meet 
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organization needs, regulatory compliance, and security requirements. All the 
production (or services the organization provide) is dependent on organization, 
processes and optimization elements, while command and control (C2) denotes 
the set of organizational and technical attributes and processes by which an en-
terprise marshals and employs human, physical, and information resources to 
solve problems and accomplish tasks (Vassiliou, M., 2015). Military system C2 
should be applied for the monitoring and management of the processes (see Fig-
ure 6). This is required as the human factor is the weakest link of any security 
system, and the biggest attention in security management should be given to the 
processes, performed by people. Cyber warfare command and control system 
demonstrates that defense in-depth can be taken to a new level that is active and 
anticipatory rather than passive and reactive (Howes et al., 2004). 
 
Fig. 2.1. Core elements (organization level) of HISMF (invented by authors) 
 
Fig. 2.2. Main components of organization security level (invented by authors) 
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The Deming cycle Plan-do-check-act (PDCA) is another approach which 
was integrated as a must in the framework (see Fig. 2.2). Based on application 
criteria, specific standards and methodologies should be applied to the ISM of the 
organization (Methods section, Fig. 2.2). According to security standards and 
technologies, security actions are planned and later integrated into the infor-
mation security platform. The information security platform is a set of physical 
tools used for information security implementation. Usually, the information se-
curity platform depends on organizations technical capabilities and professionals, 
which are capable of using those tools correctly and of obtaining clear evidence 
on the efficiency of implemented security tools. This includes an analysis of or-
ganization information, its compliance to specific controls, and acting according 
to a particular situation, defined in standards and methodologies. 
 
Fig. 2.3. High-level self-sustaining Information Security Management Framework  
(invented by authors) 
To understand the relations between components of organization security 
level and ISM shareholders and responsibilities or functions they perform (see 
Table 2.1), four additional sections are identified (Fig. 2.3): (1) prevention is done 
by cyber space monitoring in the software level, according regulations, issued by 
the legislative bodies, and involves control and information elements, as the con-
trol of information plays one of the major roles in IS prevention, weather it is data 
leakage, fraud, etc.; (2) regulations are issued by legislative bodies and imple-
mented at the cyber space monitoring and physical infrastructure levels, and in-
volves control and information elements due to ensure processes compliance to 
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national as well as international law (personal data protection, audit procedures, 
laws of cyber space, etc.); (3) systems (at the software level provided by the de-
velopers community) and (4) equipment (at the hardware – physical infrastructure 
, provided by IT enterprises) serves to the corporate government by assuring the 
security of critical infrastructure, whereas the security is implemented under the 
commands given by organization. 
When the organization is growing, the continuous improvement loop – 
PDCA cycle – turns around bringing new informational security management 
challenges that influence stakeholders’ demands. To provide more specific guid-
ance, we mapped the PDCA cycle to security level as well as associated all ele-
ments of the HISMF to particular top-level stakeholder category or its responsi-
bility (Fig. 2.3). As external parties can be of very different type and purpose they 
can act in different responsibility areas, however, they should be treated as exter-
nal level and separated from the organizational or even security level. Therefore, 
partners are linked to the elements of standards and methodology, security, inte-
grated security platform, and information.     
Self-responsive cyber security network, generated by the High-level infor-
mation security management framework, is based on five resilience principles 
(Vries, 2010): self-merging, robustness, viability, flexibility, and interoperability. 
Instructional design of self-sustainable components of high-level information se-
curity management framework is arranged to form a self-organizing system. Self-
refreshingness on demand, based upon distributed stakeholders’ initiative, ena-
bles the system to self-awareness.  
The high-level information security management framework represents a 
broader approach to collaborative information security network defense. This 
framework represents security processes demystification paradigm, based upon 
embed systems participate development. Four sections of the model correspond 
to a viable, resilient cyber security system that is based upon the inter-linked par-
ticipate network. Cybersecurity demand is fulfilled in this system as a co-working 
crowd source-based IT system integration pattern in complex self-repellent envi-
ronment. Various challenges, as the provision of skills and competencies, are 
conglomerated as general PDCA model acts upon the supervision of framework 
stakeholders’ superiority. Superior forces of self-referencing development of 
technological capabilities are fulfilled by using foremost open-source tools of 
self-referring standards that are proclaimed as best practice-based knowledge as-
sets.   
The framework provides a new approach to organization informational se-
curity management challenge and can be suitable for any organization. Emerging 
organization growth is considered in high-level information security management 
framework – processes are controlled on demand using C2 paradigm, utilizing 
the PCDA cycle collaborate stakeholders grid efforts. 
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2.2. Guidelines for Application of Proposed 
Framework 
The proposed ISM framework defines important requirements to ensure security. 
This is very useful when the enterprise is newly established, and its structure, 
policies might be changed. As well the proposed framework concentrates all 
needed information into one framework; therefore, it is suitable for SME as not 
enough resources can be assigned to gather all required information from differ-
ent or very detailed sources. Meanwhile, if existing SME has its structure and 
management policies, it might be necessary to evaluate how close the enterprise 
is to the proposed framework. Therefore, a questionary was developed to serve 
as a checklist both for newly designed ISM structure as well as evaluating the 
current situation. 
For the high-level information security management framework readiness 
evaluation self-assessment sheet based on methodology, developed by infor-
mation technology promotion agency (Japan), is presented. This self-assessment 
sheet is one component of the overall cyber security picture. This self-assessment 
cannot reveal all types of information security weaknesses, and additional means 
of determining an organization’s security management situation should be used. 
However, it is dedicated to highlighting the need for change in the ISM.  
The user of this self-assessment sheet must go through all questions (see Ta-
ble 2.2.) in the questionary and answer by selecting the answer “Yes,” “No,” 
“Partially” or “N/a” (not applicable). The answer “Yes” indicated the area, cov-
ered within the questionary is suitable in the SME, while other responses indi-
cated the area should be inspected additionally. As well existing tools are listed 
to each question to suggest the answer or take some additional actions to change 
the situation. 
As mentioned above – the self-assessment sheet is not dedicated to evaluat-
ing the security level. It is more oriented to identification of areas, which require 
more in-depth analysis. The self-assessment sheet should be used as a checklist 
for information security management as the questions, and elements will show 
whether the SME is covering the area and if they are not, they will have a set of 
tools, dedicated to doing so.  
For each question, a tool for answer deriving or situation modification was 
selected. The tools will help the person to derive objective answers rather than 
based on personal opinion. However, one additional problem was noticed – there 
are no tools for evaluation of SME management security (there are tools for pro-
cess modeling in terms of cost, time and other criteria; however, no security 
measures are indicated).  
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Table 2.2. Proposed self-assessment sheet, used as a checklist in information security 
management process 
No Question Yes No Partly N/a Tools 
General 
1.  Does organization install clearly doc-
umented control and command ena-
bling mechanisms? 
 
 
    Controllers 
checklist for data 
protection self as-
sessment (Infor-
mation Commis-
sioner’s Office, 
2018) 
2.  Does organization monitor all pro-
cesses? 
    SOLVE (Con-
ventus, 2018) 
3.  Does organization execute audits on 
control mechanisms? 
    NMAP (NMAP, 
2018)  
4.  Does organization apply best security 
practices and standards? 
    ENISA (Manso 
et al., 2015) 
5.  Does organization optimize manage-
ment and operational processes? 
    Not found 
Management 
6.  Does organization apply PDCA cycle 
for ISM? 
    PDCA Checklist 
(HIMMS, 2018) 
7.  Does organization have clear security 
regulations? 
    ISO/IEC 27001 
for SMEs 
(Valdevit et al., 
2009) 
8.  Does organization apply prevention 
mechanisms? 
    Information Se-
curity Risk As-
sessment Check-
list (Argi 
Business Insur-
ance Services) 
9.  Does risk analysis is executed in the 
organization? 
    CORAS (Fredrik-
sen et al., 2002) 
Technical 
10.  Does organization have enough tech-
nical capabilities to operate? 
    NetworkAlliance 
(NetworkAlli-
ance, 2018) 
11.  Does organization ensure the IT (soft-
ware, network, etc.) security? 
    CySeMoL EAAT 
(Rabbani, 2016) 
12.  Does organization uses needed physi-
cal infrastructure? 
    Information Se-
curity Physical & 
Environmental 
Protection Stand-
ard (State of Min-
nessota, 2010) 
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Typically, an expert is used to evaluate the situation and propose some 
improvements. This makes the optimization of management processes 
complicated. Therefore, a simplified tool or tools for SME management security 
modeling would be valuable to increase the SME security level. 
2.3. Conclusions of the Second Chapter  
1. The proposed information security management framework provides an 
evolutionary approach to organization informational security manage-
ment challenge and can be suitable for any organization, particularly for 
SMEs, as none of the existing and analyzed frameworks meet the fea-
tures, that are necessary for nowadays organization ensures its security. 
Therefore, all needed knowledge in one framework can reduce the time, 
needed to find and gather it from different sources. 
2. The proposed framework is adapted to cover emerging organization 
growth as processes are controlled on demand using the Command and 
Control paradigm, utilizing the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle collaborate 
stakeholders grid efforts. 
3. In the framework, there are defined stakeholders of a whole system of 
Information security management. Stakeholders are: Legislative bodies 
(ensure cyberspace monitoring), Corporate governance (ensure the secu-
rity of critical infrastructure), Universities (provision of expertise human 
resource), IT enterprises (provides physical infrastructure), Professionals 
(management of information security in a system-level) and Developers’ 
community (software development), External parties (all external com-
munications). These stakeholder categories ensure a wide area of infor-
mation security management will be analyzed by leaving no space for 
stakeholders influence no estimation. 
4. The High-level information security management framework can serve 
practitioners as guidelines for the development of an overall information 
security plan or program in their organizations as associated tools are 
provided to make sure its smooth implementation in SME. 
5.  High-level information security management framework distinguishes 
from existing solutions by its integration of the important information 
security management paradigms and the defined stakeholders' list and its 
interactions. 
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3 
3. Information Security 
Evaluation Models for 
Small and Medium 
Enterprise  
To execute ISM, some tools can be useful as they allow the automation of some 
complex tasks or works as decision support systems to get more suitable decisions. 
In this chapter, existing information security evaluation and/or modeling tools are 
analyzed, and a lack of solutions in strategy and organization perspectives is miss-
ing. Based on the tool analysis and previous analysis of existing ISM frameworks, 
a list of models, dedicated to model and evaluate information security level in 
organization perspective and structure aspect are presented. The new models are 
proposed to cover the most important areas of ISM and are dedicated to getting 
the data leakage, data availability, and data integrity levels for different infor-
mation flows, objects in the organization. The models are based on probability 
theory and consider the enterprise management structure, hardware, and software 
related metrics as well as human error factors. While hardware and software as-
sociated metrics are used in multiple tools, human based factors are poorly ana-
lyzed in information security modeling and evaluation tools. 
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The analysis and research presented in this chapter was published in  
(Kauspadiene L., 2018). 
3.1. Analysis of Information Security Evaluation 
Tools 
Enterprise analysis and modeling have tools developed to optimize enterprise op-
erating properties and give advantages compared to competitors. Enterprise mod-
eling covers an extensive area and enables to “use multiple, interrelated views to 
describe the properties of an enterprise system and its surrounding environment” 
(Atkinson, 2015). Ulrich Frank (Frank, 2014) states that multi-perspective enter-
prise modeling has three perspectives – strategy, organization, information sys-
tem. They can be modeled in four different aspects – resource, structure, process, 
goal (see Fig. 3.1). Combining these perspectives and aspects produces 12 differ-
ent enterprise modeling views. 
 
Fig. 3.1. High level enterprise security modeling perspectives and aspects (U. Frank, 
2014) (red notated views are lacking models in terms of security while blue notated 
views already have such models) 
U. Frank’s model is not a limit to the scope of enterprise modeling views. 
Previously, security was considered to be a separate modeling area. However, 
modern tendencies indicate that a precise security evaluation is interdisciplinary. 
Therefore integrating (Ekstedt, & Sommestad, 2009) it as a part of enterprise mod-
eling is a more promising approach, as enterprises heavily rely and sometimes are 
based on IT. Existing security models are used for enterprise modeling in the per-
spective of information systems. As one of the examples to illustrate this comes 
to a new approach to use attack–defense stochastic game Petri nets (Wang et al., 
2013) to model enterprise network to analyze its security issues. Therefore, it 
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covers resource (C09) and structure (C10) aspects of information system perspec-
tive in enterprise modeling. Petri nets provide security related metrics for more 
in-depth analysis; therefore, risk assessment models (Aa-gedal, Den Braber, Di-
mitrakos, Gran, Raptis, & Stolen, 2002) can be used to get risk assessment results. 
Another approach – the Cyber Security Modeling Language (CySeMoL) (Som-
mestad, Ekstedt, & Holm, 2013) is designed for enterprise level system architec-
ture analysis. Using attack trees (Holm, Shahzad, Buschle, & Ekstedt, 2015) to 
describe the attack scenarios defines the risk probability for each component in 
the designed model. Combining these features with visualization possibilities (Ek-
stedt, Johnson, Lagerstrom, Gorton, Nydren, & Shahzad, 2015) simplifies the 
analysis of the security situation as well as the presentation of the situation to the 
non-IT executive staff. Moreover, the approach enables automated model creation 
based on scanning (Buschle, Holm, Sommestad, Ekstedt, & Shahzad, 2011) the 
scan logs of infrastructure security software products. Various security models 
exist for modeling enterprise from the perspective of information systems. As the 
IT usage in enterprise evolves, new security models, including cloud computing 
(Kazim, & Evans, 2016) are developed to meet the needs of an enterprise. How-
ever, organizational and strategic perspectives of enterprise modeling in terms of 
security are not as advanced. 
UML notation has several extensions for security oriented process modeling: 
UMLsec (Jurgens, 2002) adds a security related notation to UML diagrams; how-
ever, it does not provide with the process security level metrics. Moreover, it is 
strictly related to the security of an information system. The development of a 
more detailed process security analysis for the UMLsec requires the usage of ad-
ditional components. In this case, BPMN (Rodriguez, Fernandez-Medina, & Pi-
attini, 2007; Altuhhov, Matulevicius, Ahmen, 2013) can be a favorable solution. 
In terms of the role assignment and management process, another extension – 
SecureUML (Lodderstedt, Basin, & Doser, 2002) exists. It provides a well known 
tool for RBAC implementation. Moreover, additional models for rode design (Pis-
toia, Fink, Flynn, & Yahav, 2007), privacy ensuring in role assignment (He, & 
Anton, 2003) are useful for the enterprise modeling as well. 
However, there is a lack of alignment between structures and processes of 
information systems and organizations (Danesh, Loucopoulos, & Yu, 2015). The 
enterprise strategy and structure does not address security issues with enough fo-
cus. P. Michelberger et al. (Michelberger, & Labodi, 2012) proposes a holistic and 
process centered enterprise security model; however, there are no suitable tools to 
model all components of the framework. Different aspects of IT security at differ-
ent levels of abstraction, including the entire lifecycle of IT security systems 
(Goldstein, & Frank, 2016) have to be considered for deep modeling of security 
in enterprise analysis. 
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Infowatch global data leakage report (Global data leakage report 2015) spec-
ifies that the number of data breaches shows an annual increase. Recent research 
data stress the importance of human behavior within the enterprise for enterprise 
security (Evans, Maglaras, He, & Janicke, 2016). However, statistical comparison 
of years 2016 and 2017 (Infowatch 2017) show the increase of accidental data 
leaks by 36.9%. This means that almost half of data leakages occur with loyal 
employees and no external attacks. Data leakage occurs due to non-existent data 
monitoring, data leakage prevention systems (Wuchner, & Pretschner, 2012) and 
insufficient security policies (Data Leakage Worldwide: The Effectiveness of Se-
curity Policies, 2014). 
This thesis proposes a model for enterprise management structure in terms of 
information security (confidentiality, availability, and integrity). The model takes 
into account the enterprise management, as well as data flow environment prop-
erties. The model is oriented towards the management instead that technical fea-
tures of the enterprise, therefore covers the view, which is missing in enterprise 
security modeling. 
3.2. Proposed Information Flow Security Evaluation 
Model  
A typical information flow security analysis is performed at the level of imple-
mentation of hardware and software. The human factor is ignored in most cases. 
However, in practice, human error is one of the weakest links in the enterprise 
security (Streeter, 2013). Typically, the foundation of an enterprise structure is 
designed according to business needs with no attention to its security metrics. The 
structure might be modified later, according to requirements of implementation 
and continual improvement security standards and best practices (e.g., ISO 27001 
and 27002, NIST 800-53, PCI DSS, etc.). Meanwhile, the presence of enterprise 
data security models would allow designing an enterprise with initial security in 
mind, thus allowing analysis and monitoring of the current structure. 
Bell-LaPadula model (Bell, & LaPadula, 1973) is the most known security 
model, defining the rules for data confidentiality. Although there are arguments 
about the security of Bell-LaPadula model (McLean, 1985), it is supported by 
military organizations, used as the base for improved, up to date security models 
(Balamurugan, Shivitha, Monisha, & Saranya, 2015). It is based on a principle to 
assign different security levels to objects and subjects, appended by the policy for 
subject to write data to higher or the same security level objects while reading 
lower or the same security level objects. Although this model can be adapted to 
vertical hierarchy management structures, modern enterprises tend to have more 
complex management and information flow structures. This complicates the ad-
aptation of the Bell-La Padula model. 
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The security levels of our proposed model are represented by the concept of 
“subordination flow.” It defines the governable nodes of the enterprise and the 
ones with the duty to provide information. The subordination flow has to be pro-
vided according to the management policies of the enterprise.  
Using the subordination allows the definition of the difference in security 
levels of the governable node compared to the superior node. The relative security 
level does not require predefined security classes, therefore allowing the modeling 
of situations when two departments of the enterprise have control over each other 
in different areas. An example of the model notation with two-directional subor-
dination flows is presented Fig. 3.2. In this case, the government requires specific 
accountability from the enterprise; the head of the enterprise dedicates the task to 
the Finance department (one person in this example); the head of the enterprise 
defines the strategy of the enterprise and presents it to the management depart-
ment; the management department is the center node, which coordinates the work 
between enterprise clients, designers, programmers and IT administrator; clients 
contact the management department (no specific person) with initial requirements, 
while management department responds to a particular client by providing the 
project details, price, and other questions; there is no subordination flow between 
the client and the management department; the management department com-
mands the IT administrator to get certain IT services for the client; management 
department shares new project ideas with design and programming departments; 
when a responsible person from the design and programming department is as-
signed to execute the project, these persons communicate with the appointed man-
ager from the management department to get more details and present the de-
signed products; the programmer has a right to contact the project designer and to 
require additional design elements; the programmers can request specific IT ser-
vices from the IT administrator to implement the fully functioning project so the 
IT administrator may send login information for the project IT services etc. 
The description of the analyzed small website development enterprise man-
agement structure and information flows requires a long explanation. It can be-
come even more complex when dealing with a medium or big enterprise. Mean-
while, the notation used in Fig. 3.3 provides the elements (departments and 
positions, persons in the enterprise) and basic subordination and information flow 
directions as well as the type of the flow (dedicated to one person in the depart-
ment or all persons in the department). Even more details are planned to be pro-
vided by an interactive tool for each of the node and the edge. 
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Fig. 3.2. Example of management structure in a small enterprise 
The meta-model of the enterprise management structure is provided in 
Fig. 3.3. It consists of four main classes: 
1. ManagementNode object indicates an element of the enterprise manage-
ment structure. It can be an individual or a department. Depending on the 
type of the ManagementNode, additional information is required for spec-
ification of the number of persons in the department, person’s position in 
the enterprise, etc.; 
2. SubordinationFlow connects two ManagementNodes and provides infor-
mation on which management node is superior and which is governable; 
3. InformationObject defines the information object, which will be sent or 
managed by the enterprise. The InformationObject object is associated 
with SubordinationFlow object to define by which command the infor-
mation could be sent. If there is no SubordinationFlow objects for the In-
formationObject object, the model assumes there is no policy, which 
specifies the initiator of the necessity to provide information flow. Each 
InformationObject object can be composed of multiple other Infor-
mationObject objects. This illustrates situations where information can be 
composed, filtered, generated or just stored as it is; 
4. InformationFlow object defines the transfer of information from one 
ManagementNode to another. During the transfer, some information has 
to be sent; therefore, one of InformationObject objects from the sending 
ManagementNode objects have to be specified. The data leak depends on 
the transfer environment. The model defines three main types of transfer 
environments: DirectCommunicationData that represents data transfer 
during a vocal conversation; DigitalData that represents data transfer us-
ing network communication; and PlysicalData that represents data trans-
fer when information is written to some external device or printed, vary-
ing depending on the situation. The specification of InformationFlow 
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types is necessary as each type of transferring environment has its char-
acteristics. They include data format, protocol, delivery service, commu-
nication environment publicity, etc. 
 
Fig. 3.3. Basic meta-model structure for enterprise management structure modeling 
The meta-model allows tracing of information flow from one node to another. 
The visual model notation does not provide the information on Information Object 
operations or information flow. However, meta-model analysis can provide the 
flow path and information flow structure (composition or share data of different 
information flows). 
The best way to analyze security risks is to analyze information confidential-
ity, availability, and integrity separately. This separation of different aspects can 
be used for various type organizations. For example, some organizations might 
collect publicly available data and publish it to the public.  This kind of organiza-
tions requires information availability and integrity to be ensured, while the data 
confidentiality is not important (at least not for all data).  
3.3. Estimation of Data Leakage Probability 
The most intuitive metric to express data leakage is data leakage probability. The 
data leakage probability may vary for different nodes on the enterprise. This is 
caused by the individual characteristics of each information transfer, including 
different departments and employee, the number of subjects the information is 
shared with, etc. When the information flow path is known, the probabilities of 
data leakage in each of the nodes PCn(ni) can be defined, evaluating each transfer 
between enterprise nodes PCt(ci). The probability of at least one leakage to happen 
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(3.1) 
(3.2) 
PC(f) can be evaluated using equation 3.1. Evaluation of a leakage in the infor-
mation flow path means that the data confidentiality is compromised if at least 
one person with no privileges to read the data gets access to it. 
𝑃!(𝑓) = 1 − ()(1 − 𝑃!"(𝑛#))$#%& + ∙ ()-1− 𝑃!'(𝑐#)/(#%& +. 
In Eq. (1) there PC(f) is the probability of information flow f to be leaked in 
at least one of nodes or transfers; N – number of nodes in the information flow 
path; PCn(ni) – the probability of the node i to leak data; M – number of transfers 
in the information flow path; PCt(ci)– the probability to leak data during the data 
transfer i. 
3.3.1. Estimation of Probability to Leak Data During the Data 
Transfer 
The probability of data leakage during the data transfer is estimated according to 
the technical data. Based on the data transfer technologies, existing vulnerabilities 
are identified. For each of these vulnerabilities the confidentiality impact C and 
likelihood L can be estimated and multiplied. In this version we use simplified 
data leakage probability for data transfer estimation. This method relies on Na-
tional Vulnerability Database (National Vulnerability Database, 2018) (NVD) for 
vulnerability identification and uses modified base score value BS of Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System v3.0 (Common Vulnerability Scoring System v3.0, 
2018) (CVSS). To get the probability of data leakage during the data transfer base 
score BS is divided by 10 to get the probability of the vulnerability and calculate 
the probability of at least one vulnerability to be exposed to the channel (see equa-
tion 3.2). This probability is multiplied by probability of the organIization to be 
attacked from the outside Pr(r) and probability of the channel to be accessible to 
an external attacker Pa(ai). The probability that the organization is be attacked 
from outside Pr(r) is based on statistical data. For example, 55% of large enter-
prises and 33% of small enterprises were attacked by an unauthorized outsider in 
2014 (Information security breaches survey 2014). Meanwhile the probability that 
channel i is be accessible to an external attacker Pa(ai) is estimated by modeling 
the certain enterprise IT architecture. 
𝑃!'(𝑐#) = 1 − 1)21 − 𝐵𝑆)10 6*)%& 7 ∙ 𝑃+(𝑟) ∙ 𝑃,(𝑎#). 
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(3.5) 
In Eq. (3.2), there BSj is modified CVSS base score for vulnerability j; K – 
the number of vulnerabilities for transfer channel i; Pr(r) – attack probability 
against this type of enterprise; Pa(ai) – channel i accessibility by external attacker. 
The same method and metric values as CVSS v3.0 is used for the modified 
base score estimation. The only difference is in base impact subscore ISCBase esti-
mation – rather than using the probability of at least one of confidentiality, integ-
rity and availability to occur (see equation 3.3), only confidentiality impact value 
is used (see equation 4). 
 𝐼𝑆𝐶-,./ = 1− <-1− 𝐼𝑀𝑃01"2/ ∙ -1 − 𝐼𝑀𝑃3"'/4/ ∙ (1 − 𝐼𝑀𝑃56,#7)>. (3.3) 
 𝐼𝑆𝐶-,./ = 𝐼𝑀𝑃01"2 .	 (3.4) 
 
In Eq. (3.3) and (3.4), there IMPconf is confidentiality impact value; IMPInteg 
is integrity impact value; IMPAvail is availability impact value. 
3.3.2. Estimation of Probability to Leak Data by Enterprise 
Node 
The estimation of data leakage probability at an enterprise node, be it person, de-
partment or a group of persons, relies on human factors rather than only IT spec-
ifications. Five main threats are taken into account for enterprise node data leak-
age probability estimation. Each threat is associated with data leakage likelihood 
values nl. Therefore, enterprise node data leakage probability is equal to the prob-
ability of occurrence of at least one of human error (refer to  
equation 3.5).  
𝑃!"(𝑛#) = 1 − 1)-1− 𝑛𝑙) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓/8)%& 7. 
In Eq. (3.5), there nlj is data leakage likelihood value for threat j; conf – em-
ployee confidentiality level coefficient for node i; τ – the number of relevant 
threats for node i. 
Equation 3.5 facilitates threats, relevant to the node. The list of possibly rel-
evant threats is specified in Table 3.1. According to Infowatch Global Data Leak-
age Report 2015 (Global data leakage report 2015) data leakage depends on per-
son’s position in the enterprise. Therefore, the data leakage likelihood value nl is 
modified to illustrate the change of confidentiality level of different positions of 
the enterprise. Five enterprise positions are analyzed (see Table 3.2). They have 
their confidentiality level coefficient cof and should be associated for each enter-
prise structure nodes. 
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Probabilities and coefficients in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 are provided as ex-
amples and should be defined and updated periodically by statistical or expert 
evaluation data in global, national or enterprise sector level. 
Table 3.1. List of human factor errors: threats and data leakage likelihood values for 
data leakage probability estimation of the enterprise management structure node 
Threat Model situation Data leak likelihood, nl 
Person uses IT to store or pro-
cess information and the data 
can be leaked because of IT 
vulnerabilities. 
Node properties de-
fine what IT is used 
to process and 
store, as well as 
specify the infor-
mation flow. 
Calculated according to 
modified CVSS score (see 
Chapter 3.3.1) for applicable 
NVD data. 
Person has secret information 
and leaks data accidently or on 
purpose. 
Node stores one or 
more information 
objects. 
0.020 (Thommesen, & An-
dersen, 2012) 
Person confusingly sends secret 
data to a lower security level 
person or department. 
Node stores multi-
ple information ob-
jects and sends it to 
one or more differ-
ent nodes.* 
0.016 (Thommesen, & An-
dersen, 2012) Node stores one or 
more information 
objects and sends 
different infor-
mation to multiple 
nodes.* 
Person confusingly sends the 
data to a wrong to specific em-
ployee in a department. 
Node sends infor-
mation to one per-
son in a multiper-
son department. 
0.006 
Unauthorized person sends 
data. This shows accountability 
problems and the possibility for 
confidential information to be 
shared. 
Node sends infor-
mation with no as-
sociated subordina-
tion flow. 
0.050 
* does not apply if all receiving nodes issued the subordination flow for all information objects the sending node 
owns. In this case the receiver gets wrong information, however the data is not leaked as it is sent to the same 
person with a right to access it. 
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Table 3.2. Data leak likelihood correction coefficients for different type enterprise  
structure nodes 
Node type Position/Department type Confidentiality level coefficient cof 
Individual 
Employee 1.05 
Contractor 1.02 
System administrator 1.00 
Executive 0.99 
Department 
Hierarchical structure 1.00 
Flat structure 1.02 
3.4. Availability Evaluation Model 
While methods for automated security risk evaluation based on computer infra-
structure exist, the automated security risk evaluation based on information man-
agement structure and human behavior is still missing. To fulfill this gap, we pro-
pose a method, which analyzes the information management scheme and derives 
the probabilistic data availability metric by estimating security needs at the com-
puterized information flow management nodes. 
Data availability depends on the number of possible data sources. If there are 
multiple data sources and one cause is unavailable, it is possible to use other ones. 
This means that the overall data availability can be calculated as a probability that 
at least one data source is available at the moment. 
To get data for the availability estimation, the visual notation is a handful 
tool, allowing a clear data flow presentation. UML (Larman, 2000) or BPMN 
(Chinosi et al., 2012) are one of the most used tools in such cases, and they can 
be used in this model too. However, in the future, this model should be combined 
with confidentiality and integrity evaluation models where enterprise hierarchy 
plays an important role. As BPMN is oriented to present business process flow 
rather than business management structure, the standard BPMN is not suitable for 
this solution; meanwhile, UML is more engineering oriented and would need ad-
ditional enterprise based notation. The enterprise management structure based no-
tation is proper and preferred comparing to UML to adopt this model in business 
areas, with no need of security or information technology specialist – to draw en-
terprise hierarchy and information flows for business area person is easier com-
paring to drawing detailed business process scheme. 
For this model, we use notation, presented in Fig. 3.2. It allows the definition 
of an enterprise hierarchy, by using subordination flows. As well we can define 
one person or group of persons. This is very important for confidentiality; how-
ever, it plays an essential role in availability evaluation too. Also, each member 
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of the group has data copy, so the availability is improved compared to the situa-
tion when one person has the data on his supervision.     
The definition of enterprise information management structure is just the first 
step in availability evaluation. As this diagram is the hierarchy and information 
transfer direction oriented, it does not allow the definition of separate information 
flows. Therefore, the second step is to define information objects in the model. 
The user defines each information object, by selecting information flows it con-
tains, its order and by defining properties for each of the information flow. 
Each information flow in the information object has to be detailed by provid-
ing such information as: 
1. Transfer type – defines the transfer environment. The list of possible en-
vironments can vary. It is important as the data availability in each envi-
ronment is different. Accordingly, each transfer environment is associated 
with the according to the probability of data availability PAt(); 
2. Storage by the receiver – the amount of time the receiver stores the infor-
mation. In some cases, the receiver resends the information, and no stor-
age is done. In such cases, the receiver can cause the delay; however, it 
will not increase the availability as the copy of the information will not 
be stored by him or her; 
3. Usage by the receiver – defines can the receiver change the information. 
Modification of received information enables deleting important parts of 
the information, while storage without modification ensures that the ini-
tial information is available. The type of actions the receiver can execute 
on received information influences its availability, therefore each type of 
actions has an associated data availability; 
4. Receiver’s availability PAn() – the receiver availability throughout the 
time. If one person stores the information and the person is unavailable, 
the information will be unavailable too. So, the parameter defines the 
probability of the receiver’s availability to provide information all the 
time; 
5. Receiver’s storage availability PAs() – defines the receiver’s computer re-
sistance to denial of service or data unavailability. This parameter should 
be calculated by other tools, designed to evaluate computers or computer 
infrastructures availability. 
In the second step, the user defines all information flows for each information 
object. This includes modification of the object; therefore, the probability of data 
availability is calculated for each version of the information object. Thus, the third 
step divides the information object into information object versions. This is done 
according to Usage by receiver property – if the user can modify the information 
object; from this point, we assume it as a new version of the object. 
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(3.6) 
The information processing sequence plays a vital role in terms of required 
incoming data. If a node needs specific information to finish its tasks, generate 
new information, the delay or absence on needed incoming flow stops the new 
information generation process; therefore, the further information is unavailable 
at the moment when incoming data is delayed. So, if we divide information object 
into M versions, probability of each information object versions depends on the 
availability of the previous version.  
In the fourth step, we analyze the availability of each version of the infor-
mation object. The probability is calculated as the probability of all needed previ-
ous versions available (PAv 1()) and the probability that the version is available 
in at least one of nodes which stores the version of an information object (PAN()). 
The PAv 1() can be calculated as availability production of all L needed infor-
mation object versions. As the first version of the information object is original 
and there are no previous versions, the availability of the initial version of the 
information object is equal to (3.6). 𝑃56(𝑓) = 𝑃569&(𝑓) ∙ 𝑃5$(𝑓) = 
()𝑃569&(𝑖):#%& + ∙ 11 −)(1 − 𝑃5'(𝑗) ∙ 𝑃5"(𝑗) ∙ 𝑃5.(𝑗))*)%& 7. 
As each information object version is stored in K nodes, the PAN() is calcu-
lated as a probability at least in one of those nodes we will be able to get the 
version of the information object. The information availability in the node de-
pends on nodes ability to get data or availability of transfer environment PAt(), 
availability of the node itself PAn() and availability of nodes storage PAs(). All three 
parameters are important for data availability in the node as at least one of those 
stages the data will be unavailable, the access to the data will not be possible. 
As the availability of each version of information object PAv() is dependent 
on the availability of previous versions PAv-1() the sequence of PAv() calculation 
have to be executed starting from the oldest versions to the newest ones. This 
generates the availability of information object for each version. The availability 
of the information flow is equal to the availability of the last version. Meanwhile 
the data availability of the entire enterprise is equal to the lowest availability be-
tween all information flows in the enterprise. The abstract scheme of all availabil-
ity evaluation steps is presented in Fig. 3.4. 
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Fig. 3.4. Abstract scheme of the steps to evaluate enterprise availability  
based on its information management structure 
The application of this method is uncomplicated if information transferring 
environment, node and node’s storage (usually personal computer) availability is 
known. All the availabilities can be unique for each enterprise as well can vary 
for a different node in the information management structure. We propose to use 
EAAT or another similar tool in parallel for security analysis of computer infra-
structure in the enterprise. The results of this analysis can be used as metrics for 
transfer PAt() and node storage PAs() availability estimation, while the node’s 
availability PAn() can be calculated according to employee contract conditions. 
3.5. Integrity Evaluation Model 
By analyzing existing literature, real world examples, and generating different sit-
uations, a list of factors influencing information integrity was derived: 
• Format of the information object. Some file formats are dedicated for 
editing while others are difficult to change. The easier to change the 
information, the bigger the probability it will be changed (acci-
dentally or no); 
• The number of persons, possible to access and change the infor-
mation. Each person who can access the information might change 
the information object, damage, or delete it; 
• Information transfer channel. Information might be altered by its us-
ers or third parties during the data transfer or getting access to the 
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storage. Therefore, it is essential how safe is the transfer channel 
from the sender to the receiver. This is a more technical aspect; how-
ever, it should be integrated into integrity estimation calculation; 
• Security of information storage. This is another technical element, 
which defines how secure the information is while it is stored in dif-
ferent locations or the organization. If the computer where the em-
ployer stores the information is compromised, third parties can 
change the data and reduce the integrity of the information object; 
• Human factors. The integrity of the information object can be re-
duced by unsuitable employees work with it. If the employee does 
not know how to work with a specific system, is stressed, not con-
centrated, etc., he or she can accidentally damage the information ob-
ject; 
• Logging and backup system usage. The bigger number of infor-
mation object copies exist, the bigger probability to trace the modifi-
cation of information object or reconstruction of original data. 
All these mentioned factors and more specific situations can be divided into 
three main categories: information storage environment; information transfer en-
vironment; human factors. The first two can be obtained by modeling and evalu-
ating the organizations IT infrastructure (by using CySeMoL EAAT tool or other), 
while the third one can by estimated be analyzing statistical data on human error 
accidents or experimentally the human error resistance in different situations. 
For information integrity estimation we will use those three summarized met-
rics: integrity corruption probability during transfer from node a to node b PIt(a, b), 
integrity corruption probability while storage in node a PIs(a), integrity corruption 
probability by its user (human factors) in node a PIh(a). In order to understand the 
occurrences of these probabilities in the information flow, an example situation is 
presented in Fig. 3.5. 
 
Fig. 3.5. Abstract scheme of information flow with noted integrity  
corrupting probabilities and modification for new version point 
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The example in Fig. 3.5 shows situation when information object is created 
by User 1 and sent to Group 2. Group 2 send it to User 3, which modifies (legally 
as a part of the process) the information object. From this point the information 
object was modified and User 3 stores both unmodified and modified versions of 
the information object while for further actions modified object is sent to User 4 
and User 5 consequently. Because of the required modification in the information 
flow the flow is divided into two – one for each version of the information object. 
Therefore the first version of the information object is influenced by probabilities 
PIs(1), PIs(2), PIs(3), PIh(1), PIh(2), PIh(3), PIt(1, 2), PIt(2, 3) while the second by probabilities 
PIs(3’), PIs(4), PIs(5), PIh(3’), PIh(4), PIh(5), PIt(3, 4), PIt(4, 5). 
All the probabilities are independent; therefore, we can calculate the infor-
mation object version integrity as probability as in all nodes of the version the 
integrity will be kept (3.7) 𝑃32(𝑓) = ) -1− 𝑃3'(#9&,#)/>#%"?& ∙)-1 − 𝑃3.(	#)/>#%" ∙)-1 − 𝑃3A(	#)/>#%" .										(3.7) 
There PIf(f) is the versions information flow f integrity. While n is the node 
from with the version’s information flow starts and m is the node, where the in-
formation of this version flow end. So we have to go through all probabilities of 
this specific version a and multiply all inverted transfer PIt(a, b), storage PIs(a) and 
human error PIh(a) occurrence probabilities. 
 
Fig. 3.6. Abstract scheme of information flow with fork, where multiple copies of the 
same version is processed in different paths 
However, there might be situations (see Fig. 3.6) when one information ob-
ject is send to multiple destinations and a fork of information flow is done. In 
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(3.8) 
(3.9) 
situations like this the versions is accessible in multiple information paths, there-
fore should be calculated separately (probabilities PIs(1), PIs(2), PIs(3), PIh(1), PIh(2), 
PIh(3), PIt(1, 2), PIt(2, 3) will be used for one path and probabilities PIs(1), PIs(4), PIs(5), 
PIh(1), PIh(4), PIh(5), PIt(1,4), PIt(4, 5) for another). The integrity of this information ob-
ject version PIv(f) will be equal to probability that it is unchanged in at least one 
of the information flows PIf(f) of the version (3.8) as we can get it from the source 
which has unchanged information. 
𝑃36(𝑓) = 1 −)-1− 𝑃32(	#)/B#%& .	 
There PIv(f) is the versions f integrity. While k is the number of different paths of 
the information flow (for this specific version), where integrity of each infor-
mation flows PIf(f) is used to get the integrity of the version. 
By using this formula (3.8) we can calculate the integrity of each version of 
the information object. In order to calculate the integrity of overall information 
object we should calculate what is the probability the information object will not 
be changed in any of its versions. If integrity is corrupted in at least one version 
this means the integrity of the information object is corrupted too. While the ver-
sions of information object is dependent on each other, the integrity probabilities 
of each version are independent, therefore we can calculate the overall infor-
mation objects integrity PIi(o) for object o as shown in (3.9). 𝑃3#(𝑜) = )𝑃36(𝑓)C)%& . 
Transfer PIt() and storage PIs() integrity corruption occurrence probabilities 
can be estimated from existing IT infrastructure estimation tools. User can model 
specific situations and analyze the security risk for each of the nodes. Meanwhile 
the most complicated part of the model is estimation of human error occurrence 
probabilities PIh(). While there are no clear statistics on integrity corruption prob-
abilities for different SME positions or other employees’ properties we suggest to 
use “Human Error Probabilities (HEPs) for generic tasks and Performance Shap-
ing Factors (PSFs) selected for railway operations” (Thommesen, & Andersen, 
2012). You can find different situations and average human errors in those situa-
tions. By linking the provided situations to the usual stress level in the organiza-
tion, some orientation metrics can be transferred and used as human error influ-
enced integrity corruption probabilities.  
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3.6. Conclusions of the Third Chapter   
1. The analysis of ISM tools revealed there are no solutions for resource and 
structure aspects in an organization perspective while strategy perspective 
is not implemented in information security tools at all. Only 50% of en-
terprise security modeling views are covered by modeling tools. The most 
important aspect for information security management is C06: organiza-
tional perspective with structure view as most information security stand-
ards and frameworks mention the importance of human factors and infor-
mation flows; however, clear methods for its evaluation do no exists. Yet 
this view is not covered by any tool; therefore, a toolset for information 
security management cannot be full. 
2. To reflect different security criteria in the organization separate models 
for information confidentiality, integrity, and availability were proposed. 
All these models rely on information flow and according to security cor-
ruption possibilities during the information flow process. By considering 
separate probabilities in each node and each transfer the overall infor-
mation object data leakage, availability, and integrity can be estimated. 
3. The information object can be modified; therefore, the models consider 
the legal modification fact and calculates the probability for each version 
and only then derives the overall probability for the total information ob-
ject. Therefore, the person who models the situation has to take into ac-
count not only the management structure of the organization but the in-
formation flows and user privileges as well. 
4. The proposed model operated even probabilities; therefore, the security 
level is expressed as probability it will stay secure or as an inverted prob-
ability – the system security will be damaged. The quantitative expression 
is more suitable for comparison and can be used for risk management too. 
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4 
4. Validation of Proposed Models 
and Framework  
The proposed information security level estimation models were proposed in the 
previous Chapter, and in this Chapter, they are validated by analyzing some se-
lected situations and how it correlates to experts’ opinions. All situations reflected 
an SME which work in web development and had the same management nodes, 
however the management scheme varied, by presenting different information flow 
schemes. All three models were applied to these situations and compared with 
information security management experts. Experts used the ranking of all pro-
posed situations; therefore, we were able to compare the ranking with modeling 
results and achieved a high correlation between experts ranking and modeling re-
sults.    
The proposed ISM framework and its leading models are developed to sim-
plify the ISM process in SME. Therefore, the main criteria for its suitability should 
be a real application in real life SME. Thus, in this Chapter, some examples of 
SME are presented too. Those SMEs applies the proposed tools, and according to 
the usage properties and the final conclusions on the suitability of proposed solu-
tions can be evaluated. 
Described research and its results, described in this Chapter were published 
(Kauspadiene et al., 2018 and Kauspadiene et al., 2019). 
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4.1. Validation of Information Flow Security 
Evaluation Models 
4.1.1. Selected Situations and Properties for Experimentation  
For validation of the proposed model, we execute an experiment where different 
management versions of the same enterprise are analyzed. The usage of different 
management versions of the same organization allows comparison of manage-
ment influence, while the nodes stay the same. 
 
 
Fig. 4.1. Hierarchal enterprise management scheme with departments 
 
 
Fig. 4.2. Hierarchal enterprise management scheme with no departments 
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Multiple enterprise management structure (EMS) variations of one company 
were analyzed to validate the proposed model: 
• Hierarchical (traditional hierarchy) EMS has tree structure subordination 
flow, where each person/department has one superior node only: 
o With departments, where multiple employees work in the same 
position (see Fig. 4.1); 
o With a single person in one position and forming no departments 
in the enterprise (see Fig. 4.2); 
• Flatter EMS removes layers within the organization and enables commu-
nication and collaboration within different layer persons/departments. 
o With departments, where multiple employees work in the same 
position (see Fig. 4.3); 
o With a single person in one position and forming no departments 
in the enterprise (see Fig. 4.4). 
 
 
Fig. 4.3. Flatter enterprise management scheme with departments 
 
The properties of each node and information flow are defined in a similar 
manner. However, the node type changes, although the values of matching prop-
erties and vulnerabilities are set to be the same. Similar settings allow more accu-
rate comparison of enterprise architecture. 
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Fig. 4.4. Flatter enterprise management scheme with no departments 
To make the analyzed situations even more similar in the sense of parameters, 
the same 8 main information flow groups are analyzed: 
1. Organization strategy – initiated by the leading authority, passed to the 
management and shared with clients; 
2. Activity report – parts generated by management, passed to the leading 
authority and the finance department. The finance department processes 
it and sends it to the government; 
3. Project idea – client generated project ideas are shared with the manage-
ment; management shares it with design and programming; 
4. Initial project price – design and programming department generates 
parts of it, send it to management, management processes it according to 
organization strategy, and sends to the client; 
5. Detailed project requirements – client generates the requirements and 
sends them to the management, management shares parts of it with design 
and programming; 
6. User server account login data – IT service generates logins and sends to 
the programmer (directly or through management); 
7. Developed system design – designer generates the system design and 
sends it to the programmer (directly or through the management), pro-
grammer integrates it into the project source code and sends to the man-
agement, which presents it to the client; 
8. Developed system source code – programmer takes the designed system 
design and uses server login data to implement it, then sends the project 
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source code to the management, where the source code is presented to the 
client. 
For better presentation, schemes of all 8 information flows are presented in 
Fig. 4.5–Fig. 4.16. Dotted areas define iterative processes. 
Organization strategy is very simple, consists of three nodes, connected line-
arly (see Fig. 4.5). The organization strategy information flow is identical for both 
hierarchical and flatter enterprise management schemes. 
 
Fig. 4.5. Information flow of Organization strategy in Hierarchical and Flatter enterprise 
management scheme 
Activity report (see Fig. 4.6) has two alternative paths as well Finance node is 
modify the information object by generating another version. 
 
 
Fig. 4.6. Information flow of Activity report in Hierarchical and Flatter enterprise 
management scheme 
Project idea information flow is more complicated and divided into two parts 
– price arrangement and project development (see Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.8). These 
parts can be executed multiple times. 
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Fig. 4.7. Information flow of Project idea in Hierarchical enterprise management scheme 
 
The difference between hierarchical and flatter enterprise management 
schemes (see Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.8) are in project development only, when 
information to IT is sent in different moment. 
 
 
Fig. 4.8. Information flow of Project idea in Fatter enterprise management scheme 
 
Initial project price information flow is different as management gets 
information from two nodes and only then can proceed by creating another version 
of the information object (see Fig. 4.9). 
Project requirements are part of the project idea, so it repeats the project 
development part (see Fig. 4.10 and 4.11). As mentioned above, the difference 
between hierarchical and flatter enterprise management schemes are the place to 
send information to the IT node. 
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Fig. 4.9. Information flow of Initial project price in Hierarchical and Fatter enterprise 
management scheme 
As well the number of information object versions is different, as in flatter 
enterprise management scheme programmer and designer changes it and send the 
modified version. Meanwhile in hierarchical enterprise management structure the 
management is responsible to collect all information and combine it to one new 
version. 
 
Fig. 4.10. Information flow of Project requirements in Hierarchical enterprise 
management scheme 
 
Fig. 4.11. Information flow of Project requirements in Fatter enterprise management 
scheme 
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The rest information flows are linear and differs according to the list of nodes 
in the flow or/and modifications in some nodes (see Fig. 4.12–Fig. 4.16). 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.12. Information flow of Login data in Hierarchical enterprise management scheme 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.13. Information flow of Login data in Flatter enterprise management scheme 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.14. Information flow of Project design in Hierarchical enterprise management 
scheme 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.15. Information flow of Project design in Fatter enterprise management scheme 
4. VALIDATION OF PROPOSED MODELS AND FRAMEWORK 71 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.16. Information flow of Project source in Hierarchical and Flatter enterprise 
management scheme 
To analyze the situation, all information transfers within the enterprise are 
done by using the local network and specialized communication and order man-
agement systems. Therefore, the transfer environment confidentiality, availabil-
ity, and integrity among enterprise employees are 0.99. Meanwhile, the client 
sends the information via the Internet, and its values in our case are 0.98. All 
employees of the enterprise use computers for order information storage and its 
confidentiality, availability, and integrity is 0.99; meanwhile, the values for cli-
ent’s computer is 0.95 as it’s a personal computer with no specific security pro-
tection tools.  
For confidentiality evaluation, the coefficients of Table 3.2 are used. Mean-
while, the confidentiality of enterprise computers which stores the information is 
0.97 (calculated according to existing threats in computers and computer network) 
the human confidentiality is 0.98 (estimated based on human error possibility, 
which is 2% in this kind of tasks). As well we assume there is a 1.6% possibility 
the information flow will be sent to the different receiver if the sender works with 
different receivers/departments. There is a 0.6% possibility a person will send the 
data to the wrong person in a group of persons. 7% possibility some data leakage 
will occur if the information is sent to unmonitored object (when the receiver is 
in lower subordination flow level). 
The availability of enterprise employees and client is as follows: 
• Head – 0.7 as the head is busy with other tasks, as well travels a lot; 
• Management. Design, Programming groups and Finance – 0.9 as there 
are multiple persons they can stand in for each other; however, they must 
participate in other activities too, therefore might be unavailable in some 
cases; 
• Management, Design, Programming individual person – 0.8 as there are 
one person for each position which is responsible for all projects at the 
same time; 
• Governance – 0.99 as it is a separate organization, which ensures it will 
be available 99% of needed time; 
• IT – 0.95 as there is only one person, which always is in place to look 
after the equipment and services, however sometimes he is ill as well he 
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has huge number of tasks to execute and cannot serve all requests at one 
time. However, he uses information technologies to work from distance; 
• Client – 0.6 as he has other responsibilities and this order is not his first 
priority. 
For availability evaluation each dashed line in Fig. 4.5–Fig. 4.16 presents 
where the information flow is modified, so from this point forward a new version 
is in action. 
For integrity evaluation, the enterprise computers availability is 0.98 (calcu-
lated according to existing threats in computers and computer network), client’s 
computer – 0.95. The human error possibility for impropriate data modification 
or corruption is 2% (estimated based on human error possibility for this kind of 
tasks) if an individual is working with the information and 1% if group is working 
(more chances to make an error but at the same time more persons can notice the 
error and correct it). 
4.1.2. Experiment Execution Process  
In order to validate the results of proposed models some data for comparison was 
required. The probability estimation for security level comparison is not new; 
however, we were not able to find a model, which would take into account enter-
prise management structure and would derive the data leakage probability. The 
closest solution is Enterprise Architecture Analysis Tool, based on attack trees 
and CySeMoL (Holm, Shahzad, Buschle, & Ekstedt, 2015). However, this tool 
allows modeling of information technology infrastructure, while human based 
factors are not included. There is only very fragmented data on SME security 
management level for specific situations therefore it is impossible to compare our 
models calculated and existing results. Therefore, in order to validate the results 
of our experiment, we used expert evaluation.  
Experts were chosen from the information security area. 15 persons were se-
lected for the first meeting to evaluate their suitability to participate in this exper-
iment as information security management experts. Multiple criteria were applied 
for expert selection: 
• At least 3 years experience in information security area; 
• Understanding of information security management principles (par-
ticipants were asked to answer some questions related to information 
security standards and best practices); 
• Experience in risk management (at least understanding how it is 
done, what methods and tools can be used for it).  
Only 8 persons meet all three criteria and were chosen to participate in the 
experiment as information security management experts. 
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The description of example enterprise, examined information flows were pro-
vided and variations of the cases were explained. Each expert had a freedom to 
use any tools or methods for evaluation of all provided situations. They had a 
period of 1 week (7 days) to rank (or provide some metric which can be used for 
ranking different situations) all information flows according to confidentiality, in-
tegrity and availability. Each expert ranked/evaluated 32 situations – 8 infor-
mation flows in each of 4 different EMS situations. 
Two of experts did not provide any data and refused to continue the partici-
pation in the experiment. Therefore, results from 6 experts were used for model 
validation. All experts used ranking or a personally chosen risk metrics for each 
situation. Each expert has his own risk evaluation methodology and metrics; there-
fore, they were not forced to use a different, maybe unknown system. Because of 
ranking, rather than risk measurement metric was used by some expert, the vali-
dation aimed to prove the correlation between experts’ opinion and modeling re-
sults rather than get the accuracy of modeling results. There is no unified and very 
clear quantitative metrics or scales for security risk measurement. While in many 
situations High, Medium and Low risk levels are used, each person can have his 
own understanding on the threshold for each of these categories. Therefore, it is 
important to evaluate does the trendline is the same between experts’ opinion and 
modeling results. If clear relationship will be noticed, the next step can be seg-
mentation of modeled values to be mapped to experts used metric. 
Half of the experts (3 out of 6) ranked all situations while other half presented 
marks or categories (defining the risk) for each situation. The expert had to explain 
the grading scale (minimum and maximum values) and later the scale ranges were 
used to normalize the results for data comparison. 
The described situations were modeled by using the proposed models. At the 
same time expert opinion was used to rank or evaluate the situations. The com-
parison of model results to expert opinion and existing rules of other models al-
lowed validation of the proposed models as different situations have different risk 
values and can be compared between to find out the better or worse case. 
4.1.3. Data Leakage Evaluation Results and their Analysis 
After modeling all four enterprise structures, data leakage probabilities for each 
of these 8 information flows were estimated. The results are presented in 
Table 4.1. Comparing the average data leakage probability for each type of 
analyzed enterprise structures has revealed a tendency of the individual based 
structure to be more suitable for data confidentiality. The difference is 1% and 
meets the rule – the more persons know the secret information, the bigger the risk 
of data leakage. 
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Table 4.1. Data leakage probability for each of the information flows of the analyzed en-
terprise structures. 
 Data leakage probability 
 Hierarchical structure Flatter structure 
Information flow With de-partments 
With no de-
partments 
With depart-
ments 
With no de-
partments 
Organization strategy 0.236 0.230 0.236 0.230 
Activity report 0.254 0.261 0.253 0.261 
Project idea 0.408 0.390 0.417 0.402 
Initial project price 0.310 0.290 0.321 0.304 
Detailed project requirements 0.370 0.352 0.380 0.364 
User server account login data 0.226 0.210 0.151 0.141 
Developed system design 0.331 0.311 0.321 0.304 
Developed system source code 0.286 0.266 0.296 0.278 
Average 0.303 0.289 0.297 0.285 
 
Comparison of data leakage probability in hierarchical and flatter structure 
enterprises showed no direct correlation. In some cases, information flow data 
leakage probability is lower when using hierarchical enterprise structure, in some 
cases it is the opposite.  
Data leakage probability mostly depends on the number of nodes and con-
nections between them. In analyzed scenario the flatter enterprise structure al-
lowed minimization of information flow shared nodes, therefore the data leakage 
probability was lower. This tendency is most obvious in “User server account 
login data” information flow: in this hierarchical structure 3 nodes know the in-
formation and 2 data transfers are needed, while in flatter enterprise structure only 
2 nodes know the information and only 1 data transferring was required to share 
it. A significant change in the node and its connection number influences the dif-
ference of data leakage probability in hierarchical and flatter enterprise structure 
for this information flow is 7.5%. 
For proposed model result validation, all four enterprise structure models and 
defined information flows were presented to 6 experts in the field of organization 
risk management. The comparison of expert ranking and modeled information 
flow data leakage probability is presented in Fig. 4.17. 
Despite the fact that the experts used different ranking scales (one expert 
ranked the situations sequentially from 1 to 32, two used the same rank for multi-
ple situations, therefore the scales were from 1 to 18 or from 1 to 7 only, two 
4. VALIDATION OF PROPOSED MODELS AND FRAMEWORK 75 
 
experts evaluated all situations according to scale High, Medium, Low and one 
expert evaluated all situations based on 10-point scale). 
 
 
Fig. 4.17. Relationship between modeled information flow data leakage  
probabilities and normalized expert rankings 
The comparison between modeled data leakage probability and situation con-
fidentiality ranking cannot provide the accuracy of the data leakage probability. 
However, the precision of the data is considered to be good, as the correlation 
coefficients between modeled values and experts ranking/marks are high (see Ta-
ble 4.2). 
Table 4.2. Experts data analysis for data leakage experiment 
Metrics Expert1 Expert2 Expert3 Expert4 Expert5 Ex-pert6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Evaluation method Rank-ing 
Rank-
ing 
Rank-
ing 
Evalua-
tion 
Evalua-
tion 
Evalu-
ation 
Scale 1–18 1–32 1–7 High (3), Medium (2), Low (1) 1–10 
Min. value 1 1 1 Low Low 2 
Max. value 18 32 7 Me-dium 
Me-
dium 6 
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End of Table 4.2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Correlation to mod-
eled values 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.72 0.72 0.82 
Linear trend-
line 
x 64.40 129.38 23.43 4.55 4.55 13.29 
C –7.59 –21.47 –2.69 1.42 1.42 0.60 
Max. difference be-
tween linear trendine 
and experts value 
12% 19% 15% 16% 16% 11% 
Polynomial  (2) 
trendline 
x^2 –93.53 80.72 15.31 –23.85 –23.85 –34.53 
x 118.62 82.59 14.56 18.37 18.37 33.30 
C –15.01 –15.08 –1.48 –0.48 –0.48 –2.14 
Max. difference be-
tween polynomial 
trendine and experts 
value 
13% 20% 15% 18% 18% 10% 
Polynomial  (3) 
trendline 
x3 –1118 –3392 –11 –281 –281 –128 
x2 841.22 2916 24.44 211.02 211.02 72.50 
x –127.9 –665.3 12.15 –43.56 –43.56 5.08 
C 5.279 46.47 -1.278 4.622 4.622 0.185 
Max. difference be-
tween polynomial  (3) 
trendine and experts 
value 
10% 18% 15% 15% 15% 11% 
 
Comparison between experts’ opinion and modeling results show high corre-
lation (0.72–0.97). However analysis of 2nd and 3rd order polynomial trendlines 
showed some experts’ opinion comparison to modeled results can be expressed 
with smaller variation by using polynomial rather than line. The maximum differ-
ence between experts’ opinion and modeled value can be reduced up to 2% by 
using 2nd or 3rd order polynomial. This shows the experts’ opinion and modeled 
values have different value distributions, however the difference is not drastic. 
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4.1.4. Data Availability Evaluation Results and their Analysis 
Data of availability modeling results is presented in Table 4.3. In a given situation 
the Project idea and Initial project price are one of the most vulnerable as its avail-
ability is the lowest. Analysis of factors which influence these results showed it is 
related to the need of different data from different sources in order to proceed. In 
situations when different data is needed to precede the node is dependent on mul-
tiple sources, while in linear transfer the node requires only one version and can 
get it from multiple sources too. 
The importance of multiple copies of the same version can be noted from the 
results too. User server account login data has one version only and is stored by 3 
or 4 different nodes. Therefore, the availability of User server account login data 
is the highest among other information flows and do not decrease less than 0.99. 
Table 4.3. Data availability probability for each of the information flows of the analyzed 
enterprise structures 
 Data availability 
 Hierarchical structure Flatter structure 
Information flow With depart-ments 
With no de-
partments 
With depart-
ments 
With no de-
partments 
Organization strategy 0.981 0.967 0.981 0.967 
Activity report 0.982 0.973 0.982 0.973 
Project idea 0.927 0.838 0.905 0.782 
Initial project price 0.912 0.810 0.912 0.810 
Detailed project requirements 0.989 0.963 0.965 0.899 
User server account login data 0.999 0.998 0.999 0.998 
Developed system design 0.990 0.965 0.975 0.926 
Developed system source code 0.992 0.977 0.992 0.977 
Average 0.972 0.937 0.964 0.917 
 
Analysis of EMS influence on data availability showed the Hierarchical EMS 
leads comparing to Flatter. The difference is not significant (averagely 1%) and 
mostly is related to the number of versions – the Flatter EMS increases the number 
of versions (for project idea and requirements), therefore smaller number of nodes 
has the same version and it is more difficult to get the data. 
In the initial parameters position with one employee had 10% smaller avail-
ability comparing to position with multiple employees (as they can cover each 
other). This influenced the information flow availability and reaches 10% for 
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project idea and initial price. However, the average information flow availability 
difference between multiple employee departments and individual person depart-
ments is 5%.  
By analyzing the experts ranking for all 32 situations, opinions of two experts 
are different comparing to other experts and our modeling results (Fig. 4.18). One 
expert ranked Initial project price and User server account login data as infor-
mation flows whose availability is the lowest while the Organization strategy and 
Project idea has the biggest availability. As the information flow is very different 
for two highest and two lowest rankings the expert was asked to explain the crite-
ria used for situation ranking. 
The expert answers revealed he based his ranking on personal experience and 
time period needed to get certain type of information (the answer of the expert 
was: “The company’s strategy is publicly stored in the web and everyone knows 
the basic idea of a project they are working with therefore you can get the infor-
mation quickly. Meanwhile no one wants to share the server’s logins or the price 
of the project. This kind of data is not meant for sharing; therefore, it takes more 
time to find a person who knows it and is willing to share it.”). 
 
 
Fig. 4.18. Relationship between modeled information flow data availability probabilities 
and normalized expert rankings 
This ranking was very content based and very related to data confidentiality 
rather than availability only. Our model does not take into account what kind of 
data it is and analyzes the information flow rather than confidentiality of the in-
formation flow and this is done consciously as availability should not be confused 
with confidentiality. However, in order to reflect the different type of data, the 
node’s storage availability value can be adjusted.  
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Another user ranked all situations the same – Low availability risk. The same 
value for all situations is not suitable for comparison. Therefore, opinion of these 
two experts was eliminated from the validation experiment.  
The other four experts took into account the availability should be evaluated 
for the person who has right to access the information therefore it is not confused 
with confidentiality. The ranking scale is different for all experts but the correla-
tion between modeled values and expert ranking is high (see We can notice some 
differences however the main trend between those four experts and our model 
results are similar.  
The same ranking/evaluation scales were used by experts as in data leakage 
experiment. In this experiment opinion of two experts is not very useful and might 
be misleading (one expert was not able to evaluate availability only and mixed it 
with confidentiality, while the second expert ranked all situations with the same 
rank – Low risk).   
The correlation between the rest four experts and modeled data availability 
values are not as high as for data leakage, however the values varies from –0.75 
till –0.80 which is high and show strong relation (see Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4. Experts data analysis for data availability experiment 
Metrics Expert1 Expert2 Expert3 Expert4 Expert5 Expert6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Evaluation method Rank-ing 
Rank-
ing 
Rank-
ing 
Evalua-
tion 
Evalua-
tion 
Evalua-
tion 
Scale 1–18 1–32 1–7 High (3), Medium (2), Low (1) 1–10 
Min. value 1 1 1 Low Low 2 
Max. value 18 32 7 Low High 5 
Correlation to mod-
eled values –0.06 –0.78 –0.78 N/A –0.75 –0.80 
Linear trend-
line 
x 
N/A 
–38.16 –20.40 
N/A 
–9.90 –19.05 
C 41.96 22.57 11.25 20.42 
Max. difference be-
tween linear trend-
ine and experts 
value 
9% 34% 31% 19% 
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End of Table 4.4 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Polynomial  
(2) trendline 
x2 
N/A 
–318.7 –152.2 
N/A 
–59.4 –87.4 
     
x 537.3 254.4 97.4 138.7 
C –216.0 –100.6 –36.8 –50.3 
Max. difference be-
tween polynomial  
(2) trendine and ex-
perts value 
11% 35% 24% 15% 
Polynomial  
(3) trendline 
x3 
N/A 
–3089 –951 
N/A 
287 950 
x2 8032 2419 –834 –2654 
x –6961 –2054 793 2444 
C 2019 587.8 –244 –738 
Max. difference be-
tween polynomial  
(3) trendine and ex-
perts value 
11% 36% 23% 15% 
 
Linear and polynomial (2nd and and 3rd order) trendlines were analyzed for 
each expert. The maximum differences between trendline based experts’ values 
and real experts’ rankings/marks were calculated. In half cases (for experts 2 and 
3) the linear trendline is capable to get a smaller maximum difference while for 
other half (experts 5 and 6) the 3rd order polynomial trendline produces smaller 
maximum difference as the value distribution has a have tails (see Table 4.4).   
4.1.5. Data Integrity Evaluation Results and their Analysis 
Results of modeled situations (see Table 4.5) showed the information flow integ-
rity is closely related to the length of in sequence transferred data. The bigger 
integrity was achieved in small processes with up to 4 nodes and 3 information 
transfers – Activity report, Organization strategy, Developed system source code.  
Another important factor – forking of information flow. Activity report has 
the same number of nodes and transfers comparing to Developed system design 
in Fatter EMS, however the integrity of the second one is approximately 10% 
lower. This is influenced by the fact the information flow is forked in Activity 
report case therefore the probability to change the information flow in all dupli-
cated information objects is significantly smaller. If multiple versions of the same 
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document exist, there will be a possibility to check whether the information object 
is changed or not. At the same time backup copies of the information object will 
help to recover the original version and changes in the object. 
Table 4.5. Data integrity probability for each of the information flows of the analyzed 
enterprise structures 
 Data integrity 
 Hierarchical structure Flatter structure 
Information flow With depart-ments 
With no de-
partments 
With depart-
ments 
With no de-
partments 
Organization strategy 0.842 0.833 0.842 0.833 
Activity report 0.917 0.916 0.917 0.916 
Project idea 0.564 0.499 0.509 0.447 
Initial project price 0.769 0.731 0.769 0.731 
Detailed project requirements 0.670 0.629 0.670 0.629 
User server account login data 0.776 0.753 0.808 0.792 
Developed system design 0.746 0.723 0.817 0.793 
Developed system source code 0.886 0.868 0.886 0.868 
Average 0.842 0.833 0.842 0.833 
 
The smallest integrity is calculated for Project idea as it is the longest infor-
mation flow, multiple versions exist, information is sent to client multiple times. 
All these criteria reduce the integrity to less than 50%. This value should be a big 
concern to the enterprise as even usage of multiple employees in the same position 
to control each other increases the integrity up to 5%. 
Observing how similar the results are to expert’s opinion a very strong corre-
lation can be examined (see Fig. 4.19 and Table 4.6). This proves the main tenden-
cies between different information flows in this situation can be captured analogue 
as experts’ opinion. 
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Fig. 4.19. Relationship between modeled information flow data integrity probabilities 
and expert rankings 
Table 4.6. Experts data analysis for data integrity experiment 
Metrics Expert1 Expert2 Expert3 Expert4 Expert5 Expert6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Evaluation method Rank-ing 
Rank-
ing 
Rank-
ing 
Evalua-
tion 
Evalua-
tion 
Evalua-
tion 
Scale 1–18 1–32 1–7 High (3), Medium (2), Low (1) 1–10 
Min. value 1 1 1 Low Low 1 
Max. value 18 32 7 Me-dium High 4 
Correlation to mod-
eled values –0.93 –0.89 –0.97 –0.40 –0.91 –0.83 
Linear trend-
line 
x –68.59 –15.27 –10.15 –1.59 –4.77 –7.12 
C 68.69 16.43 10.35 2.77 5.38 7.23 
Max. difference be-
tween linear trendine 
and experts value 
19% 29% 27% 7% 17% 11% 
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End of Table 4.6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Polynomial  
(2) trendline 
x2 –143.1 –37.41 –11.39 5.12 –4.21 10.08 
x 133.61 37.59 5.94 –8.83 1.18 –21.37 
C 0.04 1.53 4.88 5.23 3.36 12.07 
Max. difference be-
tween polynomial  
(2) trendine and ex-
perts value 
14% 59% 15% 6% 16% 13% 
Polynomial  
(3) trendline 
x3 –68.63 –115.4 45.41 102.78 –18.25 50.5 
x2 1.47 205.62 –107.1 -211.43 34.25 –96.32 
x 34.69 –128.7 71.39 139.32 –25.13 51.42 
C 21.81 35.2 –9.58 –27.5 9.17 –4.01 
Max. difference be-
tween polynomial  
(3) trendine and ex-
perts value 
14% 23% 15% 8% 15% 13% 
 
Analyzing the difference between modeled data integrity value and trendline 
based experts ranking/mark the linear trendline produces the smallest difference 
for expert 6, 2nd order polynomial trendline – for expert 1 and 4, while 3rd order 
polynomial trendline produces the smallest maximum difference for experts 2, 3 
and 5 (see Table 4.6).  
4.1.6. Summary of Information Security Evaluation Results 
Also, we can notice the errors in ranking occurred in the range between 70% and 
80% for the first expert and between 80% and 90% for the second expert as there 
were multiple situations with similar availability values. Therefore, it was easier 
for experts to rank more different situations rather than different with similar in-
tegrity values.  
The ranges of different security components (confidentiality, integrity and 
availability) can be noticed in Fig. 4.20, where all these values are presented ac-
cording to the probability of calculated overall security. All three components 
have a clear linear dependency, while the slope of confidentiality and availability 
is very similar (0.38 for confidentiality and 0.32 for availability) the slope for 
integrity is much higher (0.95). This shows the integrity values are more scattered 
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and have a bigger values ranges, while confidentiality and integrity are not as var-
ied in our situation and have more similar values.  
 
 
Fig. 4.20. Relation between modeled data confidentiality, integrity and availability 
values, ordered according to calculated overall security values 
The overall security should be reflected as probability the enterprise infor-
mation will be confidential, available and keep the integrity. It can be calculated 
as product of inverted data leakage probability, data availability probability and 
data availability probability. In these experiments it varies between 21% and 76%. 
4.2. Validation of Information Security Management 
Framework 
Validation and evaluation of proposed information security management frame-
work is a complicated task as there are no clear methodologies of how it should 
be done. To reflect both theoretical and practical benefits of the proposed infor-
mation security management framework the validation is divided into two parts: 
proposed ISMF comparison with other ISMF in the sense of framework fullness; 
experiment with enterprise presenters to evaluate reaction and benefits of pro-
posed ISMF. 
4.2.1. Multi-criteria analysis of Information Security 
Management Frameworks 
The proposed framework partly was compared with existing frameworks during 
the analysis of existing frameworks (see Table 1.1), when requirements for a new 
one were derived. However, the previous comparison reflected properties of 
4. VALIDATION OF PROPOSED MODELS AND FRAMEWORK 85 
 
analyzed ISMF and was not analyzing the fullness of ISMF. All existing ISMF 
comparisons basically are the same – relies on multiple criteria, however, all cri-
teria have the same weight: 
1. HITRUST – Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST, 2014) pre-
sents a brochure “Comparing the CSF, ISO/IEC 27001 and NIST SP 800-
53: Why Choosing the CSF is the Best Choice” where 12 factors are used 
to compare three analogues. The comparison is done in binary values by 
defining is the factor included in the analyzed framework or no; 
2. O. Rebollo et al. (Rebollo et al., 2011) presented a comparative analysis 
of information security governance frameworks. The research aims to 
guarantee an objective comparison through a set of comparative criteria 
to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each framework. Criteria for 
the comparison were selected from an analysis of existing information 
security governance papers, including both governance and management 
aspects. Meanwhile, the comparison is executed by defining values of 
each criterion, and no weights or importance factors are defined in the 
comparison; 
3. M. Alnuem et al. (Alnuem et al., 2015) executed a comparison study of 
information security risk management frameworks in cloud computing. 
The paper discussed how information security risk management is related 
to the cloud computing environment and presents seven different infor-
mation security risk management frameworks that cover all of cloud ser-
vice models and deployment models. Meanwhile, the comparison of 
mentioned frameworks was executed by summarizing framework infor-
mation and classifying the frameworks according to coverage area of the 
framework. 
A source where information security management frameworks would be 
evaluated according to clearly defined and weighted factors do not exist. How-
ever, it is clear the comparison is a multi-criteria problem and should involve 
multi-criteria decision making to select the best ISM framework. The weights of 
ISMF can be used for the optimization of newly developed ISMF. While in this 
thesis, the multi-criteria analysis will be used not to optimize the framework, but 
to find the best one. Therefore, a simple aim function is used – the sum of all 
criteria weight and value products. 
From the linguistic analysis of the aim of this research, there can be noted 
two main evaluation areas: ISM framework applicability in small and medium 
enterprise and at the same time the ISM framework must serve as a needed 
knowledge database for information security management. As these two criteria 
(applicability in SME and content of the ISM framework) are too abstract, they 
must be detailed. Therefore, we selected the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) 
methodology (Saaty, 1980) to be applied. AHP implements the hierarchical 
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criteria structure, which will be very handy in our situation. It is a multi-criteria 
decision making technique and will represent the nature of multi-purpose security 
nature. AHP enables to combine a consensus of the expert group by weighing the 
criteria and sub-criteria (Baudry, 2018). The construction of the method is based 
on three steps: definition of the criteria structure; comparative evaluation of the 
substitutes and the criteria; synthesis of the priorities. AHP combines subjective 
assessments based on qualitative criteria and objective assessments based on 
quantitative criteria analytically (Saaty et al. 2015). According to A. Mardani  
et al. research results (Mardani et al. 2015), this is the most popular decision mak-
ing technique during the period from 2000 till 2014 in scientific papers as more 
than 30% of all 393 analyzed decision making related papers were using this tech-
nique.  
As mentioned above, we instinctively have the top-level criteria: applicability 
in SME and content of the ISM framework. In order to leave no place for unfair 
second level criteria selection we need a source which could serve as a reference 
model. In case of criteria “content of the ISM framework” the most intuitive is 
usage of security standard as a reference model. The most known and used infor-
mation security management standard is ISO/IEC 27001 (ISO, 2013). This stand-
ard specifies a management system that is intended to bring information security 
under management control and gives specific requirements. Organizations that 
meet the requirements of this standard may be certified by an accredited certifica-
tion body following successful completion of an audit. The current version of this 
standard has 114 controls in 14 domains: 
1. A.5: Information security policies (2 controls); 
2. A.6: Organization of information security (7 controls); 
3. A.7: Human resource security (6 controls that are applied before, 
during, or after employment); 
4. A.8: Asset management (10 controls); 
5. A.9: Access control (14 controls); 
6. A.10: Cryptography (2 controls); 
7. A.11: Physical and environmental security (15 controls); 
8. A.12: Operations security (14 controls); 
9. A.13: Communications security (7 controls); 
10. A.14: System acquisition, development and maintenance (13 con-
trols); 
11. A.15: Supplier relationships (5 controls); 
12. A.16: Information security incident management (7 controls); 
13. A.17: Information security aspects of business continuity manage-
ment (4 controls); 
14. A.18: Compliance (with internal requirements, such as policies, and 
with external requirements, such as laws) (8 controls). 
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These 14 control domains define the main areas of ISM framework content 
therefore we will use it a second level criteria as first level criteria “content of the 
ISM framework” sub-criteria. 
Criteria for “ISM framework applicability in small and medium enterprise” 
does not have a clear reference model. There are no standards related to frame-
work applicability in small and medium enterprise. Meanwhile the research pa-
pers are more concentrated on enterprise factors rather than the framework. For 
example, the S. C. Eze et al. (Eze et al., 2018) research “Key success factors in-
fluencing SME managers' information behavior on emerging ICT (EICT) adop-
tion decision making in UK SMEs” derived 16 key success factors influencing 
small business managers' information behavior on emerging information and 
communication technologies. However, the factors defined the SME or its em-
ployee’s properties rather than the properties of EICT. Therefore, for the ISM 
framework applicability in small and medium enterprise we proposed some sec-
ond level criteria by ourselves. It is very basic in order to be adaptable for different 
type or purpose ISM frameworks and defines the ISM framework properties, in-
fluencing its easy integration into SME. The second level criteria are: 
Guidelines. In order to adapt the ISM framework its content has to be under-
stood correctly by the SME. Therefore, the presentation of ISM framework has to 
be taken into account. Guidelines include clear documentation of the ISM frame-
work. It might include some examples, visualizations or even trainings in order to 
help understanding and integrating the framework. It is important to all type of 
enterprise; however, it is very important to SME as it is lacking resources to ana-
lyze the ISM framework for a longer time, it must be as clear as possible from the 
first introduction to it.  
Community. Even if the ISM framework is fully acquired, some SME spe-
cific situations might be tricky and require additional consultations. Therefore, it 
is important to have a community, which could help in discussion requiring situ-
ations. Big enterprises might buy additional training or consultations, meanwhile 
SME are lacking of resources therefore publicly available and free of charge so-
lutions are desired. The community might be defined by the popularity of the ISM 
framework as it leads to the bigger number of persons, able to share their experi-
ence. Forums or live help systems for the ISM framework information sharing 
might help and define the community possibilities. 
Tools. Information security management might be done by using human re-
sources only, however specified tools might simplify the information security 
management process. Therefore, an ISM framework with dedicated or recom-
mended tools leads to more modern information security management. The pur-
pose of ISM framework dedicated or recommended tools might vary from logging 
to modeling, situation evaluation or even decision support. SME would be able to 
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adapt the tools and reduce the cost of manual information security management 
processes. 
In total there are 2 first level criteria and 17 second level criteria in our pro-
posed analytic hierarchy process (see 0). All criteria have descriptions in order to 
understand what should be taken into account in order to evaluate it. 
 
 
Fig. 4.21. Proposed AHP structure for evaluation of information security management 
framework suitability for usage in small and medium enterprise 
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The proposed analytic hierarchy process will be used for estimation of its 
weights and evaluating the information security management framework quality 
and suitability to be applied in small and medium enterprise. 
 
 
Fig. 4.22. Process of the research: criteria hierarchy definition, criteria weight 
estimation, ISM framework ranking and evaluation according to defined criteria and 
their weights, MCDM result comparison to experts ranking 
 
Criteria definition is important for alternative comparison, however in mul-
ticriteria decision making the importance, weight for each of the criteria has to be 
estimated. We use the standard methods of AHP technique: define the structure; 
evaluation the substitutes and criteria; synthesize the priorities. In order to elimi-
nate the unconscious bias two groups of experts were used and the MCDM results 
were compared to ISM frameworks experts ranking (see Fig. 4.22): as experts of 
ISM frameworks we prepare the hierarchy of criteria; external information 
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security management experts evaluate the weights of the criteria; we rank the 
compared ISM frameworks according to our own believes for its suitability to be 
applied in SME; we estimate the values of second level criteria for each of com-
pared ISM frameworks; the ISM framework ranking is compared to MCDM result 
for its validation.     
In criteria definition process three information security management experts 
participated. These three ISM experts have at least 5 years of experience in infor-
mation security management and currently work in this area. Each ISM expert 
individually executed the pairwise comparisons of the same level sibling criteria. 
Traditionally AHP uses nine-point intensity of importance scale. We proposed an 
alternative solution to define the pairwise importance – dividing the 100% influ-
ence between two criteria. ISM expert is able to adjust the values interactively 
(see. Fig. 4.23) by assuming how the influence of those two criteria should be 
divided in percentages.  
 
Fig. 4.23. User interface example for executing the pairwise comparison by ISM experts 
If the set of criteria are C = { Ci | i = 1, 2, …, n}, the results of the pairwise 
comparison of n criteria will be summarized in an evaluation matrix A of size n x 
n. Every element aij (i, j = 1, 2, …, n) in matrix A is the quotient of weights of the 
criteria (4.1). 
 𝐴 = G𝑎&& 𝑎&D ⋯ 𝑎&"𝑎D& 𝑎DD ⋯ 𝑎D"⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮𝑎"& 𝑎"D ⋯ 𝑎""K , 𝑎## = 1, 𝑎)# = &,MN , 𝑎#) ≠ 1	. (4.1) 
As ISM expert opinion is expressed as value from 0 to 100, we transform 
these values into evaluation matrix values. For transformation from 100% scale 
to AHP nine-point scale we use an equation 4.2. 
 𝑎#) = P &E(FMN) , 𝑥#) < 50𝑍(50 − 𝑥#)), 𝑥#) ≥ 50. (4.2) 
there aij is a value of matrix A for criteria i and j; xij is ISM experts proposed 
influence value for criteria i comparing to criteria j; Z(x) is a scale transformation 
function, presented in equation 4.3.  
 𝑍(𝑥) = 1 + GFHI. (4.3) 
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As we used three ISM experts opinion, the evaluation matrix A is formed 
based on the average value of these three ISM experts. The ISM experts were 
acting individually, however their criteria importance marks in 100-scale were 
quite similar: maximum difference between opinions of two ISM experts was 
15%; standard deviation does not reach more than 9%. The average ISM experts 
mark was transformed to nine-point system, the evaluation matrix was filled and 
Eigenvectors were calculated (see Table 4.7). For 1st level criteria one weight is 
obtained, while for 2nd level criteria local weight is known as well as global weight 
which is calculated as product of 1st level (parent) and local weight. 
Table 4.7. Criteria weights (Eigenvectors), calculated according to ISM experts pairwise 
evaluation 
Criteria 
Weight 
Local Global 
ISM framework content 0.817 
 Information security policies 0.115 0.094 
Organization of information security 0.099 0.081 
Human resource security 0.126 0.103 
Asset management 0.054 0.044 
Access control 0.115 0.094 
Cryptography 0.023 0.019 
Physical and environmental security 0.043 0.035 
Operations security 0.095 0.078 
Communications security 0.071 0.058 
System acquisition, development and maintenance 0.051 0.042 
Supplier relationships 0.020 0.016 
Information security incident management 0.103 0.084 
Information security aspects of business continuity management 0.051 0.042 
Compliance 0.033 0.027 
Applicability in SME 0.183 
 Guidelines 0.522 0.096 
Community 0.157 0.026 
Tools 0.321 0.059 
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The ISM experts’ criteria pairwise comparison leaded to no intransitive judg-
ments (three-way cycles). This fact shows the ISM experts have a clear under-
standing of the overall importance of all sibling criteria. The overall dissonance 
(Chen, 2011) is more than 0 for ISM frameworks content criteria as it has a big 
number of 2nd level criteria. However the dissonance value is equal to 0.098 and 
does not require changes. 
For ISM frameworks’ evaluation we selected 5 alternatives. These five 
frameworks were analyzed by three ISM framework experts and ranked from the 
best to the worst. All three ISM framework experts worked together and in dis-
cussion derived a consensus, one ranking. The analyzed ISM frameworks were 
ranked in this order:  
1. Holistic information security management framework (Kauspadi-
ene et al., 2017); 
2. SABSA framework (Sherwook et al., 2009); 
3. An organizational level process model in Information security policy 
framework (Knapp et al., 2009); 
4. Framework for information systems security management based on 
layered multi-panes (Trcek, 2006); 
5. M. M. Eloff and S. H. von Solms hierarchical framework (Eloff          
et al., 2000). 
The ISM framework ranking was done in the beginning to make sure there is 
no preconception. The ISM framework evaluation criteria were defined after the 
ranking, so ISM framework experts used its own criteria to evaluate the ISM 
framework suitability for SME. 
After the ISM framework evaluation criteria were defined, a list of criteria 
and their description was provided for the three ISM framework experts and they 
had to evaluate all five ISM frameworks according to all seventeen 2nd level cri-
teria. For criteria evaluation ISM framework experts were discussing and deriving 
a consensus mark. The mark had to be expressed in an interactive system (example 
provided in Fig. 4.24), using linguistic values. The ISM framework expert opin-
ions expressed in linguistic values are translated into the scale values exhibited in 
Table 4.8.  
 
Fig. 4.24. User interface example for executing the defined information security 
management framework criteria evaluation by framework experts 
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Table 4.8. Linguistic values and scale values for information security management 
framework criteria meeting 
 Linguistic value: no weak average good excellent 
 Scale value: 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 
 
The results of the ISM framework evaluation are presented in Table 4.9. and 
0. Both ISM framework experts proposed score values (score) as well as the val-
ues, multiplied by the weight of the criteria (weighted score) are presented and 
summed in the end of the table. According to the sum, ranking was presented. The 
results prove the ranking according to the sum of not weighted scores do not meet 
the ranking of ISM framework experts’ opinion (the first and the second ISM 
framework had the same sum of not weighted scores, while the ranking was dif-
ferent by the ISM framework experts; the ranking of the third and the fourth ISM 
framework according to not weighted scores and ISM framework experts opinion 
are opposite). Meanwhile the sum of weighted scores is well aligned with the ISM 
framework experts ranking. 
Table 4.9. Results of information security management framework score  
2nd level criteria HISMF SABSA Knapp Trcek Eloff 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Information security policies 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Organization of information security 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50 
Human resource security 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.00 
Asset management 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Access control 0.50 0.75 0.00 0.50 0.00 
Cryptography 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Physical and environmental security 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 
Operations security 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.50 
Communications security 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 
System acquisition, development and 
maintenance 1.00 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.50 
Supplier relationships 0.50 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 
Information security incident manage-
ment 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 
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End of Table 4.9 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Information security aspects of busi-
ness continuity management 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 
Compliance 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.50 1.00 
Guidelines 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Community 0.25 1.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Tools 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sum: 11.25 11.25 8.25 8.50 3.25 
Ranking: 1–2 1–2 4 3 5 
 
Analysis of compared ISM framework suitability for small and medium en-
terprise showed none of the ISM frameworks fully meets the criteria. The maxi-
mum quality and applicability value is 71%. This means all of the frameworks 
have place to improve 
Table 4.10. Results of information security management framework weighted score  
2nd level criteria HISMF SABSA Knapp Trcek Eloff 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Information security policies 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.000 
Organization of information security 0.081 0.040 0.081 0.061 0.040 
Human resource security 0.103 0.077 0.051 0.051 0.000 
Asset management 0.022 0.044 0.000 0.044 0.000 
Access control 0.047 0.070 0.000 0.047 0.000 
Cryptography 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.000 
Physical and environmental security 0.018 0.035 0.018 0.035 0.000 
Operations security 0.078 0.078 0.058 0.039 0.039 
Communications security 0.058 0.058 0.029 0.000 0.000 
System acquisition, development and mainte-
nance 0.042 0.031 0.010 0.021 0.021 
Supplier relationships 0.008 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 
Information security incident management 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.000 
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End of Table 4.10 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Information security aspects of business conti-
nuity management 0.031 0.042 0.042 0.021 0.000 
Compliance 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.013 0.027 
Guidelines 0.048 0.072 0.048 0.048 0.048 
Community 0.007 0.029 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Tools 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sum: 0.716 0.690 0.512 0.500 0.182 
Ranking: 1 2 3 4 5 
 
The coverage and applicability score of other analyzed ISMF varies from 
18% to 69% (see Table 4.10) and do not reach the score our proposed ISMF 
reached (72%). This prove our proposed ISMF covers a wider area of ISM com-
paring to other existing ISMF. 
4.2.2. Information Security Management Framework 
Introduction to Enterprise 
To examine the practical value of this dissertation, a discussion with SME pre-
senters was executed. The discussion aimed to evaluate do presenters of SME un-
derstand the proposed ISMF, do they understand how the ISFM should be applied 
in the SME. Practical application of the proposed ISMF was not executed because 
of multiple reasons: the process is time and resource consuming, and there were 
no SME willing to do it for experimental purposes; proposed ISMF application in 
SME could not be made by thesis author (in order to save SME resources) as SME 
has security sensitive data and were not willing to let unknown person inside to 
the enterprise with policy changing actions.  
In this discussion, persons from the IT field and different enterprises were 
asked to participate. There was no filter to make sure the person is responsible for 
the ISM in the enterprise as this would limit the number of possible candidates 
because of the lack of persons in this position in SME. However, the IT back-
ground was required to ensure the person will be able to understand the basics of 
ISM.  
The experiment was executed in the premises of Vilnius Gediminas Tech-
nical University. All participants arrived and spend from 2 to 6 hours in person 
with experiment executor. During the meeting, some talks, tasks had to be done 
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by the participant. The experiment with persons who agreed to participate in the 
experiment consisted of several steps: 
1. Experiment executor provided a short list of questions to the partici-
pant to log its relevance to ISM and specifics of the enterprise, the 
person is working in; 
2. Later the person was asked to list the main security management 
weaknesses and countermeasures, which could be used to fix the sit-
uation in his or her organization; 
3.  Experiment executor introduced the participant with the proposed 
ISM framework. It was an oral presentation with some additional vis-
ual materials. The presentation lasted about 10 minutes. Any ques-
tions the participant had regarding the framework were answered 
during the presentation as well; 
4. The participant was asked to try to adapt the framework to its enter-
prise. The adaptation was more like a discussion, bidirectional ques-
tion and answer session. The participant was able to use any tools, 
take notes or ask the experiment executor to demonstrate some situ-
ations by selected tools. This phase was not logged because of high 
occupation of the experiment executor; 
5. The participant was asked to answer the same questions as in phase 
2 in order to analyze the difference of ISM understanding in the spe-
cific enterprise; 
6. The experiment ended with an open question for the participant to 
summarize the experience of this experiment.    
This scheme of the experiment was selected to measure the perception of the 
ISM framework for non-security experts to apply it for information security man-
agement and improvement in the SME. To utilize existing examples, an ensure 
similarity between analyzed enterprises, all enterprises were selected to work in 
the web development sector. 
It is worth noting the experiment was executed in Lithuania and Lithuanian 
language was used in the experiment.  
Five persons of different enterprises participated in the experiment. The size 
of enterprise they work varies from 2 persons to up to 300 (answers were 2, 10, 
12, ~200, ~ 300). According to the European Commission, the company of 2 per-
sons should be treated as micro, while the enterprise with more than 250 employ-
ees is too big for the medium-size enterprise. However, we left those two cases to 
see is it applicable for micro companies also.  The two biggest enterprises have a 
position for ISM. The head of the rest three enterprises states the security assur-
ance is part of the IT administrators work. Meanwhile, the rest two persons say 
there is no person in the company, whose responsibility would be to take care 
security questions and issues. According to it – medium enterprise in Lithuania 
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understands the importance of security management and has positions for it. 
Meanwhile, small and micro enterprises do not have enough resources for them.     
The second phase of the experiment was dedicated to gathering initial 
thoughts on enterprise security. As the primary research trend in the security area 
is hardware/software security, we expected similar results from enterprise pre-
senters too. However, one person only mentioned threats related to hardware and 
software vulnerabilities (see Table 4.11). It is interesting the enterprise owners 
only mention the lack of resources as the main threat to security. The opinion the 
lack of resources is the foremost important remains even after the introduction to 
the ISM framework, however before the experiment, they noted the need of 
money; meanwhile, after the experiment they mention the lack of time, additional 
work.  
Analyzing the changes of opinion on main threats before and after the exper-
iment, it is noted that the person, who stated the hardware/software vulnerabilities 
are the most important, now thinks the security policies and stakeholders are the 
most important. The stakeholders were not mentioned as a threat before the ex-
periment; meanwhile, after the experiment, two persons say it in the second place. 
This is interesting as the ISM framework adds communication with stakeholder 
as one of the components, which have to be considered in ISM. 
The two presenters of the biggest enterprises in the experiment stayed with 
the same opinion – the security policies are the main component in enterprise se-
curity. From these results, it seems the medium or bigger enterprise has no bene-
fits from the ISM framework as they stay with the same opinion. 
Table 4.11. Framework usability experiments summarized data 
Enterprise data Answers on main threats in the enterprise 
Number 
of em-
ployees 
Position of 
enterprise pre-
senter 
Is there IS 
department? Before the frame-work usage 
After the framework 
usage 
2 Owner,  
programmer 
No Lack of resources Lack of resources, spe-
cifics of the enterprise 
10 Programmer No Hardware/ 
software 
Security policies, 
stakeholders 
12 Owner,  
designer 
No Lack of resources Lack of resources, 
stakeholders 
~200 Programmer Yes Security policies Security policies 
~300 Quality assur-
ance engineer 
Yes Security policies Security policies 
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However, the enterprises were the two persons work, has a department, re-
sponsible for security assurance in the enterprise. The ISM is executed in these 
enterprises; therefore, the persons are introduced with the security management 
process in the enterprise. This means the proposed ISMF is capable even within a 
short period to reflect the same main ideas of ISM as departments, responsible for 
ISM in the enterprise. 
As well the fact persons from bigger enterprises stay with the same opinion 
does not mean the introduction with the proposed ISM frameworks was useless. 
Both persons from the biggest enterprises in the discussion are not responsible for 
the ISM in the enterprise; however, both were interested in different tools, which 
allows security modeling. Those two persons were not sure what should be the 
initial values of the model, how to apply it, but valued the ability to measure the 
influence of enterprise process and IT infrastructure parameters and mentioned 
this could be used as reasoning tool during the personnel teaching (in the security 
area).   
The presenters of small and micro enterprise mentioned the framework and 
tools are useful for security level incensement in the enterprise, however, would 
like to have even more automated systems, with recommendations how exactly 
the current situation should be improved. 
4.3. Conclusions of the Fourth Chapter  
1. The comparison of experts ranking and modeling results revealed high 
correlation (up to 0.97) between experts ranking and ranking, obtained by 
ordering modeling results. This proves the proposed model is suitable to 
be used in practice in order to replace experts ranking. 
2. In executed experiments the cumulative enterprise security level varies 
between 21% and 76% for different situations. The range size is wider 
and similar to integrity values (it ranges between 47% and 92%) as the 
range of values for data leakage and availability is 19–21%. This fact 
shows the most sensitive security component is integrity for this enter-
prise. 
3. The executed experiments are not enough to prove the precision of pro-
posed models as there are no unified measures and experts used ranking. 
However, the models are accuracy as in all except one expert’s evaluation 
had a very close ranking. This show the proposed models can be used for 
comparison on multiple situations in order to define the better one accord-
ing to the data confidentiality, availability or integrity.  
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4. Analysis of a person’s opinion on main security threats in his or her en-
terprise showed the proposed ISM frameworks and usage of recom-
mended tools allows understanding of security policies importance.  
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General Conclusions 
1. The analysis of existing tools and frameworks revealed the lack of solutions, 
dedicated to SME. Existing solutions concentrate on some specific areas of 
information security or require an in-depth analysis of provided recommen-
dations and management guidelines. Therefore, it would be difficult to adapt 
existing solutions in SME for a person with insufficient knowledge in infor-
mation security.  
2. The newly proposed information security management framework consoli-
dates main principles of information security insurance as well add a bigger 
concentration to different type stakeholders. The attention to stakeholders’ 
existence ensures the information security will reflect the total information 
security level rather than the situation of isolated from outside communication 
enterprise while integrated PDCA cycles assure sustainable information tech-
nology security in the enterprise. 
3. The proposed models for information security estimation (data leakage, data 
integrity, and data availability) are based on probability theory and its results 
in analyzed situations closely correlate (up to 0.97) to experts ranking. Experts 
provided situations rankings and not metrics for security level estimation; 
therefore, experiment result confirms the accuracy of these models. 
4. Proposed analytic hierarchy process in multi-criteria decision making defines 
weights for information security management framework evaluation criteria 
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which usage is more suitable for ISM framework ranking than not weighted 
sum of criteria values.  
5. Proposed multi-criteria evaluation method defines a quantitative score of ISM 
framework suitability to be applied in small and medium enterprise. Accord-
ing to the score, the newly proposed ISM framework outperforms other frame-
works (our framework reaches 72%, while the next best fullness is 69% only). 
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Summary in Lithuanian 
Įvadas 
Problemos formulavimas  
Informacijos sauga yra vienas esminių kiekvienos įmonės ar organizacijos saugos aspektų. 
Visi įmonės duomenys turi būti prieinami sėkmingam operacijų vykdymui, paslaugų 
klientams teikimui. Įmonė privalo užtikrinti savo ir savo klientų duomenų 
konfidencialumą ir vientisumą. Šių funkcijų užtikrinimui didelės įmonės įsteigia atskirus 
departamentus. Tuo tarpu mažos ir vidutinės įmonės neturi tam pakankamai resursų, nors 
privalo kovoti su tomis pačiomis saugos grėsmėmis, kaip ir didelės. 
Įmonėse visą informacinių technologijų priežiūrą ir valdymą atlieka informacinių 
technologijų padaliniai, arba, priklausomai nuo įmonės dydžio, tai gali daryti ir vos vienas 
asmuo. Informacijos saugos valdymui reikia specifinių žinių ir įgūdžių, tačiau vien jų 
nepakanka. Bet kokiu atveju, vien žmogiškųjų išteklių neužtenka, todėl papildomi 
įrankiai, skirti mažoms ir vidutinėms įmonėms, gali pagerinti situaciją, ir iš dalies 
automatizuoti procesus ar netgi veikti kaip informacijos saugos valdymo sprendimų 
priėmimo sistema. Tačiau sistema, padedanti smulkiam ir vidutiniam verslui spręsti 
informacijos saugos valdymo problemas kol kas neegzistuoja, nes nėra pakankamai 
plačių, informacijos saugos valdymo karkasų bei metodų, skirtų informacijos iš dalies 
automatizuotam saugos vertinimui.  
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Darbo aktualumas  
Egzistuoja daug įvairių įrankių bei standartų, skirtų informacijos saugos reglamentavimui, 
rizikos vertinimui ir valdymui. Tačiau dauguma šių įrankių nėra pritaikyti mažoms ir 
vidutinėms įmonėms ir dengia tik dalį informacijos saugos valdymo procesų. Todėl 
pritaikyti šiuos įrankius praktikoje yra ganėtinai sudėtingas ir ištekliams imlus uždavinys. 
Tik iš dalies adaptuojamų informacijos saugos įrankių ar informacijos saugos valdymo 
sistemos netinkamas palaikymas ar apskritai jo nebuvimas gali baigtis padidėjusiu įmonės 
informacijos saugos pažeidžiamumu, sugadintais įmonės duomenimis ar paslaugomis, 
įmonės veiklos sutrikimu, žala įmonės klientams, partneriams, sistemoms, ir kt. 
Suteikiant mažai ir vidutinei įmonei labai koncentruotus ir savalaikius informacijos 
saugos valdymo įrankius, įmonė gali atsilaikyti prieš naujausias saugos grėsmes ir 
užtikrinti įmonės informacijos saugumą net resursų informacijos saugos valdymui 
trūkumo atveju. 
Tyrimų objektas  
Darbo tyrimų objektas  –  informacijos saugos valdymo karkasai, kuriuos pajėgus taikyti 
mažas ir vidutinis verslas. 
Darbo tikslas  
Pagrindinis disertacijos tikslas yra pagerinti informacijos saugos valdymo karkasų 
ekosistemą, pasiūlant informacijos saugos valdymo karkasą, kuriame išplėsti 
suinteresuotų šalių ir mažam bei vidutiniam verslui pritaikytų įrankių sąrašai.   
Darbo uždaviniai  
Darbo tikslui pasiekti ir mokslinei problemai spręsti darbe iškelti šie uždaviniai:  
1. Išanalizuoti egzistuojančius informacijos saugos valdymo karkasus; 
2. Patobulinti esamus arba sukurti naują informacijos saugos valdymo karkasą, 
kuris apimtų aukšto lygmens procesus ir išorines suinteresuotas šalis; 
3. Sudaryti pasiūlyto informacijos saugos valdymo karkaso įgyvendinimui 
reikiamus saugos vertinimo modelius, siekiant automatizuoti ir supaprastinti 
karkaso naudojimą mažoms ir vidutinėms įmonėms; 
4. Įvertinti pasiūlyto informacijos saugos valdymo karkaso ir siūlomų įrankių 
tinkamumą mažo ir vidutinio verslo informacijos saugos valdymo tobulinimui.  
Tyrimų metodika  
Darbe taikomi lyginamosios analizės ir literatūros analizės metodai naudoti siekiant 
išanalizuoti informacijos saugos valdymą ir egzistuojančius informacijos saugos valdymo 
karkasus. Eksperimentinių tyrimų metodai naudojami pagrįsti pasiūlytų informacijos 
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saugos valdymo idėjų tinkamumą. Klasifikavimo ir statistikos metodai buvo naudojami 
tyrimų ir analizių rezultatų apdorojimui bei pateikimui.  
Darbo mokslinis naujumas  
Darbo mokslinis naujumas pagrįstas šiais rezultatais:  
1. Sudarytas naujas informacijos saugos valdymo karkasas, susisteminantis esmines 
informacijos saugos valdymo praktikas bei apjungiantis visus suinteresuotų šalių 
tipus, siekiant užtikrinti informacijos saugos valdymą. Siūlomo karkaso 
pritaikomumas mažam ir vidutiniam verslui padidinamas pateikiant tam 
reikalingų įrankių sąrašą; 
2. Parengti informacijos saugos įvertinimo modeliai, padedantys atvaizduoti 
informacijos srautų ir žmogiškųjų faktorių poveikį informacijos saugai. Šio 
modelio naudojimas leidžia įvertinant tiek techninės ir programinės įrangos, tiek 
informacijos srautų bei žmogiškojo faktoriaus įtaką informacijos saugos lygiui. 
Darbo rezultatų praktinė reikšmė  
Pasiūlytas informacijos saugos valdymo karkasas, kartu su naujai pasiūlytais ir jau 
egzistuojančiais įrankiais,  reikalauja mažiau resursų, siekiant įvertinti ir sumodeliuoti  
mažos ir vidutinės įmonės informacijos saugos valdymą. Maža ir vidutinė įmonė, 
naudodama pasiūlytą karkasą ir įrankius gali sumažinti išlaidas informacijos saugos 
valdymui, nes nereikalingas ekspertinis vertinimas. Siūlomų įrankių pagalba maža ir 
vidutinė įmonė gali palaikyti pakankamą ar net didinti įmonės saugos lygį, nes 
naudodamasi įrankiais, o ne ekspertų vertinimu, gali paprasčiau modeliuoti skirtingas 
situacijas ir jas lyginti tarpusavyje. 
Ginamieji teiginiai  
1. Įvairių tipų suinteresuotų šalių įtraukimas į Informacijos saugos valdymo karkasą 
leidžia užtikrinti platesnę informacijos saugos valdymo sritį įmonėje ir padidinti 
saugos politikos svarbos suvokimą saugos užtikinimui; 
2. Tikimybiniai metodai leidžia mažo ir vidutinio verslo atvejais nustatyti 
informacijos saugos lygį ir pakeisti ekspertų atliekamą informacijos saugos rizikų 
vertinimą, taip sumažinant Informacijos saugos valdymo kaštus; 
3. Informacijos saugos valdymo karkasų tinkamumo taikyti mažame ir vidutiniame 
versle įvertinimui reikalinga daugiakriterinė analizė ir hierarchinis analizės 
procesas (AHP). 
Darbo rezultatų aprobavimas  
Disertacijos tema yra parengti trys moksliniai straipsniai mokslo žurnaluose, įtrauktuose į 
Clarivate Analytics Web of Science duomenų̨ bazę. Vienas iš šių žurnalų turi citavimo 
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rodiklį, o du jo neturi. Disertacijos rezultatai buvo aprobuoti dviejose tarptautinėse 
konferencijose: 
1. The 1st IEEE Workshop on Advances in Information, Electronic and Electrical 
Engineering AIEEE’13, Ryga, Latvija, Lapkričio 26–27, 2013; 
2. IEEE International Conference, Hamburgas, Vokietija, Spalio 4, 2018. 
Disertacijos struktūra  
Disertaciją sudaro įvadas, keturi pagrindiniai skyriai, bendrosios išvados, literatūros 
šaltinių sąrašas, autoriaus publikacijų disertacijos tema sąrašas, santrauka lietuvių kalba. 
Darbo apimtis – 114 puslapių neskaitant priedų, tekste yra 37 paveikslai ir 11 lentelių. 
Rašant disertaciją buvo panaudota 141 literatūros šaltinis.  
1. Informacijos saugos valdymas ir egzistuojantys 
informacijos saugos valdymo karkasai  
Informacijos saugos valdymas apima įrankius, ryšius, sąveikas, dokumentaciją, duomenis, 
technologines ir kitas priemones, kurios padeda užtikrinti minimalų informacijos saugos 
rizikos lygmenį organizacijos vykstančių procesų tiek viduje, tiek išorėje, kartu 
užtikrinant veiklos nenutrūkstamumą. Išlaikant sisteminius ir savalaikius informacijos 
saugos valdymo procesus, organizacija yra pajėgi apsaugoti savo  jautrius duomenis, 
sistemas nuo įsilaužimo, informacijos nutekėjimo ar kitų neigiamų faktorių, kaip, pvz., 
žmogiškų klaidų, tyčinių ar netyčinių veiksmų.  
Disertacijoje dėmesys kreipiamas į tris pagrindinius informacijos saugos aspektus – 
konfidencialumas, vientisumas ir prieinamumas. ISO/IEC 27000 informacijos saugos 
valdymo sistemų standartų grupė Konfidencialumą apibrėžia kaip “Informacija negali būti 
prieinama ar atskleidžiama autorizuotos prieigos neturintiems asmenims, organizacijoms 
ar procesams”. Vientisumo principo laikymasis užtikrina, kad informacija nebus pakeista 
nesankcionuotu būdu, sugadinta arba visiškai prarasta. Galiausiai, Prieinamumo principas 
reiškia, kad informaciniai duomenys bet kada turi būti prieinami autorizuotiems 
asmenims. 
Darbe buvo atlikta sisteminė literatūros analizė, iš dalies vadovaujantis 
B. Kitchenham (2007) pasiūlyta metodika. Literatūros šaltinių paieška buvo vykdoma 
skaitmeninėse bibliotekose, tokiose, kaip ACM, InterScience, Google scholar, IEEE 
Explore, Inspec, ISI Web of Science, ScienceDirect, SpringerLink. Disertacijoje literatūros 
apžvalgos dalyje ypatingas dėmesys buvo skirtas straipsniams, kuriuose pateikiami tam 
tikri konkretūs sprendimai/karkasai informacijos saugos valdymui. Iš viso buvo atlikta 80 
straipsnių išsami analizė, pradedant 1998 ir baigiant 2016 metais. Vienas žymesnių 
autorių, itin daug dėmesio skyręs informacijos saugos valdymui – R. Von Solms. 
Mokslininkas analizavo ne tik informacijos saugos valdymo procesus, tačiau ir ruošė 
metodikas  informacinių technologijų saugos sistemoms, vykdė įvairius standartų ir 
metodikų tyrimus. Apibendrinant literatūros straipsnių grupes pagal populiarumą, galima 
teigti, kad pirmąją vietą užima rizikų valdymo tema. Antroje vietoje – straipsniai, 
dedikuoti standartų ir metodologijų tyrimams. Trečioje vietoje lieka tyrimai, skirti 
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integruotų sistemų platformoms, informacinių sistemų koncepciniams modeliams, 
karkasams. Nuo 2014 m. nebuvo identifikuota iš esmės naujų informacijos saugos 
valdymo modelių, buvo analizuojamos tik tam tikros  specifinės sritys. 
Verslo poreikiams sukurtas ne vienas informacijos saugos valdymo 
modelis/karkasas. Karkasus siūlo mokslininkai, visuotinai pripažintos organizacijos, 
verslo kompanijos, vyriausybių institucijos, atsakingos už informacinius išteklius  ir kt. 
Visi šie karkasai koncentruojasi į tam tikrą sritį, turi savus specifiškumus. Disertacijoje 
analizuojami ir tarpusavyje palyginami labiausiai su disertacijos tema susiję informacijos 
saugos valdymo karkasai. Vieni žymesnių – SABSA modelis, kurį pasiūlė John 
Sherwood, Andrew Clark ir David Lynas (Sherwood et al., 2005) bei Pietų Australijos 
Vyriausybės 2014 metais parengtas Informacijos saugos valdymo karkasas. Abu šie 
modeliai pateikia aiškią karkaso architektūrą bei įvardina konkrečius žingsnius jo 
diegimui organizacijoje. Tačiau nepaisant šių karkasų išsamumo, pirmasis nėra holistinis 
ir neapima ITIL standarto 4P elementų (People, Process, Products, Partners), o antrasis 
yra orientuotas į valstybės įmones, todėl sunkiai pritaikomas mažose ir vidutinėse 
įmonėse. 
Karkasų analizė parodė, kad daugiausia jie yra vieno lygmens – organizacijos arba 
informacijos saugos sistemų. Tai tik patvirtino iškeltą idėją, jog trūksta informacijos 
saugos valdymo karkaso, kuris atspindėtų šių dienų organizacijų įvairiapusiškumą. 
Dauguma modelių gali būti pritaikyti tik vienai ar keletui organizacijos dalių/lygmenų, 
kai tuo tarpu kiti, apimantys visą organizaciją, yra labai abstraktūs, neįvertina 
suinteresuotų šalių integracijos, partnerių ryšių, išorinės komunikacijos. 
Apžvelgiant Lietuvos autorių, tyrinėjančių informacijos saugos valdymą, mokslinius 
darbus, galima išskirti S. Jastiugino, R. Matulevičiaus, A. Čenio, R. Rainio, N. Goranin, 
S. Ramanauskaitės darbus. Sisteminę valstybės informacinių sistemų saugos valdymo 
analizę-auditą atlieka Valstybės kontrolė.  
Apibendrinant galima teigti, kad tyrimų rezultatuose informacijos saugos valdymo 
modeliai užima nemenką dalį, deja ne visi jie atspindi sritis, kurios turėtų būti įtrauktos 
organizuojant informacijos saugos valdymą. Vienas esminių elementų, kuris nėra 
atspindėtas – visų suinteresuotų grupių įtraukimas ir jų poveikio organizacijos 
informacijos saugos valdymui nustatymas. 
2. Siūlomas informacijos saugos valdymo karkasas 
Šiame skyriuje pateikiamas naujas Informacijos saugos valdymo karkasas (ISMF). Šiame 
skyriuje pateikta analizė buvo publikuota 2017 m. (Kauspadiene et al., 2017). 
Naujos kartos informacijos saugos valdymo metu būtina atsižvelgti į šiuolaikinių 
organizacijų specifiką, jų veiklos principus ir tai, kad jos turi daugybę partnerių, naudojasi 
bendradarbiavimo sistemomis ir platformomis, perka paslaugas iš trečiųjų šalių (angl. out-
sourcing) ir kt. Visi šie aspektai reikalauja plataus požiūrio į informacijos saugos valdymą. 
Siekiant užtikrinti įmonės saugą, turi būti atsižvelgta į platų suinteresuotų šalių ratą. 
Pasiūlytame karkase naudojamos 7 suinteresuotų šalių kategorijos, neskirstant jų 
lygmenimis ar formomis: korporatyvinis valdymas, reguliaciniai mechanizmai, 
profesionalai, IT korporacijos, programuotojai, akademinė bendruomenė, išorės 
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elementai. Visos šios suinteresuotų šalių grupės gali būti padalintos į dar smulkesnes. 
Disertacijoje pateikiami jų aprašymai, interesų laukai, atsakomybės sritys. Pasiūlytas 
karkasas integruoja pagrindinius informacijos saugos valdymo elementus, kurie, kartu su 
sąsajomis pavaizduoti S2.1 paveiksle. Organizacijos procesų stebėsenai ir valdymui 
siūloma taikyti karinę doktriną C2 (Command and Control), o produkcijos ar paslaugų 
teikimo užtikrinimui ir nenutrūkstamumui siūloma nuolatos taikyti gerąsias praktikas. 
 
 
S2.1 pav. Informacijos saugos valdymo karkaso pagrindiniai organizacinio lygmens elementai 
Karkaso veikimo patikimumo ir tęstinumo užtikrinimui buvo pasitelktas Demingo 
ciklas Plan-Do-Check-Act, kuris buvo integruotas į organizacijos saugos lygmenį. Ši 
integracija pavaizduota S2.2 paveiksle. Priklausomai nuo taikymo kriterijų, atitinkami 
standartai ir metodikos turi būti pritaikomi organizacijos informacijos saugos valdymui. 
Karkase pavaizduota informacijos saugos platforma apima fizinius įrankius, naudojamus 
informacijos saugos sistemos įdiegimui. Dažniausiai informacijos saugos platforma 
priklauso nuo organizacijos techninių galimybių bei profesionalų, kurie geba tuos įrankius 
tinkamai valdyti, kas apima ne tik jų kasdieninį valdymą, bet ir organizacijos informacijos 
srautų analizę, veikimo kontrolę, reagavimą į trikdžius ir kt.  
 
S2.2 pav. Pagrindiniai organizacijos saugos lygmens komponentai 
SUMMARY IN LITHUANIAN 121 
 
Norint tinkamai suprasti ryšius tarp organizacijos saugos lygmenų komponentų ir 
informacijos saugos valdymo suinteresuotų šalių bei jų atsakomybių ar funkcijų, kurias 
jie atlieka, buvo identifikuotos keturios papildomos dalys: (1) prevencija (kibernetinės 
erdvės stebėsena programinės įrangos lygmenyje; stebėsena vykdoma vadovaujantis 
teisės aktais ir susideda iš kontrolės ir informacijos elementų, nes tai yra esminės 
prevencijos komponentai, nusakantys duomenų nutekėjimą, pažeidžiamumą ir t.t.); (2) 
reguliaciniai mechanizmai (juos išleidžia vyriausybės, ministerijos ar kitos įsakymų 
leidimo galią turinčios organizacijos, o mechanizmų diegimas vykdomas kibernetinės 
erdvės stebėsenos ir fizinės infrastruktūros lygmenyse, įtraukiant kontrolės ir informacijos 
elementus tam, kad būtų užtikrintas procesų atitikimas nacionalinei ir tarptautinei teisei 
(asmens duomenų apsauga, audito procedūros, kibernetinę erdvę reglamentuojantys teisės 
aktai ir kt.); (3) sistemos (programuotojų bendruomenės kuriama programinė įranga); (4) 
įranga (IT korporacijų, gamintojų tiekiama techninė įranga techniniam lygmeniui tarnauja 
korporatyvinio valdymo aspektu, užtikrinant kritinės infrastruktūros saugą). 
S2.3 paveiksle pateiktas karkasas – naujas požiūris, atliepiantis informacijos saugos 
valdymo procesuose kylančius iššūkius ir itin tinkantis mažoms ir vidutinėms įmonėms. 
Keturios karkaso dalys atliepia atsparią (angl. resilient) kibernetinės saugos sistemą, kuri 
paremta tarpusavyje susijusiais sąveikaujančiais tinklais. Pasiūlytas informacijos saugos 
valdymo karkasas yra puikus įrankis informacijos saugos specialistams ir kitiems 
praktikams ruošiant organizacijoms jų informacinės saugos planus ar programas.    
 
S2.3 pav. Informacijos saugos valdymo karkasas 
Pasiūlytas karkasas apibrėžia pagrindinius reikalavimus mažai ir vidutinei įmonei, 
jos informacijos saugai. Karkaso diegimo metodas labai patogus naudoti naujai 
kuriamoms ar įkurtoms įmonėms. Tuo tarpu įmonėms su jau nusistovėjusia politika, 
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valdymo struktūra, gali tekti atlikti vertinimą, siekiant nustatyti kiek procedūrų reikia 
atlikti, kad pilnai ar iš dalies įdiegtų karkasą savo organizacijoje. Šiuo tikslu buvo 
paruoštas klausimynas, leidžiantis įvertinti įmonės pasirengimą karkaso diegimui. 
Kiekvieno klausimo tiksliam ir išsamiam atsakymui buvo parinkti laisvai prieinami 
įrankiai, kurie padeda objektyviai pateikti atsakymą, išvengiant subjektyvių asmeninių 
nuomonių. Klausimui „Ar organizacija optimizuoja valdymo ir operacinio (kasdienės 
veiklos) lygmens procesus?“ nebuvo rasta tinkamų įrankių, todėl organizacija turėtų 
subjektyviai įvertinti savo pastangas ar jų trūkumą/nebuvimą šioje srityje. Siekiant 
išvengti subjektyvių vertinimų, kurie galėtų daryti įtaką MVĮ informacijos saugos 
valdymui, kyla poreikis plėtoti naujus informacijos saugos modelius, leidžiančius vertinti 
informacijos srautų įtaką bendrai įmonės ar organizacijos informacijos saugai. 
3. Informacijos saugos vertinimo įrankiai, skirti mažam ir 
vidutiniam verslui  
Trečiajame skyriuje pateikiama informacijos saugos įrankių vertinimo analizė bei 
pasiūlomi nauji modeliai. Daugiapakopis organizacijos modeliavimas turi tris aspektus 
(U. Frank, 2014) – strategija, organizacija, informacinė sistema. Jie gali būti 
modeliuojami dar keturiais skirtingais aspektais: resursai, struktūra, procesai, tikslai. 
Kombinuojant šiuos aspektus tarpusavyje galima gauti 12 skirtingų organizacijos 
modeliavimo būdų. 
Anksčiau informacijos sauga buvo laikoma atskira modeliavimo sritimi. Tačiau 
naujausios tendencijos rodo, kad tikslus saugos vertinimas turi būti tarpdisciplininis. 
Todėl informacijos saugos integracija į organizacijos modeliavimą yra būtina, įvertinant 
tai, kad organizacijos yra labai, o kartais ir visiškai priklausomos nuo informacinių 
technologijų. Taip pat darbe apžvelgiami tokie įrankiai kaip CySeMoL (Cyber Security 
Modeling Language), UML plėtiniai (UMLsec, SecureUML), Petri tinklai ir kt. 
Atkreiptinas dėmesys, jog nepavyko identifikuoti įrankių leidžiančių modeliuoti 
organizacijos procesų ar valdymo struktūros saugumo lygmenis. 
Darbe pasiūlyti organizacijos valdymo struktūros modeliai, atsižvelgiantys į 
informacijos saugą (konfidencialumas, prieinamumas, vientisumas). Modeliuose įvertinta 
tiek organizacijos vadyba, tiek informacijos srautai. Modeliai labiau yra orientuoti į 
vadybą nei į technines organizacijos savybes, todėl dengia tą modeliavimo dalį, kuri 
dažnai yra praleidžiama modeliuojant organizacijos informacijos saugą. 
Pasiūlyti modeliai saugos lygio įvertinimui naudoja sąvoką „subordinaciniai srautai“. 
Jie nustato organizacijos valdymo mazgų, atsakingų už informacijos tiekimą, tarpusavio 
pavaldumą, kas iš daleis atitinka skirtingus saugos lygmenis. 
Organizacijos valdymo struktūros meta modelis pateikiamas S3.1 paveiksle. Jį 
sudaro  keturios pagrindinės klasės: 
1. Valdymo mazgas (ManagementNode) – nurodo organizacijos valdymo 
struktūros elementą). Tai gali būti individas arba departamentas. Priklausomai 
nuo šio mazgo tipo, yra būtina papildoma informacija, specifikuojanti 
departamento žmonių skaičių, jų pozicijas organizacijoje ir kt.; 
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2. Subordinacinis srautas (SubordinationFlow) jungia du valdymo mazgus ir 
suteikia informaciją kuris valdymo mazgas yra tiekiantis informaciją, o kuris – 
valdantysis; 
3. Informacijos objektas (InformationObject) apibrėžia objektą, kuris bus 
siunčiamas organizacijai arba bus jos valdomas. Šis objektas yra susietas su 
subordinaciniu srautu tam, kad būtų aišku, kokia komanda bus naudojama 
informacijos perdavimui; 
4. Informacijos srauto (InformationFlow) objektas apsprendžia informacijos 
perdavimą iš vieno Valdymo mazgo į kitą. Šiame procese aplinka gali lemti 
informacijos nuotėkius.  
 
 
S.3.1 pav. Organizacijos valdymo struktūros modeliavimo meta modelis 
Šis meta modelis leidžia sekti informacijos srautus, keliaujančius nuo vieno mazgo 
prie kito ir taip vertinti kokios savybės kiekvieno veiksmo metu ar mazgo viduje gali keisti 
atitinkamą saugos komponento (CIA) reikšmę. 
Darbe taip pat pateikti pasiūlyto modelio duomenų nutekėjimo tikimybės 
skaičiavimai duomenų perdavimo metu, per tam tikrą organizacijos mazgą (individą, jų 
grupę ar tam tikrą departamentą).  
Toliau darbe pateikiamas prieinamumo įvertinimo modelis. Duomenų prieinamumas 
priklauso nuo galimų duomenų šaltinių. Jei yra keletas jų, nors ir vienas yra neprieinamas, 
galima naudotis kitu, kuris duotuoju momentu yra prieinamas. Tai reiškia, kad duomenų 
prieinamumas apskritai gali būti apskaičiuojamas kaip tikimybė, jog nors vienas duomenų 
šaltinis tam tikru momentu yra prieinamas. Pirmasis žingsnis vertinant prieinamumą yra 
organizacijos informacijos valdymo struktūros nustatymas. Sekantis žingsnis – nustatyti 
informacijos objektus. Vartotojas nustato kiekvieną informacijos objektą pagal jo 
informacijos srautus ir tam tikrus tų srautų parametrus. Trečiame žingsnyje informacijos 
objektas padalinamas į skirtingas versijas, ir čia informacijos apdorojimo seka atlieka 
pagrindinį vaidmenį. Padalinus informacijos objektą į keletą versijų, kiekvieno objekto 
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versijų duomenų prieinamumas priklauso nuo prieš tai buvusios versijos prieinamumo. 
Galiausiai ketvirtame žingsnyje analizuojamas kiekvienos objekto versijos prieinamumas.  
Formuojant vientisumo vertinimo modelį buvo išskirti trys jį lemiantys veiksniai: 
informacijos saugojimo aplinka, informacijos perdavimo aplinka ir žmogiškieji veiksniai. 
Darbe pateikti du atvejai – linijinis informacijos perdavimas bei išsišakojantis 
informacijos srauto tekėjimas. Abiem atvejais itin jautrus yra žmogiškojo faktoriaus 
elementas, tuo tarpu informacijos saugojimas ir perdavimas orientuojamas į organizacijos 
IT infrastruktūrą naudojant CySeMoL EAAT ar kurį kitą įrankį. 
4. Siūlomų modelių ir karkaso validavimo rezultatai  
Ankstesniame skyriuje buvo pasiūlyti informacijos saugos lygmens apskaičiavimo 
modeliai, o šis skyrius yra skirtas jų validavimui analizuojant tam tikras situacijas bei 
pateikiant ekspertines nuomones.  
Modelių validavimui buvo atliktas eksperimentas, kurio rezultatais remiantis buvo 
analizuojami vienos organizacijos skirtingi valdymo būdai – hierarchinis (tradicinis), 
kuomet informacija didžiąja dalimi perduodama vertikaliais kanalais, ir horizontalus, 
kuomet informacija dažniausiai perduodama tinkliniu būdu. Iš viso eksperimentui buvo 
paruošti 8 informacijos perdavimo variantai. Eksperimento rezultatų validavimui buvo 
pasirinktas ekspertinis vertinimas. Tyrimui buvo atrinkta 15 asmenų, dirbančių 
informacijos saugos srityje. Juos įvertinus pagal tam tikrus kriterijus buvo atrinkti aštuoni 
ekspertai tolimesniam ekspertiniam vertinimui. Ekspertams buvo pateikti organizacijos 
pavyzdžiai bei galimi informacijos perdavimo organizacijos viduje variantai. Situacijų 
įvertinimui ekspertai galėjo savo nuožiūra pasirinkti vertinimo įrankius ir metodikas. 
Buvo skirta viena savaitė sureitinguoti informacijos srautus pagal konfidencialumą, 
vientisumą ir prieinamumą. Ekspertinę nuomonę pateikė šeši ekspertai iš aštuonių. 
Disertacijoje pateikti skaitiniai informacijos saugos vertinimo rezultatai atsižvelgiant 
į atliktus duomenų nutekėjimo, prieinamumo ir vientisumo vertinimus. Kiekvienas iš šių 
aspektų buvo vertintas pagal organizacijos valdymo struktūrą (hierarchinė – su ir be 
departamentinio valdymo bei horizontali – su ir be departamentinio valdymo). Kiekvienu 
atveju buvo vertinamos šios informacijos srautų grupės: 
• Organizacijos strategija – vadovybės inicijuojama, perleidžiama vadovaujančiam 
personalui, dalinamasi su klientais; 
• Veiklos ataskaita – atskiros dalys generuojamos vadovaujančio personalo, 
perleidžiama vadovybei ir finansų departamentui; 
• Projekto idėja – su į klientus orientuotomis projektų idėjomis dalinamasi su 
vadovaujančiu personalu, darbuotojais; 
• Pradinė projekto kaina – iš dalies sugeneruotą kainą dizaino ir programavimo 
departamentai (asmenys) siunčia ją vadovaujančiam personalui, šis apdoroja 
informaciją pagal organizacijos strategiją, įvertina resursus, maržą, ir siunčia ją 
klientui; 
• Detalūs reikalavimai projektui – kliento suformuluoti ir su vadovybe pasidalinti 
reikalavimai užduočiai atlikti; 
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• Naudotojų serverių prisijungimo duomenys – IT padalinys suformuoja 
prisijungimo duomenis ir siunčia juos programuotojams (tiesiogiai arba per 
vadovybę); 
• Sukurtos sistemos dizainas – dizaineris sukuria dizainą ir siunčia jį 
programuotojui, šis integruoja jį į programos kodą ir siunčia vadovaujančiam 
personalui, kuris pristato rezultatą klientui; 
• Sistemos kodas – programuotojas, pasinaudodamas serverio prisijungiamais 
įdiegia sistemos dizainą, tada siunčia pirminį kodą vadovaujančiam personalui, 
o pastarasis jį pristato klientui. 
Darbo ketvirtajame skyriuje pateikti ekspertinio reitingavimo palyginimai ir 
modeliavimo rezultatai atskleidė aukštą (0,97) tarpusavio koreliaciją. Tačiau vienas 
ekspertas pateikė vieną absoliučiai nekoreliuojančią (-0,06) nuomonę duomenų 
prieinamumo įvertinimui. Tikėtina, jog šis rezultatas galėjo būti įtakotas klaidinančios 
konfidencialumo ir prieinamumo elementų kombinacijos.  
Skirtingų saugos komponentų (konfidencialumas, vientisumas, prieinamumas) 
intervalai pateikti S4.1 paveiksle, kur visos reikšmės pateiktos atsižvelgiant į 
suskaičiuotas saugos tikimybes. Visi trys komponentai turi linijinį priklausomumą, tuo 
tarpu konfidencialumo ir prieinamumo nuolydžiai yra labai panašūs (0,38 
konfidencialumui ir 0,32 prieinamumui), o vientisumo nuolydis yra ženkliai aukštesnis 
(0,95). Tai parodo, kad vientisumo vertinimo rezultatai yra labai išsibarstę ir turi didesnius 
verčių diapazonus. 
  
 
S.4.1 pav. Ryšiai tarp modeliuotų duomenų konfidencialumo, vientisumo ir konfidencialumo 
verčių, surūšiuoti pagal apskaičiuotas bendras saugumo vertes 
Nors atlikti eksperimentai nėra pakankami, norint įrodyti pasiūlytų modelių rezultatų 
tikslumą, nes buvo taikomas neunifikuotas ekspertinis vertinimas, tačiau modeliai 
pademonstravo rezultatų panašumą su ekspertų vertinimais, kada didžioji dalis modelio 
rezultatų koreliuoja su ekspertų nuomone. Tai rodo, kad pasiūlyti modeliai tinkami 
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naudoti skirtingų situacijų palyginimui. Šio palyginimo metu galima nustatyti geriausiąją 
alternatyvą pagal duomenų konfidencialumą, prieinamumą ir vientisumą.  
Pasiūlytas informacijos saugos valdymo karkasas ir jį lydintys modeliai buvo 
sudaryti tam, kad supaprastintų informacijos saugos valdymą mažoje ir vidutinėje 
įmonėje. Taigi, pagrindinis karkaso tinkamumo kriterijus – realus karkaso pritaikymas 
mažoje ir vidutinėje (MVĮ) įmonėje.  
Karkaso suvokimui įvertinti, buvo surengta diskusija su skirtingų organizacijų 
atstovais. Kiekvienam diskusijos dalyviui buvo skirta nuo 2 iki 6 valandų. Diskusija vyko 
tokiais etapais:  
1. Dalyviui buvo pateiktas trumpas klausimynas, siekiant nustatyti jo sąsajas su 
informacijos saugos valdymu ir jo atsakomybes organizacijoje; 
2. Dalyvis buvo paprašytas įvardinti pagrindines informacijos saugos valdymo 
silpnybes ir priemones, kurios padėtų pataisyti situaciją jo/jos organizacijoje; 
3. Diskusijos vykdytojas pristatė dalyviui Informacijos saugos valdymo karkasą ir 
atsakė į dalyviui kylančius klausimus; 
4. Dalyvio buvo paprašyta adaptuoti karkasą pasirinktoje (kurioje dirba) 
organizacijoje. Adaptacija vyko diskusijos forma, buvo naudojami brėžiniai. 
Dalyvis naudojosi visomis galimomis priemonėmis ir įrankiais, galėjo prašyti 
eksperimento vykdytojo pademonstruoti tam tikras situacijas su pasirinktais 
įrankiais. Šis procesas dėl ilgos jo trukmės nebuvo nuolatos stebimas diskusijos 
vykdytojo; 
5. Dalyvis buvo paprašytas atsakyti į diskusijos antrojo etapo klausimus, kad būtų 
galima išsiaiškinti informacijos saugos valdymo supratimo skirtingose 
organizacijose skirtumus; 
6. Diskusijos pabaigoje dalyvis buvo paprašytas apibendrinti patirtį, įgytą 
eksperimento metu. 
S4.1 lentelė. Diskusijoje dalyvavusių asmenų ir jų atsakymų apibendrinti duomenys  
Organizacijos duomenys Respondento nuomone pagrindinės jo įmonei kylančios grėsmės yra 
Darbuotojų 
skaičius 
Dalyvio pareigos 
organizacijoje 
Ar yra už 
saugą 
atsakingas 
padalinys? 
Prieš naudojant 
karkasą 
Po karkaso naudojimo 
(susipažinimo su juo) 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 Savininkas, 
programuotojas 
Ne Resursų stoka Resursų stoka ir įmonės 
veiklos specifika 
10 Programuotojas Ne Techninė/ 
Programinė įranga 
Saugumo politika, jos 
nesilaikymas ir 
suinteresuotų šalių 
nepatikimumas  
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S4.1 lentelės pabaiga 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 Savininkas, 
dizaineris 
Ne Resursų stoka Resursų stoka ir 
suinteresuotų šalių 
nepatikimumas 
~200 Programuotojas Taip Saugumo politika, 
jos nesilaikymas 
Saugumo politika, jos 
nesilaikymas 
~300 Kokybės 
užtikrinimo 
inžinierius 
Taip Saugumo politika, 
jos nesilaikymas 
Saugumo politika, jos 
nesilaikymas 
 
Iš viso diskusijoje dalyvavo penki skirtingų organizacijų darbuotojai. Jų 
atstovaujamose organizacijose dirba nuo 2 iki 300 žmonių (atsakymai buvo 2, 10, 12, 
~200, ~300). Nors dviejų atstovų įmonės yra laikomos mikro įmonėmis, o didelės įmonės 
darbuotojų skaičius viršija 250, vis tik diskusijoje dalyvauti buvo palikti šių, MVĮ 
apibrėžties neatitinkančių, organizacijų atstovai tam, kad patikrinti karkaso tinkamumą ir 
šių dydžių įmonėms.  
Surengta diskusija nesuteikė išsamių duomenų informacijos saugos valdymo karkaso 
taikymo analizei, nes buvo sunku surasti organizacijų, kurios galėtų skirti pakankamai 
laiko ir resursų karkaso diegimui organizacijos viduje. Tačiau gautas grįžtamasis ryšys iš 
penkių diskusijos dalyvių buvo teigiamas, ir parodo, kad karkasas yra nesunkiai 
suprantamas ir gali būti pritaikomas verslo vadovybei priėmus atitinkamus sprendimus. 
Taip pat nustatyta, kad įmonėse, kuriose jau vykdomas informacijos saugos valdymas, 
darbuotojai žino pagrindinius informacijos saugos valdymo principus ir suvokia galimas 
grėsmes, o siūlomame karkase apibendrintos informacijos saugos valdymui svarbios 
vietos (nuomonė pakito tik įmonių atstovams, kuriose nėra saugos valdymo). 
Bendrosios išvados  
1. Informacijos saugos valdymo įrankių ir karkasų analizė atskleidė sprendimų, 
skirtų mažoms ir vidutinėms įmonėms, trūkumą. Aptikti ir nagrinėti sprendimai 
koncentruojasi į tam tikras labai specifines informacijos saugos sritis arba 
reikalauja gilios rekomendacijų ar valdymo gairių analizės. Todėl žmonėms, 
neturintiems pakankamai informacijos saugumo žinių, yra sudėtinga pritaikyti 
šiuos sprendimus mažoje ir vidutinėje įmonėje.  
2. Naujai pasiūlytas informacijos saugos valdymo karkasas apjungia pagrindinius 
informacijos saugumo užtikrinimo principus bei sukuria pridėtinę vertę 
įtraukdamas didesnį ratą skirtingų organizacijos suinteresuotų šalių. Dėmesys 
suinteresuotoms šalims karkase užtikrina, kad informacijos sauga atspindės 
pakankamą informacijos saugos lygmenį, o integruotas PDCA ciklas užtikrins 
informacijos saugos valdymo nenutrūkstamumą organizacijoje. 
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3. Pasiūlytieji informacijos saugos įvertinimo (duomenų nutekėjimas, duomenų 
vientisumas ir prieinamumas) modeliai yra paremti tikimybių teorija ir 
analizuotose situacijose jų rezultatai stipriai koreliuoja (iki 0,97) su ekspertiniu 
vertinimu. Saugos lygio nustatymui ekspertai pateikė ne metrikas, o situacijų 
reitingavimą, todėl modelių tikslumas negali būti visiškai patvirtintas. 
4. Pasiūlytas hierarchinis analizės procesas daugiakriterinei analizei nustato 
informacijos saugos vertinimo kriterijų svarbą, svorius ir leidžia analizuojamus 
informacijos saugos valdymo karkasus reitinguoti taip pat, kaip tai darytų 
ekspertas, kai tuo tarpu vertinamų kriterijų nesvertinė suma neatitinka ekspertų 
vertinimų. 
5. Pasiūlytas daugiakriterinis informacijos saugos valdymo karkasų tinkamumo 
taikyti mažame ir vidutiniame versle metodas išreiškiamas kiekybiniu matu. 
Remiantis šiuo matu lyginami analizuojami informacijos saugos valdymo 
karkasai ir pastebėta, kad naujai pasiūlytas karkasas yra geresnis, nei kiti 
analizuoti karkasai (pasiūlyto karkaso įvertinimas yra 72%, kai tuo tarpu sekantis 
geriausias karkasas pasiekė tik 69 % įvertį). 
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